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Abstract 
 
The thesis examines the dividend puzzle in the context of the Chinese capital market and further 
investigates the factors that significantly affect dividend policy in Chinese listed firms. In Chapter 
two, we examine the announcement effects of dividends in the Chinese capital market, with an 
emphasis on stock dividends. We begin by separately investigating the cumulative abnormal returns 
around the announcements of cash, stock and combined dividends. Because earnings are announced 
concurrently with dividend decisions in China, and therefore the estimated abnormal returns could 
be confounded by the earnings effect, we attempt to examine the dividend announcement effect 
under different earnings signals. We find a strong announcement effect of stock dividends even 
after controlling for concurrent earnings surprises. In contrast, pure cash dividend stocks experience 
no significant price run-up around the announcements. In addition, we examine the difference in 
market reactions to a positive or negative earnings announcement as firms initiate, maintain or 
switch to different forms of payouts. It appears that switching from other types of dividends to stock 
dividends reinforces the earnings signal. 
 
Chapter three examines the effect of corporate governance and stock liquidity on corporate payout 
policy in the context of the split-share structure reform initiated in China in 2005. Under this 
reform, non-tradable shares were compulsorily converted into tradable shares. The reform removed 
a liquidity constraint; it also facilitated better alignment of the interests of controlling shareholders 
with those of outside investors. These changes led to significant improvements in firms’ share 
liquidity and governance. We investigate the implications of share reform-induced governance and 
liquidity improvements for corporate dividend policy. First, we examine how listed firms’ dividend 
policy responds to a governance and liquidity shock (i.e., the split-share structure reform) by 
comparing corporate dividend policy before and after the reform. Second, we explore the channels 
through which the reform affects corporate dividend policy by considering the effect of corporate 
governance and stock liquidity. We find that the average cash dividend payout decreases in the 
post-reform period and that the reduction in cash payouts is more pronounced among firms with 
higher growth rates and higher liquidity. Given the fundamental difference in controlling 
shareholders between state-controlled and privately controlled firms, the reduction in cash payouts 
appears to be more substantial in state-controlled firms. Our results are robust to different time 
horizons surrounding the reform. We also investigate whether the reform affects the decisions of 
firms to pay cash dividends. The results indicate that the propensity to pay cash dividends 
 
 
significantly decreases after the reform. Furthermore, the post-reform period features a decrease in 
the probability of initiating a cash dividend and a greater likelihood of firms omitting cash 
dividends. In addition, firms tend to pay a lower level of dividends in the post-reform period when 
they maintain dividend payments. 
 
In Chapter four, we investigate how a shock to financing capacity affects listed firms’ dividend 
decisions in China, with a focus on financially constrained firms. In particular, we examine the 
change in firms’ propensity to pay cash dividends and the change in the dividend payout ratio after 
a mandatory regulation on financing qualification was released in 2008. As the regulation 
mandatorily associates dividend payment with firms’ external financing qualification, it can be 
regarded as a negative shock to firms’ financing capacity. Measuring financial constraints using a 
synthetic Whited and Wu (2006) index, we observe that the regulation alters the relationship 
between financial constraints and dividend policy. Before the regulation, constrained firms are less 
likely to pay cash dividends than unconstrained firms; when these firms do pay dividends, they tend 
to pay lower dividends. However, this pattern reverses after the regulation comes into effect. 
Financially constrained firms become more willing to pay cash dividends than are unconstrained 
firms, and they also pay higher dividends in relative terms. Furthermore, we find that the behavior 
of financially constrained firms differs from that of unconstrained firms when affected by the shock 
to financing capacity. Constrained firms display a larger post-regulation increase in the propensity 
to pay cash dividends and a smaller post-regulation reduction in cash dividend payout ratios. We 
argue that the increased use of dividends among constrained firms is driven by the desire to enhance 
public financing capacity. Our results confirm this conjecture by demonstrating that financing 
activities in the post-regulation period are concentrated in constrained firms that qualify for public 
financing. 
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 Introduction Chapter 1
Why do firms pay dividends? The irrelevance proposition developed by Miller and Modigliani 
(1961) established the foundation for the contemporary study of dividend policy. Classical M&M 
theory states that what is truly important is a firm’s investment policy and that the dividend is 
merely the residual between earnings and investments and is thus irrelevant to firm value. In 
particular, pure accounting changes, such as stock dividends, should have no significant effect on 
stock prices because shareholders do not actually receive any real cash returns. However, 
considerable empirical evidence shows that both managers and markets are concerned about 
dividends and that firm value changes in a manner consistent with dividend policy. This thesis 
examines this dividend puzzle in the context of the Chinese capital market and further investigates 
the factors that affect dividend policy in Chinese listed firms. 
Prior studies observe a positive relationship between dividend announcements and common 
stock prices. For example, cash dividend initiations (Michaely, Thaler and Womack (1995)) or 
increases (Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan (2002)) are found to have a positive return effect, 
but announcements of stock dividends also have significantly positive announcement effects (e.g., 
Grinblatt, Masulis and Titman (1984)). The majority of the research focuses on the U.S. market, 
while research conducted in less-developed markets is sparse. With its unique institutional setting, 
the Chinese stock market provides an interesting sample for examining this issue. Particularly, 
compared with the U.S., stock dividends are used more widely as a form of payouts in China.  
In Chapter two, we examine the announcement effects of dividends in the Chinese capital 
market, with an emphasis on stock dividends. We begin by separately investigating the cumulative 
abnormal returns around the announcements of cash, stock and combined dividends. Because 
earnings are announced concurrently with dividend decisions in China, and therefore estimated 
abnormal returns could be confounded by the earnings effect, we then attempt to examine the 
dividend announcement effect under different earnings signals. We find a strong announcement 
effect of stock dividends even after controlling for concurrent earnings surprises. By contrast, pure 
cash dividend stocks experience no significant price run-up around the announcements. Our 
multivariate regressions further control for firm size, industry, along with earnings surprises. Our 
results are robust to these controls. Our findings remain unaffected when we define earnings 
surprises as current year profit or as the change in earnings per share from the previous year. Finally, 
we examine the difference in market reactions to a positive or negative earnings announcement as 
firms initiate, continue or switch to different forms of payouts. It appears that switching from other 
types of dividends to stock dividends reinforces the earnings signal.  
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These findings are puzzling in the context of contemporary dividend theories and our 
understanding of the Chinese capital market. One possible explanation for the puzzle is that stock 
dividend is a dual signal of good corporate governance and good future earnings prospect. In 
contrast, cash distributions may be interpreted as negative firm signals, for example, a signal of 
weak governance. This conjecture motivates us to further explore the factors that could affect the 
cash dividend policy of Chinese listed firms in the next two chapters. 
Agency theory suggests that an increase in dividends mitigates agency problems and is 
favorably received by investors because managers will have less free cash flows to invest in 
negative net present value projects, leading to higher firm value (Easterbrook (1984); Jensen and 
Meckling (1976)). This implies a significant deviation from the M&M dividend irrelevance 
proposition. Another assumption embedded in the original M&M proposition is that investors are 
not liquidity constrained. When capital markets are perfect, investors with liquidity needs can create 
“homemade” dividends at no cost by selling an appropriate amount of their holdings in the firm. 
However, trading is not frictionless in real financial markets. Investors must either provide a price 
concession for an immediate execution or wait some time for an optimal execution. Therefore, stock 
liquidity can affect investors’ demand for cash dividends. In an extreme form, the existence of 
trading constraints does not allow investors to freely sell their shares in the secondary market to 
satisfy their liquidity needs; thus, cash dividends represent the primary source of liquidity for 
investors. 
Chapter three examines how corporate governance and stock liquidity affect corporate dividend 
policy in the context of an exogenous policy shock, the Chinese 2005 split-share structure reform. 
The split-share structure reform mandated the conversion of non-tradable shares into tradable shares, 
which constitutes firms’ governance that facilitated better alignment of the interests of controlling 
shareholders with those of outside investors. This represents a potential improvement in firms’ 
corporate governance. Moreover, the reform removed a substantial trading constraint. After the 
reform, stock liquidity is more closely related to the interests of controlling shareholders, who can 
sell some of their shares to meet their liquidity needs while benefitting from share price 
appreciation.  
We investigate the implications of share reform-induced governance and liquidity 
improvements for corporate dividend policy in Chapter three. First, we examine how listed firms’ 
dividend policy responds to a governance and liquidity shock (i.e., the split-share structure reform) 
by comparing corporate dividend policy before and after the reform. Second, we explore the 
channels through which the reform affects dividend policy by considering the effect of corporate 
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governance and stock liquidity. The consideration regarding the effect of liquidity on dividends is 
relatively new, partly because non-tradability is not a particular issue in more mature markets. 
Using a panel of 1,275 listed non-financial firms in China over the period 2003-2011, we find 
that the average cash dividend payout decreases in the post-reform period and the reduction in cash 
payouts appears to be more notable for firms with higher growth rates and greater liquidity. Given 
the fundamental difference in controlling shareholders between state-controlled and privately 
controlled firms, the reduction in cash payouts appears to be substantial in state-controlled firms. 
The results are largely consistent with the view that the split-share structure reform is associated 
with improvements in corporate governance and stock liquidity. 
We also investigate whether the reform affects firms’ decision to pay cash dividends in Chapter 
three. The result indicates that the propensity to pay cash dividends significantly decreases after the 
reform. Furthermore, in the post-reform period, the post-reform period features a decrease in the 
probability of initiating a cash dividend and a greater likelihood of firms omitting cash dividends. In 
addition, when firms maintain dividend payments in the post-reform period, these payments tend to 
be lower relative to those in the pre-reform period. 
Prior research suggests a value-enhancing effect of corporate dividend initiations and increases 
by reporting positive abnormal stock returns associated with dividend initiation and increase 
announcements (see, for example, Michaely, et al. (1995); Grullon, et al. (2002)). However, recent 
evidence (Chen and Wang (2012); Masters, Faff and Pathan (2013)) shows that dividend increases 
by financially constrained firms do not enhance firm value because a decline in corporate liquidity 
following dividend increases can be very harmful to constrained firms. For example, they are more 
exposed to financial distress risk due to diminished cash balances and could also experience 
underinvestment in the product market and become less competitive as financing future investment 
becomes more difficult. 
Why would a constrained firm increase dividends if the increase does not improve firm value? 
In Chapter four, we propose that enhancing financing capacity could be a potential motivation for 
financially constrained firms to approach dividend-increasing decisions.1 Previous studies show that 
issue costs are adversely associated with dividend yield (Deshmukh (2005)) and that the market 
reacts less negatively to dividend payers’ SEO announcements than to nonpayers’ announcements 
(Booth and Chang (2011)). The underlying argument is that dividend payment could reduce 
potential information asymmetry, thereby mitigating financing costs. La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, 
1 Hereinafter, by the term “financing capacity”, we refer to the capacity to obtain public financing in the secondary 
market. 
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Vishny and Shleifer (2000) also note that in countries with weak legal protection of minority 
shareholders (for example, China), to be able to raise external funds on attractive terms, firms pay 
higher dividends to develop a reputation of treating shareholders well. Therefore, firms have 
incentives to utilize dividend payments to reduce information asymmetry and thus alleviate future 
financing costs. The incentive is even stronger for constrained firms, as they typically face a higher 
level of information asymmetry and thus higher costs of external funds. 
Although the existing literature suggests a potential link between firms’ dividend policy and 
financing capacity, most studies suffer from the problem of endogeneity arising from the 
interdependence of financing and dividend decisions (see, e.g., Li, Wang and Qi (2006); Masters, et 
al. (2013)). In Chapter four, we attempt to mitigate this potential endogeneity by examining a 
mandatory regulation on financing qualification that was enacted by the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC, the equivalent of the Securities and Exchange Commission in the 
U.S.) in 2008.2 In this regulation, the CSRC specified that, for listed firms intending to publicly 
issue new securities, the accumulated cash dividends distributed over the past three years must be 
no less than 30% of the average realized annual distributable profits. The regulation in essence 
dampens firms’ financing capacity by associating dividend payment with financing eligibility, but it 
has no universal impact on dividend policy itself because it is applicable only if the firm is seeking 
public financing in the secondary market. This regulation can be regarded as an exogenous shock to 
firms’ external financing capacity and thus provides us with an ideal quasi-natural experimental 
setting. 
In Chapter four, we examine how the shock to financing capacity affects firms’ dividend 
decisions and further investigate the cross-sectional difference between financially constrained and 
unconstrained firms by constructing a synthetic Whited-Wu financial constraints index (WW index, 
hereinafter), following Whited and Wu (2006). Using a sample of 8,758 firm-year observations 
from 941 non-financial firms listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2003 through 
2012, we find that, on average, firms are more likely to pay cash dividends after the regulation, but 
the amounts they pay are lower than before. 
Applying the WW index to categorize our sample firms into constrained and unconstrained 
firms, we observe that the regulation alters the relationship between financial constraints and 
dividend policy. Before the regulation, constrained firms are less willing to pay cash dividends than 
unconstrained firms; when they do pay, they tend to pay lower dividends. This pattern, however, is 
reversed after the regulation comes into effect. Financially constrained firms now become more 
2 Hereinafter, by the term “financing qualification”, we refer to the eligibility to publicly issue securities with respect to 
the dividend requirement. 
4 
 
                                                 
willing to pay cash dividends than unconstrained firms and also pay higher dividends in relative 
terms. 
Furthermore, we find that the behavior of financially constrained firms differs from that of 
unconstrained firms when affected by the shock to financing capacity. Constrained firms display a 
larger post-regulation increase in the propensity to pay cash dividends and a smaller post-regulation 
reduction in cash dividend payout ratios. As a robustness check, we use three alternative measures 
of financial constraints that are suggested by prior studies (i.e., firm size, state ownership and sales 
growth) and re-perform our tests. Our conclusions remain unchanged. 
We also observe that, among all firms that qualify for financing (in terms of the dividend 
requirement), financially constrained firms in particular increase their propensity to finance in the 
post-regulation period. Combined with our previous findings that financially constrained firms 
increase both the propensity to pay dividends and the amount paid after the regulation (relative to 
their unconstrained counterparts), this additional finding provides a possible answer to the question 
of why financially constrained firms increase dividends. Our evidence suggests that constrained 
firms tend to increase cash dividend payments for the purpose of enhancing external financing 
capacity and facilitating future financing. 
The thesis makes a number of contributions. First, we document Chinese investors’ hierarchical 
preference for different types of dividends in Chapter two. It should be noted that before the 
completion of the split-share reform in September 2006, the state and legal person shares, which 
represent the majority ownership in most stocks in our sample, are prohibited from being traded. 
Therefore, the preference for stock dividends that we document in Chapter two is dominated by the 
preferences of small, minority investors. Understanding their preferred form of distribution would 
go a long way towards understanding governance and other issues in the Chinese market.  
Second, our Chapter three complements prior work on dividend policy by providing insights 
into the effect of corporate governance and stock liquidity on dividend policy. Using the split-share 
structure reform as a quasi-natural experiment, our study contributes to the literature by identifying 
a setting that enables us to identify the causal effect of corporate governance and stock liquidity on 
dividend policy. Most previous empirical studies focus on the governance effect on dividend policy, 
but the effect of stock liquidity is rarely examined. Our study fills this gap. From a methodological 
perspective, our setting avoids the inference problems arising from the concern that both dividend 
policy and corporate governance arrangements can be endogenous responses to forces in firms’ 
operating environments that are unobservable to researchers. Our findings in Chapter three also 
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advance the knowledge of corporate dividend policy in emerging economies by providing evidence 
from the Chinese capital market. 
Third, our Chapter four advances the literature on the relationship between financial constraints 
and corporate dividend policy by empirically examining how financial constraints affect dividend 
policy in the presence of a financing shock. Such an examination greatly enriches the existing 
knowledge of the real effects of financial constraints. We gain a deeper insight into the relationship 
between financial constraints and corporate behaviors. Chapter four also contributes by highlighting 
the effect of external financing capacity on dividend policy. As Chinese listed firms, especially non-
state-owned firms, rely heavily on external financing, identifying financing capacity as an 
influential factor enriches the understanding of the determinants of dividend policy in Chinese listed 
firms. 
Finally, our Chapters three and four extend the research on the split-share reform and the 
dividend regulations in the Chinese capital market. Investigating the implications that the reform 
and the regulation have on firms’ dividend policy is of particular importance, as it could provide 
real evidence on whether these policies achieve the goals of regulators. 
The remainder of the thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter two examines the announcement 
effects of dividends in the Chinese capital market. Chapter three investigates how corporate 
governance and stock liquidity affect corporate dividend policy in the context of the 2005 Chinese 
split-share structure reform, and Chapter four explores how a shock to financing capacity affects 
listed firms’ dividend decisions in China, with a focus on financially constrained firms. The final 
Chapter concludes the thesis. 
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 The Love for Stock Dividends: Chinese Evidence Chapter 2
2.1 Introduction 
The effects of dividend policies are puzzling. The famous Modigliani-Miller theorem states that in 
an efficient market corporate policy (such as a dividend decision) has no effect on firm value unless 
it changes the firm’s total cash flows or expected returns. Therefore, pure accounting changes, such 
as stock dividends, should have no significant effect on stock price since shareholders do not 
actually receive any real cash returns. However, empirical research shows that stock prices do react 
in a significant manner when firms make stock dividend announcements (Grinblatt, et al. (1984)). 
In this chapter, we document an even stronger form of the puzzle in the Chinese capital market.  
Using a comprehensive sample of Chinese listed firms from 1993 to 2006, we confirm that Chinese 
listed firms experience significantly positive abnormal returns when they announce stock dividends. 
The average cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) in a 10-day window around the event date is 
1.83%, twice of what has been reported in the U.S. market.  Further, and more puzzlingly, we find 
that the announcement effect of pure cash dividend is negative for Chinese firms. These firms on 
average have a CAR of -0.56% in a 10-day window around announcements. The most preferred 
form of distribution however appear to be a combined cash and stock dividend distribution 
(combined dividend thereafter), which enjoys a CAR of 2.51% in the same window. Our finding of 
hierarchical preference for combined and stock dividends in China is robust to controlling for the 
effect of earnings announcement, an important factor previous studies neglect to account for. These 
additional findings are in stark contrast to what has been previously documented in the more mature 
markets. These studies generally find that cash dividend has positive announcement effects and is 
the more preferred form of payoff over stock dividend or repurchase (see for example, Michaely, et 
al. (1995)). By comparing investor reaction to different forms of dividend distribution, we unearth a 
deeper puzzle in the role of stock dividends in the Chinese market. Stock dividends not only act as a 
positive signal to the investors, they also validate cash distributions, which otherwise are seen as 
negative signals of the firms. We dub this phenomenon broadly as the Chinese dividend puzzle.   
The majority of the research on stock dividends has been focused on the U.S. market (e.g. 
Grinblatt, et al. (1984); Conroy and Harris (1999)). Research conducted in less developed markets 
is sparse. With its unique institutional setting, the Chinese stock market provides an interesting 
sample for the issue. Comparing to the U.S., stock dividends are used more widely as a form of 
payouts in China. Chen and Yao (2000), Yu and Cheng (2001) and Wei (1998) are some of the few 
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published papers that provide limited evidence on the announcement effect of stock dividends. Our 
paper is partly motivated by the lack of previous empirical work in the area. 
In order to provide more comprehensive and robust empirical evidence, we start, as mentioned, 
by investigating the market reactions to cash, stock and combined dividend announcements 
respectively. Since earnings are announced concurrently with dividend decisions in China, and 
therefore the abnormal returns could potentially be confounded with the earnings effect, we then set 
out to examine the dividend announcement effect under different earnings signals. We find a strong 
announcement effect of stock dividends even after controlling for the concurrent earnings surprises. 
Our multivariate regressions further control for firm size, industry, along with earnings surprises. 
And our results are robust to these controls. Our findings are also robust to whether we define 
earnings surprises as current year profit or as the change in earnings per share from the previous 
year. Finally, we examine the difference in market reactions to a positive or negative earnings 
announcement as firms initiate, continue or switch into different forms of payouts. It appears that 
switching from other types of dividends to stock dividends reinforces the earnings signal.  
It should be noted that before the completion of the so called split shares reform in September 
2006, the state and legal person shares which represent the majority ownership in most stocks in our 
sample are prohibited from trading. Therefore, the preference for stock dividends we document here 
is dominated by the preferences of small minority investors. Understanding their preferred form of 
distribution would go a long way towards understanding the governance and other issues in the 
Chinese market. Our study will also contribute to the literature of stock dividend and corporate 
payout policy in general. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the related literature and 
introduces the institutional background of dividend payouts in China. Section 2.3 describes the data 
sources and summary statistics on financial characteristics of various groups are also provided. 
Section 2.4 presents the empirical evidence on the announcement effects of stock dividends and the 
robustness check is reported in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 concludes the chapter with a brief 
discussion of the implications of the results. 
2.2 Related Literature and Institutional Background   
Dividends are generally set by a firm’s Board of Directors. The amount of earnings to be paid out as 
dividends is one of the major financial decisions for a company.  
A great deal of research has been conducted on dividend effects over the last several decades. 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) show that in a perfect capital market, a company’s dividend policy 
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will not affect its value since there is a trade-off between dividends and capital gains. However, a 
great number of researches observe a positive relationship between dividend announcements and 
common stock prices. Announcement of stock dividends is found to have a positive return effect 
(e.g. Grinblatt, et al. (1984)), but cash dividend initiations (Michaely, et al. (1995)) or increases 
(Grullon, et al. (2002)) also have significantly positive, if not bigger, announcement effects.  
The traditional explanation of such announcement effect is that dividends, including stock 
dividends, are perceived by investors as a mechanism to reveal private information that was 
previously known only by company insiders such as managers (Bhattacharya (1979)). A stock 
dividend helps to reduce such information asymmetry by either directly signaling good information 
to investors (Miller and Rock (1985)) or by attracting media and analyst attention to make the stock 
price more desirable. In the Chinese context, Chen, Firth and Gao (2002) suggests that stock 
dividends are used to signal future earnings information to the market. A recent alternative theory is 
that firms pay cash dividends or stock dividends to cater to investor preferences (Baker and Wurgler 
(2004)).  
The Chinese stock market is unique in terms of its legal systems, institutional features and state 
controlled economy. State Owned Enterprises play an important role in Chinese stock market. Most 
of the listed firms are controlled by the state governments via large proportion of direct 
shareholdings while individual shareholders have little influence over the firms. Minority 
shareholders have little influence in deciding Chinese listed firms’ dividend policies.  
Chinese companies are required to announce dividend decisions on the announcement day 
whether they decide to pay any dividend or not. According to the Chinese Company Law, 
companies can declare dividend distributions from the remaining distributable profits after reserved 
funds are satisfied. These reserved funds include the Surplus Reserve Fund (SRF), the Employee 
Welfare and Bonus Fund (EWBF), and the Other Surplus Reserve Fund (OSRF). A company can 
declare cash dividends which are taxable at the individual tax rate of 20 percent, or declare stock 
dividends which in accounting terms transfer retained earnings to equity capital. The capital gains 
on stocks are tax free. A company can also choose to pay a combination of cash and stock dividends. 
And in fact, many companies do.  
While most US firms tend to adopt a stable dividend-paying policy, Chinese firms do not have 
a tradition to maintain a stable cash dividend. The extensive speculation in the Chinese stock market 
generates large volatility and turnover that make dividends less attractive than expected capital 
gains. As a result, most Chinese individual investors do not perceive cash dividends as the main 
source of stock returns. Anecdotal evidence suggests that stock dividend (rather than cash dividend) 
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announcements are regarded as favorable news by individual investors in China despite of the fact 
that the investors do not receive any real returns. The popularity of stock dividends as a form of 
corporate payout in China, in part, is also due to the strict approval requirement of stock splits. 
Companies find it easier to increase the number of shares outstanding and to reduce the share price 
through stock dividends. 
Another characteristic of the Chinese stock market is that earnings are announced at the same 
time as cash dividends and stock dividends. As a result, the positive market reaction to stock 
dividend announcements may be attributed to the effect of the contemporaneous earnings surprise 
(e.g. Kane, Lee and Marcus (1984)). 
A few papers study the announcement effect of stock dividends. However, their empirical 
evidence is limited. For example, Chen and Yao (2000) and Wei (1998) find positive abnormal 
stock returns around the announcement dates of stock dividends in Chinese stock market. However, 
only 403 announcements are examined in Chen and Yao (2000) and the sample in Wei (1998) only 
consists of the announcements in 1997. And they do not compare stock dividend announcement 
with the announcement of other forms of the distributions. Chen, et al. (2002) conduct a study on 
the announcements made by listed A-share companies in China and show that stock dividend 
announcements, which are released simultaneously with earnings in China, corroborate or attenuate 
the signal from earnings. However, they do not explain why stock dividends have greater signaling 
properties than cash dividends in Chinese stock market and do not take into account combined cash 
and stock dividends either. 
2.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3.1 Data 
Our sample includes all Chinese A-shares listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges 
during the period from 1 January 1993 to 31 December 2006, obtained from China Centre of 
Economics Research (CCER). Since the split-share reform is not completed until end of 2006, 
restricting our sample to that period allows us to have a consistent regulatory environment for our 
study. For each firm in each year (thereafter, firm-year), we merge company financial information, 
dividend distribution details with the return data collected from Thomason Financial DataStream.3 
The original data consists of 12,538 firm-years which representing 1,475 listed A-shares on both 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. After removing delisted companies for which we cannot 
3 The returns are adjusted for capitalization changes. The results (unreported) are essentially the same when unadjusted 
prices are used. 
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obtain share price data, a total of 11,943 observations are included in our test sample. They 
represent 1,413 companies over the sample period. 
2.3.2 Summary Statistics 
Table 2.1 compares firm characteristics between non-dividend paying and dividend paying firms, 
and various subgroups. Unlike U.S. firms, Chinese firms need to make a dividend declaration on 
announcement date even when no dividend, cash, stock or combined, is to be paid. Therefore, we 
can classify a company as non-dividend paying or dividend paying depending on whether any type 
of dividend payments is declared.  
[Insert Table 2.1 about here] 
We observe a number of interesting differences in firm characteristics between the dividend 
paying and the non-dividend paying groups. Dividend paying firms are on average larger. The 
average total asset value for the dividend paying group is $3,254 million, much higher than the 
$1,804 million for the non-dividend paying group. Dividend paying firms also exhibit a higher 
average earnings per share (EPS=$0.32) than non-dividend paying firms, who on average have a 
negative EPS ($-0.01). Further, dividend paying firms have a much higher growth rate than non-
dividend paying firms. The EPS growth rate is 41 percent for dividend paying group while non-
dividend paying group shows negative growth. The t-test results indicate that the above differences 
between the two groups are highly statistically significant. The results therefore imply that 
companies that experience an operational loss and decreased earnings are less likely to make 
dividend payments. The difference in earnings also motivates the need of controlling for earnings 
announcement in our later analysis.  
The dividend paying firms are further grouped into three sub-samples by dividend types. We 
then investigate the cross sectional differences in firm characteristics among those subsamples. 
Although our goal is not to explain the motivations for firms to choose different dividend payment 
mechanisms, this allows us to gain a basic understanding about whether the announcement effects 
are likely to be uniformly distributed across various firm characteristics. The results are also 
presented in Table 2.1. On average, pure cash dividend firms are larger in size than that of the stock 
dividend and combined dividend groups. The average total asset value for the pure cash dividend 
group is almost four times larger than its two counterparts. However, the two stock dividend groups 
exhibit much better earnings capacities. For instance, the average EPS for the combined dividend 
groups is $0.44, which is about 50 percent higher than that of the pure cash dividend group. More 
importantly, the pure stock dividend group and the combined dividend group exhibit an earnings 
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growth rate of over 70 percent per year on average. In contrast, it is only 24 percent for the pure 
cash dividend group. This indicates that companies that choose to pay any form of stock dividends 
are normally those small companies with higher growth opportunities. 
In summary, the results reported in Table 2.1 outline that dividend paying groups are larger 
companies with better earnings capacities and higher growth opportunities. Within the two stock 
dividend paying groups, the pure cash dividend paying companies are relatively larger in size but 
with poorer operational earnings and growth options. 
2.4 Empirical Results 
We use an event study model to investigate the announcement effect in the event window.  Event 
window is defined as five trading days before the announcement date (t=-5) to five trading day after 
the announcement date (t=5). The design of our event window is to capture any possible 
information leakage prior to the formal announcement, as well as the possible delayed reactions of 
investors. We also experimented with different definitions of event window, the results, which are 
not reported for brevity, are qualitatively similar and do not affect our conclusions. For each firm, 
abnormal returns are defined as the differences between firm returns and market return on a 
specified date within the event window. The abnormal returns are then summed up over periods in 
the window to calculate the cumulative abnormal returns. We then compute average cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs). For a sample of N firms, t-test statistics is formed by calculating
NCARstd
CAR
i /)(
, where )( iCARstd is the standard deviation of individual firm’s cumulative 
abnormal return, iCAR . Our approach has higher bench market than a market model approach; 
therefore, any abnormal return we find should be robust to alternative market model methodology. 
2.4.1 Dividend Paying vs. Non-Dividend Paying Groups 
Table 2.2 reports average abnormal returns (ARs) and average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
for both dividend paying and no paying groups. Two clear patterns are observed. First, there are 
persistent ARs prior to the announcement date, suggesting information leakage prior to the actual 
announcement. For instance, dividend paying firms have significantly positive abnormal returns 
ranging from 0.09% to 1.17% per day before the event day (i.e., t=-5 to -1). On the event day (t=0), 
dividend paying firms actually exhibit a negative AR. And, the ARs after the announcement (t=1 to 
5) are largely insignificant. These results suggest that the information about the dividend 
announcement has already been incorporated in the share price before the announcement.  It is 
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consistent with the notion that the Chinese capital market is immature and subject to information 
leakages.  
[Insert Table 2.2 about here] 
Second, dividend paying firms have a significantly positive CAR in the event window while 
non-paying firms have a significantly negative CAR. Figure 2.1 plots these CARs for the two 
groups. The CAR in [-5, 5] is 0.43 percent for dividend paying group, compared with -1.47 percent 
for non-dividend paying group. The differences in CARs between the two groups are significantly 
different from zero. The evidence shows that investors react differently to dividend announcements. 
They react positively to any type of dividend payment and react negatively if a company chooses 
not to pay dividends. 
[Insert Figure 2.1 about here] 
2.4.2 Comparing Abnormal Returns among Dividend Paying Sub-groups 
Announcement effects of dividends among dividend paying sub-groups are further explored in 
Table 2.3 and Figure 2.2. Three dividend paying sub-groups are considered. They are pure cash 
dividends, pure stock dividends and combined cash and stock dividends groups.  
[Insert Table 2.3 and Figure 2.2 about here] 
The result provides empirical support on the argument that Chinese investors prefer stock 
dividends rather than cash dividends. In Table 2.3 and Figure 2.2, it is obvious that investors react 
negatively to the pure cash dividend payment. For instance, for pure cash dividend group over the 
event window, there are only three (out of eleven) ARs that are significantly different from zero, 
occurring at t = -1 to 1 and surprisingly, they are all negative. The [-5, 5] CAR for the pure cash 
dividend group is -0.56 percent and highly significant. Examining the pure stock dividend and 
combined dividend groups reveals a different story. ARs for both groups are always significantly 
positive before and at the announcement date. The [-5, 5] window CAR is 1.83 percent for the pure 
stock dividend group and is 2.51 percent for the combined dividend group with respective t-
statistics of 6.63 and 9.61. In panel B of Table 2.3, we test the differences in CARs between the 
pure cash dividend and the two stock dividend groups. These differences are highly significant. 
Investors seem to prefer the combined distribution, followed by pure stock dividend, to pure cash 
distributions. It is interesting to note that abnormal returns for the pure stock dividend and the 
combined dividend groups have similar patterns over the event window. The significantly positive 
abnormal returns are mainly in the pre-announcement period, while they are generally insignificant 
in the post-announcement period. It suggests that the pattern of CARs we observe in Table 2.2 is 
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mainly driven by those of stock dividend firms and combined dividend firms. Cash dividend does 
not appear to be preferred by investors. Compared to cash dividends, stock dividends not only can 
help investors to avoid tax, but also can increase the number of shares held by investors. Given that 
the extensive speculation in the Chinese stock market generates large volatility and turnover (Xiong 
and Yu (2011)), the incremental share holdings obtained from stock dividends can bring additional 
capital gains to those investors when the stock price increases, which are generally higher than the 
amount of cash dividends. Therefore, most investors prefer stock dividends to cash dividends in 
general. However, the realization of capital gains relies on the increase of stock prices and thus is 
uncertain. At the same time, paying too many stock dividends also dilutes share value. Alternatively, 
combining cash with stock dividends entitles investors to potential capital gains while guaranteeing 
a certain amount of cash returns and minimizing the dilution effect. Thus, it may explain why 
Chinese investors prefer combined dividends to pure stock or pure cash dividends. 
2.4.3 The Effect of Earnings Surprise 
In the above analysis, we have documented positive abnormal stock returns around stock dividend 
announcement dates. In order to rule out the possibility that it is the contemporaneously announced 
earning surprise that drives such positive abnormal returns, we investigate the effect of a concurrent 
earnings surprise in this section. We consider a positive and a negative earnings surprise. Following 
Chen, et al. (2002), we use earnings change as a measure for earnings surprise as there are no data 
on earnings expectations in China. The earnings surprise is then defined as the difference in net 
profits between the current and previous periods. 
Table 2.4 compares [-5, 5] CARs for dividend paying and non-paying groups when a positive 
or negative earnings change is announced. The results show that higher CARs are associated with a 
positive earnings surprise. Specifically, for the dividend paying group, a positive average CAR of 
1.27 percent is reported for a positive earnings surprise and a negative average CAR of -0.17 
percent is observed for a negative surprise. The difference in CARs is highly significant at the 1% 
level. Similar patterns are observed for dividend paying subgroups as well as for the non-dividend 
paying group. All the differences in CARs are highly significant. These evidences suggest that 
earnings surprise (i.e., profit change) have a significant effect on stock returns.  
[Insert Table 2.4 about here] 
Results reported in Table 2.4 also give us indications about differences in announcement effects 
among dividend distribution groups given a positive or a negative earnings change. For example, 
within the sample of a positive earnings change, the dividend paying group experiences a 
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significantly higher CAR (1.27 percent) than the non-dividend paying group (0.04 percent). Among 
the three dividend paying subgroups, the highest average CAR of 3.32 percent is observed in the 
combined dividend group, followed by the stock dividend paying group (3.11 percent) and the cash 
dividend group (0.24 percent). A similar pattern is also observed within the negative earnings 
surprise sample. For example, the combined dividend firms on average still earn positive (1.89 
percent) CAR despite the negative earnings news. Therefore, the superior announcement window 
CARs for combined and stock dividend firms is still present when positive or negative earnings 
surprises are taken into consideration.  
2.4.4 Regression Analysis 
The results of Table 2.4 are based on the univariate framework. To better control for different 
effects on announcement window returns, we now turn to multivariate regression analysis. 
Specifically, we estimate the following regression on the full sample and the respective subsamples: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑇 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑇𝐴) +𝛽4𝐸𝑃𝑆 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑇                                             (2.1) 
Where Payer equals 1 if firm i pays dividends and 0 otherwise, EarningSurprise is a proxy to 
control for earnings surprise, Log(TA) is log total assets, and EPS is earnings per share. Industry 
fixed effects are included to control for the possible industry differences. We use two proxies for 
earnings surprises. One proxy is ΔEPS, the change in earnings per share, following Benartzi, 
Michaely and Thaler (1997). Another proxy is D_profits, a dummy equals to 1 if the change in a 
firm’s net profits is positive, and zero otherwise. D_profits is to capture the possible nonlinear 
return response to earnings surprise. The results are reported in Table 2.5 and Table 2.6. Table 2.5 
reports the results using D_profits as a proxy. Table 2.6 reports results using ΔEPS as the proxy. In 
each table, Columns 1 to 4 report the regression results for the comparison subsamples. Column 5 
reports the full sample pooled regression result.   
Results in Table 2.5 confirm our findings in univariate analysis. In Table 2.5, the coefficient 
estimates on the positive earnings surprise dummy (D_profits) are all positive and significant across 
all the models. This suggests that earnings surprise has a significantly positive impact on CARs. 
When we compare different dividend payment forms pairwise to the no-paying group (column 2-4), 
we find that cash dividend has a positive but not significant coefficient, while stock dividend and 
combined dividend estimates are both positive and significant. In column 5, we run a pooled 
regression on the entire sample while breaking the dividend payers into different subgroups, using a 
dummy variable for each category. The resulting estimates are similar to the pairwise estimates. 
15 
 
Notably, the estimates on dummy variables stock and combined not only are statistically significant 
at 1% level, they are also economically significant. The coefficient estimate on pure stock dividend 
is 2.89, and on combined dividend is 3.19. Ceteris paribus, paying stock dividend earns a firm close 
to 3 percent in cumulative abnormal returns in the [-5, 5] event window, and about 3.2 percent when 
such stock dividends are combined with cash. 
[Insert Table 2.5 about here] 
Table 2.6 reports the similar set of regressions using the change in earnings per share to control 
for earnings surprise. Controlling for ΔEPS allows for the possibility that cumulative abnormal 
return is proportional to the magnitude in earning changes. The results are qualitatively similar to 
those of Table 2.5. Investors react positively to dividend payments, especially to the dividend 
payments consisting of a stock dividend component. Such positive market reaction to stock 
dividends cannot be attributed to the simultaneous earnings surprise. In contrast, estimate on the 
pure cash dividend payer dummy is close to zero (although positive) and is only marginally 
significant. Investors react indifferently towards cash dividend and no-dividend announcements.  
[Insert Table 2.6 about here] 
2.4.5 Earnings Surprise and Dividend Paying Status 
We further split the dividend paying group into three subgroups according to the change in dividend 
paying status. The initiation group consists of firms initiating dividend payments (cash, stock or 
combined) in current period. The continuation group includes firms continuing the same type of 
dividends from last period to current period. Finally, the change-to group consists of payers that 
switch from one type of dividend payment to another since last period. We then explore the 
difference in CARs between subgroups and the results are reported in Table 2.7. Panel A presents 
the result for the full dividend paying sample while Panel B, C and D report the results for three 
dividend paying subsamples. 
[Insert Table 2.7 about here] 
On average, not surprisingly, all dividend payers experience higher CARs for a positive 
earnings surprise than that for a negative surprise, regardless of the change in the firms’ paying 
status (Panel A). When we examine different dividend paying subgroups, several interesting 
patterns emerge. First stock dividend and combined dividend payers always have positive CARs 
regardless of earnings surprise or whether the dividend is initiated, continuing, or changed from 
other forms of payments. The same is not true for the pure cash dividend payers. For cash dividend 
payers, the significant difference in CARs between positive and negative earnings surprises is 
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observed only when a firm initiates or continues its cash dividends. Firms who switch into cash 
dividend from other forms of payments do not have differentiating CARs between positive and 
negative earnings. This corroborates the evidence that the market reaction towards stock dividends 
and combined dividends is much stronger than that towards cash dividends. Second, for stock 
dividend payers, the CAR is the highest (5.85 percent) when a switch to stock dividends and a 
positive earnings change are simultaneously announced. Looking at it another way, when firms 
switch to other forms of payment, the differentiation between positive and negative earnings is only 
significant (CAR difference=4.84) when firms switch into stock dividend. This suggests that 
switching from cash dividends to stock dividends reinforce the signaling effect of a positive 
earnings surprise, which is consistent with the finding by Chen et al. (2002). Finally, for the 
combined dividend payer, the average announcement CARs are higher when there is a concurrent 
positive earnings surprise than a negative earnings surprise. The difference in CARs is significant 
when the combined dividend is a continuing payment, but not significant when the dividend is 
initiated or switched from other categories. This is consistent with the hypothesis that combined 
dividend is a strong signal about future earnings. Its initiation or switching into that category has a 
stronger signaling effect than current earnings surprise. Only when the combined dividend is a 
continuing form of payment, current earnings surprise becomes a significant differentiating factor in 
market reactions. It is interesting to note here that while investors are more happy to see a firm 
switch into stock dividend when earnings surprise is positive (CAR=5.85%, Panel C), they are 
indifferent between positive and negative current earnings surprises when a firm switches into 
combined dividend (CAR=3.74% and 3.44%, Panel D).4 This is consistent with our overall finding 
that combined dividend has the strongest signaling effect (see Figure 2.2). Current earnings surprise 
has less signaling power when firms switching into combined dividend than into other categories.   
In summary, Table 2.4 to Table 2.7 provide evidence that the market reacts positively to stock 
dividend announcements. When we control for the effect of the concurrent earnings surprise, such 
announcement effect of stock dividends still exists. One interpretation is that stock dividends may 
convey strong signal about firm’s future performance to the market. However, dividend paying 
status may change the extent of the earnings effect. Specifically, a switch to stock dividends 
strongly corroborates the earnings signal. By contrast, a switch to cash dividends tends to attenuate 
the effect of earnings surprise. In addition, the market reaction towards combined cash and stock 
dividends is the largest, compared with its two counterparts.  
4 We thank an anonymous referee to point this out. 
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2.5 Robustness Tests 
As a robustness check, we measure the earning surprise in a different way. The earning surprise is 
now defined as the difference in relative profit changes (ΔEPS) between the current period and the 
last period. The results are provided in Table 2.8.  
[Insert Table 2.8 about here] 
In general, the results from the robustness test do not alter our major conclusions. For instance, 
a strong announcement effect of stock dividends is still observed in Table 2.8.  Again, a switch to 
stock dividends reinforces the earnings signal while a switch to cash dividends tend to undermine 
the earnings effect. 
2.6 Conclusion 
Significant price increases around stock dividends announcements are well documented in the 
literature. In this chapter, we examine the announcement effect of dividend payments in China with 
a focus on stock dividend announcements.  
We find that companies that choose not to pay dividends experience a significantly negative 
CAR over the announcement window. In contrast, dividend paying firms on average exhibit a 
significantly positive CAR. However, the positive announcement effect is mainly driven by 
distributions that include stock dividends.  Investors react more positively to the combined dividend 
and stock dividend payouts and cash dividend appears to be least valued by the Chinese investors. 
These findings are robust to the effect of the earnings surprise concurrently announced. We also 
find that changes in stock dividend paying status tend to interact with differential in return creations 
to earnings surprise. For instance, a switch to stock dividends is likely to reinforce the earnings 
signal. 
These findings are puzzling under the current dividend theories and our understanding of the 
Chinese capital market. If the explanation is in the Chinese investors’ preference for stock 
dividends, then the challenge is in providing a rational explanation for that preference. Stock 
dividends after all are accounting cosmetics. Taxation difference between cash and stock dividends 
is unlikely to provide this explanation. If tax advantage is the reason investors prefer stock 
dividends over cash dividends, the same logic should also apply to no dividend payouts. We should 
not observe that dividends are preferred over no dividends or that combined cash and stock 
dividends are preferred over pure stock dividends.  
18 
 
Would the taxation cost or other signaling cost be able to explain the puzzle through a costly 
signaling model (Bhattacharya (1979); Miller and Rock (1985); John and Williams (1985))? It 
would imply that stock dividends have a higher cost than cash dividends to the Chinese firms. On 
the surface, that is not the case. For the signaling story to work, the answer might lie in the 
governance structure of the Chinese listed firms. The controlling state and legal person shareholders 
own the majority illiquid shares. They have little incentive to pay stock dividends as these 
additional shares are also illiquid. The reduction in accounting retained earnings also increases the 
firms’ possible financing cost as various reserve funds need to be filled first. Their preference 
would be cash dividends which they can divert for other purposes. Wei and Xiao (2009) find that 
cash dividend level is significantly and positively related to the proportion of non-tradable shares. 
Therefore, a possible explanation of the puzzle is that stock dividend is a dual signal of good 
corporate governance and good future earnings prospect. We plan to explore this point in future 
studies.   
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Table 2.1    Comparing Financial Characteristics of Various Groups 
This table reports differences in financial characteristics between dividend paying groups. All the figures in the table are 
mean value of the variables. Non-Dividend paying group consists of companies that do not pay dividend at all; dividend 
paying group consists of companies that paid either cash or stock dividend (or a combination of cash and stock 
dividends); pure cash dividend group consists of companies that paid cash dividend only; pure stock dividend group 
consists of companies that paid stock dividend only; combined dividend group consists of companies that paid a 
combination of cash and stock dividends. The sample period is between 1993 and 2006 and the data is collected from 
China Centre of Economics Research. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics based on White’s Heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Number of Observations 
Total Assets 
(in mil$) 
Net Asset per 
Share 
Earnings per 
Share 
Growth Rate 
in Earnings 
per Share 
Price-
Earnings 
Ratio 
       
Non-Dividend  Paying Group 5,697 $1,804 $2.14 $-0.01 -3.22 139.10 
       
Dividend Paying Group 6,240 $3,254 $3.23 $0.32 0.41 53.46 
- Pure Cash Dividend Only 3,988 $4,002 $3.15 $0.28 0.24 51.83 
- Pure Stock Dividend Only 1,067 $1,324 $3.08 $0.31 0.78 68.10 
- Combined Cash and 
Stock Dividend 1,185 $2,475 $3.64 $0.44 0.72 45.77 
       
t-test between the Groups       
Difference between Dividend 
Paying and Non-dividend Paying 
Groups 
 $1,450*** $1.09*** $0.33*** 3.63*** -85.64*** 
 (6.20) (40.85) (38.57) (11.30) (-10.84) 
       
Difference between Pure Cash 
Dividend and Other Dividend 
Paying Groups 
 $2,073*** $-0.23*** $-0.09*** -0.51 -4.53 
 (6.22) (-5.72) (-12.02) (-1.68) (-1.36) 
       
Difference between Pure Stock 
Dividend and Other Dividend 
Paying Groups 
 $-2,329*** $-0.18*** $-0.01 0.44 17.66*** 
 (-9.05) (-3.69) (-0.60) (1.64) (3.72) 
       
Difference between Combined 
Dividend and Other Dividend 
Paying Groups 
 $-962*** $0.51*** $0.15*** 0.38 -9.50** 
 (-3.34) (10.20) (13.23) (0.75) (-2.24) 
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Table 2.2    Comparing Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Abnormal Returns between Dividend Paying and No 
Paying Groups 
This table compares ARs and CARs between dividend paying and no paying groups. Event day, T=0, denotes the 
announcement date of dividend payments. The event period is five trading days before and after the event date. The 
sample period is between 1993 and 2006. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics based on White’s Heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Event Day 
Dividend Paying Group 
(n=6,240) 
 Non-dividend paying Group 
(n=5,697) 
  Differences in CARs (%) 
AR (%) CAR (%)  AR (%) CAR (%)  (Paying - Non Paying) 
T = -5 0.12*** 0.12***  -0.17*** -0.17***  0.29*** 
 (4.21) (4.21)  (-4.91) (-4.91)  (6.47) 
T = -4 0.16*** 0.28***  -0.09** -0.26***  0.54*** 
 (5.59) (6.86)  (-2.40) (-4.91)  (8.12) 
T = -3 0.11*** 0.39***  -0.11*** -0.36***  0.75*** 
 (3.95) (7.85)  (-2.65) (-5.35)  (8.98) 
T = -2 0.17*** 0.56***  -0.15*** -0.51***  1.07*** 
 (5.74) (9.57)  (-4.05) (-6.63)  (11.09) 
T = -1 0.09*** 0.66***  -0.11*** -0.61***  1.27*** 
 (2.93) (9.66)  (-2.91) (-7.17)  (11.63) 
T = 0 -0.23*** 0.43***  -0.50*** -1.11***  1.54*** 
 (-6.43) (5.70)  (-10.56) (-11.73)  (12.73) 
T = 1 -0.04 0.39***  -0.31*** -1.42***  1.81*** 
 (-1.11) (4.67)  (-7.61) -13.64)  (13.55) 
T = 2 0.02 0.41***  -0.02 -1.44***  1.85*** 
 (0.84) (4.63)  (-0.73) (-13.00)  (13.03) 
T = 3 0.04 0.45***  -0.04 -1.48***  1.93*** 
 (1.48) (4.80)  (-1.36) (-12.67)  (12.88) 
T = 4 -0.04 0.42***  0.01 -1.48***  1.90*** 
 (-1.41) (4.25)  (0.23) (-12.08)  (12.08) 
T = 5 0.02 0.43***  0.01 -1.47***  1.90*** 
 (0.67) (4.29)  (0.32) (-11.70)  (11.81) 
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Table 2.3    Comparing Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Abnormal Returns among Dividend Paying Sub-groups  
This table compares ARs and CARs among dividend paying sub-groups. Panel A reports the ARs and CARs for three dividend paying subgroups and Panel B reports their 
differences in CARs. Pure cash dividend group consists of those companies that paid cash dividends only; pure stock dividend group consists of those companies that paid stock 
dividends only; and combined dividend group consists of those companies that paid a combination of cash and stock dividends. Event day, T=0, denotes the announcement date of 
dividend payments. The event period is five trading days before and after the event date. The sample period is between 1993 and 2006. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics based on 
White’s Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: ARs and CARs for the three dividend paying sub-groups 
 Event Day T = -5 T = -4 T = -3 T = -2 T = -1 T = 0 T = 1 T = 2 T = 3 T = 4 T = 5 
Pure Cash Dividend 
(n=3,988) 
AR (%) 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.02 -0.09** -0.52*** -0.13*** 0.06* 0.04 -0.04 -0.02 
 (1.16) (1.30) (0.85) (0.64) (-2.45) (-12.74) (-3.41) (1.67) (1.39) (-1.20) (-0.48) 
CAR (%) 0.04 0.08* 0.11* 0.13** 0.05 -0.48*** -0.61*** -0.55*** -0.51*** -0.54*** -0.56*** 
 (1.16) (1.73) (1.90) (1.98) (0.63) (-5.87) (-6.72) (-5.71) (-4.96) (-5.09) (-4.97) 
Pure Stock 
Dividend (n=1,067) 
AR (%) 0.28*** 0.38*** 0.11 0.36*** 0.21** 0.14 0.21** -0.13* 0.04 0.05 0.18*** 
 (3.38) (4.92) (1.41) (4.38) (2.31) (1.35) (2.15) (-1.71) (0.65) (0.77) (2.69) 
CAR (%) 0.28*** 0.66*** 0.77*** 1.13*** 1.34*** 1.48*** 1.69*** 1.56*** 1.60*** 1.65*** 1.83*** 
  (3.38) (5.80) (5.68) (6.89) (6.90) (6.89) (7.10) (6.15) (6.13) (6.15) (6.63) 
Combined Cash and 
Stock Dividend 
(n=1,185) 
AR (%) 0.25*** 0.36*** 0.39*** 0.49*** 0.60*** 0.42*** 0.06 0.06 0.02 -0.12* -0.02 
 (3.98) (5.20) (6.01) (6.79) (7.13) (4.86) (0.75) (0.80) (0.25) (-1.84) (-0.34) 
CAR (%) 0.25*** 0.61*** 1.00*** 1.49*** 2.09*** 2.51*** 2.57*** 2.63*** 2.65*** 2.53*** 2.51*** 
  (3.98) (6.28) (8.30) (10.47) (12.20) (13.25) (12.00) (11.23) (10.53) (9.62) (9.61) 
Panel B: Differences in CARs for the three dividend paying sub-groups 
 Event Day T = -5 T = -4 T = -3 T = -2 T = -1 T = 0 T = 1 T = 2 T = 3 T = 4 T = 5 
Pure Cash Dividend 
vs. other Dividend 
Groups 
Differences in CARs (%) -0.22*** -0.55*** -0.78*** -1.19*** -1.69*** -2.50*** -2.76*** -2.68*** -2.66*** -2.66*** -2.75*** 
 (-3.65) (-6.19) (-7.21) (-9.29) (-11.28) (-15.20) (-15.05) (-13.54) (-12.76) (-12.28) (-12.46) 
Pure Stock 
Dividend vs. other 
Dividend Groups 
Differences in CARs (%) 0.19** 0.46*** 0.45*** 0.69*** 0.83*** 1.27*** 1.57*** 1.38*** 1.39*** 1.49*** 1.69*** 
 (2.18) (3.73) (3.11) (3.90) (3.99) (5.57) (6.19) (5.12) (4.96) (5.18) (5.70) 
Combined 
Dividends vs. other 
Dividend Groups 
Differences in CARs (%) 0.16** 0.41*** 0.75*** 1.15*** 1.77*** 2.58*** 2.70*** 2.74 2.71*** 2.61*** 2.57*** 
 (2.28) (3.77) (5.66) (7.34) (9.50) (12.53) (11.63) (10.85) (10.04) (9.25) (9.09) 
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Table 2.4    Difference in CARs among the Groups Classified by Changes in Profits  
This table reports the differences in [-5, +5] CARs among the groups, classified by change in Profits. Change in Profits is the difference between the current and previous periods’ 
net profits per share. Cash dividend group consists of those companies that paid cash dividends only; Stock dividend group consists of those companies that paid stock dividends 
only; and combined dividend group consists of those companies that paid a combination of cash and stock dividends. Event day, T=0, denotes the announcement date of dividend 
payments. The event period is five trading days before and after the event date. The sample period is between 1993 and 2006. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics based on White’s 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. *** denotes significance at 1% level. 
 Dividend Paying vs. Non-paying Firms  Dividend Paying Firms 
 
(1) 
Non-Dividend Paying 
group (%) 
(2) 
Dividend Paying 
Group (%) 
 
(3) 
Cash Dividend Paying 
Group (%) 
(4) 
Stock Dividend Paying 
Group (%) 
(5) 
Combined Cash and Stock 
Dividend Paying Group (%) 
When Change in Profits ≤0 -2.40*** -0.17  -1.15*** 1.12*** 1.89*** 
 (-15.07) (-1.29)  (-7.80) (3.35) (5.99) 
Number of observations 3,527 3,643  2,287 684 672 
       
When Change in Profits >0 0.04 1.27***  0.24 3.11*** 3.32*** 
 (0.20) (7.89)  (1.38) (6.47) (7.60) 
Number of observations 2,170 2,597  1,701 383 513 
       
Difference in CARs between 
Change in Profits ≤0 and >0 -2.44*** -1.44***  -1.39*** -1.99*** -1.43*** 
t-stat on the difference (-9.50) (-6.98)  (-6.13) (-3.41) (-2.65) 
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Table 2.5    Regression Analysis on Announcement Effect Controlling for D_profits  
This table reports cross-sectional analysis on market reaction to the dividend announcement. The dependent variable is 
market-adjusted [-5, +5] cumulative abnormal return, where t=0 is the announcement date of dividend schedule. TA is 
the total assets; EPS is the net earnings per share; D_profits is a dummy variable and equal to 1 if the change in a firm’s 
net profit is positive, zero otherwise; Payer is a dummy variable and equals to 1 for dividend-paying firms and zero 
otherwise; Cash is a dummy variable and equal to 1 if the dividend payment method is cash and zero otherwise; Stock is 
a dummy variable and equal to 1 if the dividend payment method is stock and zero otherwise; Combined is a dummy 
variable and equal to 1 if the dividend payment method is the combination of cash and stocks and zero otherwise. 
Column 1 reports the regression for the full sample; Column 2 reports the regressions for the subsample of cash 
dividend paying firms and non-dividend paying firms; Column 3 reports the regressions for the subsample of stock 
dividend paying and non-dividend paying firms; Column 4 reports the regressions for the subsample of the combined 
cash and stock dividend paying firms and non-dividend paying firms; Column 5 reports the regression for the full 
sample, but includes Cash, Stock and Combined in a single regression. All regressions include dummy variables for 
industries (finance, utilities, properties, conglomerate, and industrial). Figures in parentheses are t-statistics based on 
White’s heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively. 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 Payers vs. Non-payers (%)  
Cash payers vs. 
Non-Payers (%)  
Stock Payers vs. 
Non-Payers (%)  
Combined vs. 
Non-payers (%)  All (%) 
          
Intercept -2.60 (-1.53)  
-6.01*** 
(-3.22)  
-3.70 
(-1.47)  
-3.77 
(-1.53)  
-5.86*** 
(-3.42) 
          
Log(TA) 0.02 (0.30)  
0.19** 
(2.09)  
0.07 
(0.58)  
0.08 
(0.64)  
0.18** 
(2.19) 
          
EPS 1.74*** (9.44)  
1.59*** 
(8.28)  
1.86*** 
(8.51)  
1.74*** 
(8.11)  
1.52*** 
(8.26) 
          
D_profits 0.02*** (10.08)  
1.73*** 
(9.64)  
2.01*** 
(8.48)  
1.89*** 
(9.11)  
1.69*** 
(10.38) 
          
Payer 1.65*** (7.48)         
          
Cash   0.26 (1.40)      
0.29 
(1.53) 
          
Stock     2.77*** (8.69)    
2.89*** 
(9.85) 
          
Combined       3.11*** (9.98)  
3.19*** 
(11.12) 
          
Industry Fixed 
Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
          
Adj R-squared 0.03  0.02  0.04  0.05  0.04 
Observations 11,903  9,664  6,751  6,870  11,903 
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Table 2.6    Regression Analysis on Announcement Effect Controlling for ΔEPS  
This table reports cross-sectional analysis on market reaction to the dividend announcement. The dependent variable is 
market-adjusted cumulative abnormal return from t= -5 to t=5, where t=0 is the announcement date of dividend 
schedule. TA is the total assets; EPS is the net earnings per share; ΔEPS is the change in net earnings per share; Payer is 
a dummy variable and equals to 1 for dividend-paying firms and zero otherwise; Cash is a dummy variable and equal to 
1 if the dividend payment method is cash and zero otherwise; Stock is a dummy variable and equal to 1 if the dividend 
payment method is stock and zero otherwise; Combined is a dummy variable and equal to 1 if the dividend payment 
method is the combination of cash and stocks and zero otherwise. Column 1 reports the regression for the full sample; 
Column 2 reports the regressions for the subsample of cash dividend paying firms and non-dividend paying firms; 
Column 3 reports the regressions for the subsample of stock dividend paying and non-dividend paying firms; Column 4 
reports the regressions for the subsample of the combined cash and stock dividend paying firms and non-dividend 
paying firms; Column 5 reports the regression for the full sample, but includes Cash, Stock and Combined in a single 
regression. All regressions include dummy variables for industries (finance, utilities, properties, conglomerate, and 
industrial). Figures in parentheses are t-statistics based on White’s heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. ***, ** 
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 Payers vs. Non-payers (%)  
Cash payers vs. 
Non-Payers (%)  
Stock Payers vs. 
Non-Payers (%)  
Combined vs. 
Non-payers (%)  All (%) 
          
Intercept -0.09 (-0.05)  
-3.78* 
(-1.86)  
0.07 
(0.03)  
0.21 
(0.08)  
-2.67 
(-1.41) 
          
Log(TA) -0.06 (-0.66)  
0.12 
(1.21)  
-0.07 
(-0.52)  
-0.07 
(-0.58)  
0.06 
(0.71) 
          
EPS 2.03*** (10.30)  
1.91*** 
(9.36)  
2.15*** 
(9.25)  
2.09*** 
(9.20)  
1.87*** 
(9.48) 
          
ΔEPS 0.01** (2.30)  
0.01** 
(2.39)  
0.01* 
(1.85)  
0.01* 
(1.78)  
0.01** 
(2.40) 
          
Payer 1.29*** (6.98)         
          
Cash   0.32 (1.55)      
0.37* 
(1.77) 
          
Stock     2.93*** (7.94)    
3.01*** 
(8.86) 
          
Combined       3.25*** (9.28)  
3.27*** 
(10.19) 
          
Industry Fixed 
Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
          
Adj R-squared 0.02  0.02  0.03  0.04  0.04 
Observations 10,481  8,765  6,080  6,242  10,481 
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Table 2.7    Difference in CARs among the Groups Classified by Changes in Profits and Dividend Paying Status 
This Table reports tests on the difference in [-5, +5] CARs among the group, classified by change in Profits and 
dividend paying status. Change in Profits is the difference between the current and previous periods’ net profits per 
share. Continue is a dummy variable equals 1 for continuing (cash, stock or combined) dividend payers from last period 
and zero otherwise; Initiate is 1 for newly initiated (cash, stock or combined) dividend payers (i.e., no dividend was 
paid last period) and zero otherwise; Changeto is 1 for payers that switch from cash (stock or combined) dividends in 
the last period to stock or combined (cash) dividends in this period and zero otherwise. Cash dividend group consists of 
those companies that paid cash dividends only; Stock dividend group consists of those companies that paid stock 
dividends only; and combined dividend group consists of those companies that paid a combination of cash and stock 
dividends. Event day, T=0, denotes the announcement date of dividend payments. The event period is five trading days 
before and after the event date. The sample period is between 1993 and 2006. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics 
based on White’s heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. *** and ** denote significance at 1% and 5% levels, 
respectively. 
 Initiate (%)  Continue (%)  Changeto (%) 
Panel A: All Dividend Paying Firms 
When Change in Profits ≤0 0.42  -0.70***  -0.05 
 (1.40) 
(N=711) 
 (-3.12) 
(N=1116) 
 (0.18) 
(N=784) 
When Change in Profits >0 1.22***  0.47**  3.24*** 
 (4.76) 
(N=899) 
 (2.20) 
(N=1189) 
 (6.97) 
(N=509) 
Difference in CARs between Change in Profits ≤0 and >0 -0.80**  -1.17***  -3.29*** 
t-stat on the difference (-2.05)  (-3.78)  (-5.85) 
Panel B: Cash Dividend Paying Group 
When Change in Profits ≤0 -0.70*  -1.12***  -1.14*** 
 (-1.90) 
(N=420) 
 (-4.60) 
(N=848) 
 (-3.54) 
(N=507) 
When Change in Profits >0 0.59*  0.14  -0.31 
 (1.86) 
(N=508) 
 (0.64) 
(N=1064) 
 (-0.48) 
(N=129) 
Difference in CARs between Change in Profits ≤0 and >0 -1.29***  -1.26***  -0.83 
t-stat on the difference (-2.66)  (-3.87)  (-1.15) 
Panel C: Stock Dividend Paying Group 
When Change in Profits ≤0 2.25***  0.18  1.01 
 (3.28) 
(N=154) 
 (0.23) 
(N=111) 
 (1.26) 
(N=138) 
When Change in Profits >0 1.61***  2.27*  5.85*** 
 (2.79) 
(N=203) 
 (1.93) 
(N=52) 
 (6.06) 
(N=128) 
Difference in CARs between Change in Profits ≤0 and >0 0.64  -2.09  -4.84*** 
t-stat on the difference (0.72)  (-1.49)  (-3.88) 
Panel D: Combined Cash and Stock Dividend Paying Group 
When Change in Profits ≤0 1.73**  1.04*  3.44*** 
 (2.41) 
(N=137) 
 (1.72) 
(N=157) 
 (5.12) 
(N=139) 
When Change in Profits >0 2.51***  3.97***  3.74*** 
 (4.09) 
(N=188) 
 (3.86) 
(N=73) 
 (5.33) 
(N=252) 
Difference in CARs between Change in Profits ≤0 and >0 -0.78  -2.93**  -0.30 
t-stat on the difference (-0.83)  (-2.58)  (-0.30) 
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Table 2.8    Difference in CARs among the Paying firms Classified by Difference in Relative Profit Change and 
Dividend Paying Status 
This Table reports mean difference in [-5, +5] CARs and test statistics among the group, classified by difference in 
relative profit change and dividend paying status. Difference in relative profit change is the difference in relative profit 
changes between the current and previous periods. Continue is a dummy variable equals 1 for continuing (cash, stock or 
combined) dividend payers from last period and zero otherwise; Initiate is 1 for newly initiated (cash, stock or 
combined) dividend payers (i.e., no dividend was paid last period) and zero otherwise; Changeto is 1 for payers that 
switch from cash (stock or combined) dividends in the last period to stock or combined (cash) dividends in this period 
and zero otherwise. Cash dividend group consists of those companies that paid cash dividends only; Stock dividend 
group consists of those companies that paid stock dividends only; and combined dividend group consists of those 
companies that paid a combination of cash and stock dividends. Event day, T=0, denotes the announcement date of 
dividend payments. The event period is five trading days before and after the event date. The sample period is between 
1993 and 2006. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics based on White’s heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. *** 
and ** denote significance at 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
 Initiate (%)  Continue (%)  Changeto (%) 
Panel A: All Dividend Paying Firms 
When Difference in Relative Profit change ≤0 0.27  -0.60**  0.39 
 (0.94) 
(N=779) 
 (-2.55) 
(N=1163) 
 (1.36) 
(N=832) 
When Difference in Relative Profit change >0 1.42***  0.39*  2.97*** 
 (5.40) 
(N=831) 
 (1.89) 
(N=1142) 
 (6.06) 
(N=461) 
Difference in CARs between Relative Profit change ≤0 and >0 -1.15***  -0.99***  -2.58*** 
t-stat on the difference  (-2.97)  (-3.15)  (-4.55) 
Panel B: Cash Dividend Paying Firms 
When Difference in Relative Profit change ≤0 -0.60  -1.10***  -1.20*** 
 (-1.59) 
(N=443) 
 (-4.34) 
(N=904) 
 (-3.74) 
(N=481) 
When Difference in Relative Profit change >0 0.57*  0.15  -0.10 
 (1.91) 
(N=485) 
 (0.72) 
(N=1008) 
 (-0.23) 
(N=155) 
Difference in CARs between Relative Profit change ≤0 and >0 -1.17***  -1.25***  -1.10* 
t-stat on the difference (-2.46)  (-3.74)  (-1.65) 
Panel C: Stock Dividend Paying Firms 
When Difference in Relative Profit change ≤0 1.22**  0.45  1.54** 
 (2.07) 
(N=168) 
 (0.57) 
(N=107) 
 (2.01) 
(N=152) 
When Difference in Relative Profit change >0 2.47***  1.61  5.73*** 
 (3.83) 
(N=189) 
 (1.36) 
(N=56) 
 (5.46) 
(N=114) 
Difference in CARs between Change in Profits ≤0 and >0 -1.25  -1.16  -4.19*** 
t-stat on the difference (-1.42)  (-0.84)  (-3.23) 
Panel D: Combined Cash and Stock Dividend Paying Firms 
When Difference in Relative Profit change ≤0 1.61**  1.65**  3.45*** 
 (2.52) 
(N=168) 
 (2.51) 
(N=152) 
 (5.85) 
(N=199) 
When Difference in Relative Profit change >0 2.79***  2.60***  3.82*** 
 (4.11) 
(N=157) 
 (2.84) 
(N=78) 
 (4.53) 
(N=192) 
Difference in CARs between Relative Profit change ≤0 and >0 -1.18  -0.95  -0.37 
t-stat on the difference (-1.27)  (-0.85)  (-0.36) 
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Figure 2.1    Cumulative Abnormal Returns between Dividend Paying and No Paying Groups 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2    Cumulative Abnormal Returns among Dividend Paying Sub-groups  
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 Dividend Policy, Corporate Governance and Stock Liquidity Chapter 3
3.1 Introduction 
Why do firms pay dividends? The irrelevance proposition developed by Miller and Modigliani 
(1961) established the foundation for the contemporary study of dividend policy. Classical M&M 
theory states that what is truly important is a firm’s investment policy and that the dividend is 
merely the residual between earnings and investments and is thus irrelevant to firm value. However, 
considerable empirical evidence shows that both managers and markets do care about dividends and 
that firm value changes in a manner consistent with dividend policy. Therefore, the dividend 
literature in the past forty years has attempted to reconcile the M&M irrelevance theorem with the 
empirical evidence by relaxing the assumptions on which the irrelevance proposition is based. Such 
studies consider the role of taxes, agency relationships, and asymmetric information, among other 
factors.  
Agency theory posits that the incentives of management are likely to differ from those of 
stockholders. Managers may allocate resources to activities for their own benefits but not 
necessarily in the best interest of stockholders. For example, an excessive amount of cash in a firm 
can result in overinvestment. One solution to this problem is to increase the level of dividends to 
take the free cash flow from the firm (Grossman and Hart (1980); Easterbrook (1984); Jensen 
(1986)). These theories suggest a significant deviation from the M&M dividend irrelevance 
proposition because paying more dividends increases firm value by reducing potential 
overinvestment and is favorably received by investors. 
The assumption embedded in the original M&M proposition is that investors are not 
constrained by liquidity. When capital markets are perfect and when there is no asymmetric 
information, trading is frictionless, and investors with liquidity needs can thus create homemade 
dividends at no cost by selling an appropriate amount of their holdings in the firm. However, 
trading is not frictionless in real financial markets. Investors must either provide a price concession 
for an immediate execution or wait some time for an optimal execution.5 In an extreme form, the 
existence of trading constraints does not allow investors to freely sell their shares in the secondary 
market to satisfy their liquidity needs. In a less extreme form, investors must account for liquidity 
costs in the possible liquidation of stocks. 
This chapter examines how corporate governance and stock liquidity affect corporate dividend 
payouts in the context of an exogenous policy shock, the Chinese 2005 split-share structure reform. 
5 Investors must also pay trading commissions. 
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The split-share structure reform mandated the conversion of non-tradable shares (NTS) into tradable 
shares (TS), constituting an exogenous shock to firms’ governance that facilitated better alignment 
of the interests of controlling shareholders with those of outside investors, resulting in an 
improvement in firms’ corporate governance. Moreover, the reform removed a substantial trading 
constraint. Because of the reform, stock liquidity is more closely related to the interests of 
controlling shareholders, who can sell some of their shares for liquidity needs and benefit from 
share price appreciation. We investigate the implications of share reform-induced governance and 
liquidity improvements for corporate dividend policy. First, we examine how listed firms’ dividend 
policy responds to a governance and liquidity shock (i.e., the split-share structure reform) by 
comparing corporate dividend policy before and after the reform. Second, we explore the channels 
through which the reform affects corporate dividend policy by considering the effect of corporate 
governance and stock liquidity. The point regarding the effect of liquidity on dividends is relatively 
new, partly because non-tradability is less of an issue in the more mature markets. 
The traditional approach to testing for the governance effect is cross-sectional, such as the 
approach used by La Porta, et al. (2000). Those researchers propose two agency models of 
dividends. Specifically, the “outcome model” hypothesizes that dividends result from minority 
shareholders using their legal powers to extract cash from corporate insiders. Alternatively, in the 
“substitute model,” the payment of dividends is a substitute in the absence of legal protection for 
shareholders. Because of the need to seek external finance at some point in time, firms pay 
dividends to build their reputation for good shareholder treatment. La Porta, et al. (2000) show that 
dividend payouts are higher on average in countries with stronger legal protection of minority 
shareholders. Their findings lend support to the “outcome” agency model.  
Some studies also adopt an approach based on firm fixed effects. For example, Mitton (2004) 
investigates dividend policies in emerging markets and concludes that firms with better governance 
pay higher dividends. A limitation of the previous studies is that their results can be attributed to 
selection bias. For example, a firm could choose to improve its governance, and hence, the 
improvement is endogenously determined, which may affect any inference drawn. In this study, an 
exogenous event (i.e., the split-share reform) provides a quasi-natural experiment and mitigates 
endogeneity concerns. 
Many studies attempt to establish a link between dividend policy and stock market liquidity. 
Banerjee, Gatchev and Spindt (2007) show that firms with less liquid stock are more likely to pay 
dividends, indicating that investors view dividends and liquidity as substitutes. In a similar paper, 
however, Igan, de Paula and Pinheiro (2010) suggest the opposite relationship: dividend-paying 
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firms are associated with greater stock liquidity. Despite their discrepancies, both studies suffer 
from the issue that stock liquidity and dividend policy can be endogenously determined by other 
forces in firms’ operating environments. Hence, the question of whether stock liquidity has an effect 
on dividend policy remains a largely empirical issue, and its investigation is one of the aims of our 
study. The main feature that distinguishes our paper is that we take advantage of an exogenous 
event that may have a bearing on this effect (i.e., the split-share structure reform) and avoid the 
potential inference problem. 
For several reasons, the split-share structure reform offers a unique setting that allows us to test 
the relationship among corporate governance, stock liquidity and corporate payouts. First, the 
reform provides a quasi-natural experimental setting that allows us to compare the relationship in 
the pre- and post-reform periods. Second, the setting helps to avoid endogeneity bias and provides 
clear identification of the effects of governance and liquidity on corporate dividend policy. The 
reform was mandatory and dominated by the Chinese government. Although the reform altered the 
exchangeability of NTS throughout the entire market, it had a relatively small effect on firms’ 
operating, financing, and investment opportunities. The reform thus provides us with a desired 
setting for the analysis. Third, the reform restricted the number of firms entering the reform at any 
given time. Thus, we can apply a difference-in-differences approach to identify the effect of the 
reform by isolating the time-specific changes. Fourth, the reform applied to both state- and privately 
controlled firms. Hence, we have an opportunity to cleanly measure the net effect of the reform. 
When China reintroduced its two stock exchanges in 1991, it imposed a regulation on share 
ownership. For all listed companies, approximately two-thirds of their shares were held in the form 
of NTS (primarily held by state governments), and only approximately one-third of shares 
(primarily held by individual investors) were tradable. The NTS entitled holders to the same voting 
rights but could not be traded publicly. This dual-share structure caused serious corporate 
governance problems (i.e., ineffective boards and the expropriation of minority investors), which 
have jeopardized the development of the capital market.6 
In April 2005, the Chinese authorities launched a stock market reform program in which NTS 
gradually became tradable. The reform for Chinese firms was staggered over time. By the end of 
2007, approximately 98% of listed firms had completed the reform. Upon completion of the reform, 
there would theoretically be no fundamental difference in terms of pricing and valuation between 
the Chinese stock market and international markets.  
6 For instance, TS holders are normally minority shareholders who are unlikely to influence management decisions. 
Furthermore, given their inability to trade, NTS holders are relatively less sensitive to stock price movement. In 
addition, NTS limit market liquidity, resulting in a more volatile market. 
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The reform represents an exogenous shock to improve corporate governance through an 
enhanced role of minority investors and a more vibrant market for corporate control. The reform 
facilitated better alignment of the interests of controlling shareholders with those of outside 
investors. The reform also removed a liquidity constraint, which in turn reduced controlling 
shareholders’ demand for cash dividends.7 In addition, the ability of NTS holders to trade their 
shares publicly aligned the incentives of controlling shareholders with firm value, leading to a 
reduction in expropriating behavior.8  
Using a panel of 1,275 listed non-financial firms in China over the 2003-2011 period, we find 
that the average cash dividend payout decreases in the post-reform period and that the reduction in 
cash payouts appears to apply more to firms with higher growth rates and higher liquidity. Given 
the fundamental difference in controlling shareholders between state-controlled and privately 
controlled firms, the reduction in cash payouts appears to be more substantial in state-controlled 
firms. Our results are robust to different time horizons surrounding the reform. These findings are 
largely consistent with the view that the split-share structure reform is associated with 
improvements in corporate governance and stock liquidity. 
We also investigate whether the reform affects the decisions of firms to pay cash dividends. The 
results indicate that the propensity to pay cash dividends decreases significantly after the reform. 
Furthermore, the post-reform period features a decrease in the probability of initiating a cash 
dividend and a greater likelihood of firms omitting cash dividends. In addition, firms tend to pay a 
lower level of dividends in the post-reform period when they maintain dividend payments.  
Our study offers a number of contributions. First, by providing insights into the effect of 
corporate governance and stock liquidity on dividend policy, this study complements prior work on 
dividend policy. Second, using the split-share structure reform as a quasi-natural experiment, our 
study contributes to the literature by identifying a setting in which firms experience an exogenous 
shock to their governance systems, which enables us to identify the causal effect of governance on 
dividend policy. Third, we study a novel channel in which an exogenous liquidity shock (triggered 
by the reform) exerts influence on firms’ dividend decisions beyond the straightforward governance 
channel. Most of the previous empirical studies focus on the governance effect on dividend policy 
while neglecting the effect of stock liquidity. Our study fills this gap in the literature. Fourth, from a 
methodological perspective, our setting avoids inference problems arising from the concern that 
7 Prior to the reform, given that NTS could not be traded in the market, the only way to distribute company profits to 
controlling shareholders was through cash dividends.  
8 The expropriation by NTS holders can take the form of giving up subscription rights and using receipts from rights 
offering to pay huge cash dividends. This is equivalent to sell a proportion of NTS to TS holders at a price much higher 
than that in private negotiation (Lee and Xiao (2004)). 
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both dividend policy and corporate governance arrangements can be endogenous responses to 
forces in firms’ operating environments that are unobservable to researchers. Finally, our findings 
advance the knowledge of corporate dividend policy in emerging economies by providing evidence 
from the Chinese capital market. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the institutional 
environment that provides the setting for our analysis, and Section 3.3 reviews the related literature. 
The development of our hypotheses is presented in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 describes the data and 
our sample. Our empirical results are reported in Section 3.6. Section 3.7 describes the robustness 
check, and the final section concludes the chapter. 
3.2 Institutional Background 
3.2.1 The split-share structure reform 
In 1990, the Chinese government began to partially privatize state-owned enterprises on the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. Shares in listed firms were issued to public investors, 
employees, legal entities and the state government. However, the Chinese government often 
retained control of listed firms through controlling share positions held in the form of a non-tradable 
class of shares. Trading these NTS was prohibited in the secondary market.9 Approximately two-
thirds of NTS were held by government agencies, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and legal entities. 
By contrast, TS were held by diverse minority shareholders, such as mutual funds, pension funds, 
private firms and individuals. Generally, controlling shareholders in Chinese listed firms were 
typically NTS holders. 10 The trading restriction on NTS affected stock liquidity, resulting in a 
significant market friction. 
On April 29, 2005, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC, the equivalent of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission in the U.S.) launched a stock market reform program in 
which NTS gradually became tradable. Each firm was required to propose a reform plan to change 
the status of NTS. 
To prevent NTS holders from benefiting at the expense of TS holders (who face a flood of 
shares into the secondary market), the announcement further specified that over a period of trading 
suspension, NTS holders must negotiate with TS holders on the level of compensation (in the form 
9  Although it was impossible to trade NTS in the secondary market, the transfer of NTS was possible through 
irregularly scheduled auctions and over-the-counter transactions, and the trade price was normally close to net asset 
values. 
10 According to Huang, Shen and Sun (2011), TS accounted for an average of only approximately one-third of the total 
shares during their sample period. 
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of stock grants or both cash and stock grants) that they will pay to TS holders for the right to sell 
their shares in the future.  
To stabilize the stock market, the CSRC further imposed a 12-month lockup to restrict NTS 
holders from selling their shares after the completion of the reform. In the two years following 
expiration of the lockup, NTS holders owning more than 5% of a firm were allowed to sell only a 
maximum of 5% and 10% of the firms’ total shares within a period of 12 and 24 months, 
respectively. 
3.3 Literature Review 
3.3.1 Corporate governance and dividend policy 
In traditional agency theory, agency problems arise from the conflicts of interest between 
management and stockholders because the incentives for management are likely to differ from those 
for stockholders. Management teams can allocate resources to activities that benefit themselves but 
are not in the best interest of stockholders. For example, an excessive amount of in a firm can lead 
to potential overinvestment. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Easterbrook (1984) observe that an 
increase in dividends mitigates agency problems and leads to higher firm value because managers 
have less free cash flows to invest in negative net present value projects. Hence, agency theory 
predicts that cash dividend payments increase with free cash flow but decrease with the growth 
opportunities of firms (Jensen (1986)). Consistent with these theories, Twite, Shi, He and Li (2012) 
report that Chinese listed firms that have higher cash holdings are more likely to pay cash dividends 
than are other firms. Given that agency problems are prominent in Chinese listed firms, the need to 
mitigate agency conflicts could partially motivate NTS holders to prefer cash dividends.11 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that in many large companies around the world, conflicts of 
interest between management and outside investors, such as minority shareholders, may not be the 
major source of agency problems. Instead, agency problems can arise from the conflicts of interest 
between minority shareholders and controlling shareholders who can exert considerable influence 
on management’s decision making. Controlling shareholders who control corporate assets can use 
these assets for a range of purposes that are detrimental to the interests of minority shareholders. 
For example, controlling shareholders can divert corporate assets to themselves or implement 
corporate policies that provide them with personal benefits of control at the expense of minority 
shareholders.  
11 Given that controlling shareholders in Chinese listed firms are typically NTS holders and given that TS holders are 
normally minority shareholders who are unlikely to affect management decisions, the preferences of NTS holders tend 
to dominate firms’ dividend policy. 
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In the context of the split-share structure, NTS holders are typically the controlling shareholders 
in Chinese listed firms. They have both the power and incentives to expropriate corporate wealth at 
the expense of minority shareholders (normally TS holders). Given the overwhelming shareholding 
of NTS holders, paying huge cash dividends can be a legal vehicle to exploit minority shareholders. 
Many Chinese studies document the expropriation behavior of NTS holders through large cash 
dividend payments (see Lee and Xiao (2004); Tang and Luo (2006); Tang and Xie (2006); Wang, 
Li and Lu (2007); Yan (2004); Yuan (2001); Zhang and Xu (2006)).12 
3.3.2 Stock liquidity and dividend policy 
The link between dividend policy and stock liquidity can be traced back to Miller and Modigliani 
(1961). Under the assumption of perfect capital markets, investors with liquidity needs do not have 
to bear any direct or indirect costs of trading when liquidating their investment in a firm. When 
trading friction exists in financial markets, stocks that pay cash dividends allow investors to satisfy 
their liquidity needs with less or no trading, thus enabling them to mitigate trading costs. Dong, 
Robinson and Veld (2005) present survey evidence that individual investors prefer cash dividends, 
partly because their transaction costs involved in selling shares are higher than the costs of cashing 
in dividends. Therefore, in markets with trading friction, firms with less liquid stocks offer investors 
more dividends to compensate for higher levels of trading friction, which is the intuitive implication 
of the “liquidity hypothesis of dividends” in Banerjee, et al. (2007). 
Brav, Graham, Harvey and Michaely (2005) survey 384 CFOs and treasurers primarily from 
U.S. companies and conduct 23 in-depth interviews with executives on their payout policies. Their 
results suggest that the liquidity of firms’ stocks is an important factor affecting their payout 
decisions. For example, repurchases may be curtailed if managers believe that repurchases would 
reduce liquidity below a critical level. If such firms decide to distribute cash dividends rather than 
repurchase shares, then their behavior is consistent with the liquidity hypothesis of dividends. More 
directly, Banerjee, et al. (2007) show that firms with less liquid shares are more inclined to pay 
dividends compared with firms with more liquid shares. Their evidence provides empirical support 
for the liquidity hypothesis of dividends. Igan, et al. (2010) also investigate the interaction between 
stock liquidity and dividend policy, but they suggest an opposite relationship: dividend-paying 
firms are associated with greater stock liquidity.13 Despite their discrepancies, both studies suffer 
from the issue that stock liquidity and dividend policy can be endogenously determined by other 
12 Note that the expropriation behavior of NTS holders can be affected by the split-share structure reform and that this 
change may result in subsequent change in firms’ dividend policy. We will leave it to our future research. 
13 The discrepancies arise primarily because all regressions in Banerjee, et al. (2007) are conducted on sub-samples 
partitioned by different time periods, whereas Igan, et al. (2010) focus on the entire sample period. 
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forces in firms’ operating environments. By using the split-share structure reform as an exogenous 
shock that affected only the liquidity of firms’ stocks but had no effects on other factors unrelated to 
liquidity, our study avoids the potential inference problem and provides insight into the causal 
effect of stock liquidity on firms’ payout decisions. 
Before the split-share structure reform in the Chinese stock market, given the existence of 
trading constraints, NTS -holders could neither sell their shares in the secondary market nor benefit 
from capital gains arising from share price changes; thus, cash dividends represented the primary 
source of liquidity for NTS holders. As a result, NTS holders tend to demand high cash dividends to 
compensate for the liquidity constraint. Huang, et al. (2011) provide empirical evidence that the 
cash dividend level in Chinese listed firms is significantly and positively correlated with the 
proportion of NTS.  
3.3.3 State-controlled vs. privately controlled firms 
The nature of ownership is believed to have a considerable effect on firms’ dividend policy. In the 
context of the Chinese market, previous studies find that state-controlled firms pay higher cash 
dividends than privately controlled firms do (see, e.g., Gao (2009); Hu and Huang (2005); Ma, 
Huang and Xue (2005); Song and Li (2007); Wu and Zhai (2013); Yu, Chen and Sun (2010)).  
The incentive to pay cash dividends also differs between state-controlled and privately 
controlled firms (Lv and Zhou (2005)). Empirical evidence suggests that state-controlled firms pay 
high cash dividends to limit managerial entrenchment behavior and to reduce agency costs (Xu, Xin 
and Chen (2006)). For historical reasons, state-controlled firms in China are well known for their 
acute owner-manager agency problems because of the vaguely defined state ownership rights and 
the delegation of management and monitoring functions to bureaucrats whose interests are not well 
aligned with those of shareholders. More precisely, in state-controlled listed firms, state 
shareholders are virtually represented by government agencies or officials who are nominated by 
the government. Although these government agencies and officials possess actual control of state 
assets, the cash flow rights do not belong to them because they are paid by the government, and 
their remuneration and rewards are unrelated to the performance of the listed firms that they oversee. 
As a consequence, state shareholders have no incentive to actively participate in the management of 
state-controlled listed firms. Therefore, the virtual absence of state shareholders renders the 
supervision and monitoring of managers ineffective (Liao and Fang (2005)). In addition, state 
shareholders, especially government officials, typically have no relevant industry experience and 
thus lack both the necessary skills to effectively monitor listed firms’ managers and the knowledge 
necessary to provide strategic advice (Chen, Firth and Xu (2009)). Therefore, state shareholders 
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have neither the incentive nor ability to efficiently monitor managers in listed firms. In this sense, 
the agency problem between state shareholders and management is prominent in state-controlled 
firms, and the corporate governance in such firms is relatively weak.  
By contrast, expropriation is less likely to be an incentive for large dividend payments in state-
controlled firms. Given their nature as government agents, state shareholders generally have 
substantial non-price considerations, such as a wish to meet certain political and social welfare 
objectives. Moreover, state shareholders are subject to monitoring by the state. Hence, the incentive 
and ability for a state shareholder to expropriate wealth away from minority shareholders via large 
cash dividends is diminished by the its general nature as an organization with its own system of 
internal controls (Lin, Cai and Li (1998)). 
In firms that are controlled by private investors, controlling shareholders often install 
themselves or their representatives as the CEO or chairman of listed firms; therefore, management 
is actively monitored by these private shareholders. Meanwhile, these private controlling 
shareholders normally have detailed knowledge of the industry in which the firm operates; thus, 
they find it easier to be involved in the management function and to monitor hired managers more 
effectively (Chen, et al. (2009)). Therefore, agency problems associated with the separation of 
ownership and management are smaller in privately controlled listed firms than in state-controlled 
firms. A much larger concern in such firms is the expropriation incentive of controlling 
shareholders. Specifically, in contrast to state-controlled firms, privately controlled firms are not 
subject to state monitoring or government intervention. Controlling shareholders thus have more 
opportunity to expropriate corporate wealth. More importantly, private controlling shareholders are 
expected to focus on maximizing returns, including pursuing the private benefits associated with 
diverting corporate assets to themselves or paying large amounts of cash dividends. Therefore, cash 
dividends are more likely to be used by controlling shareholders as a means of expropriation in 
privately controlled firms. 
3.3.4 The split-share structure reform 
Research on the split-share structure reform generally focuses on whether the split-share structure 
reform is associated with positive outcomes. Chen, Chen, Schipper, Xu and Xue (2012) find that the 
split-share reform results in lower cash holdings and higher market valuations of cash holdings, 
suggesting that better governance has followed the reform. Campello, Ribas and Wang (2010) also 
report post-reform improvements in the profitability, productivity, and investments of firms. 
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Another stream of studies focuses on the effect of corporate governance on the reform process, 
particularly the compensation paid by NTS holders to TS holders. With better governance standards, 
including stronger shareholder protection, TS holders are willing to accept a relatively lower level 
of compensation (Jin and Yuan (2008)).14 Evidence shows that the compensation ratio is negatively 
associated with firms’ pre-reform corporate governance levels (see, e.g., Jin and Yuan (2008); 
Zheng, Sun, Tan and Jiang (2007)).15 In relation to this finding, Xin and Xu (2007) observe that 
firms with better external governance environments tend to have lower compensation ratios. 
3.4 Hypothesis Development 
In this chapter, we study how corporate governance and stock liquidity affect corporate dividend 
policy by investigating the effect of the split-share reform on cash dividends. The reform has 
occurred through two channels: a governance channel and a liquidity channel. 
By removing a significant market friction, the split-share structure reform represents an 
exogenous shock to firms’ governance systems that facilitated better alignment of the interests of 
controlling shareholders (i.e., holders of previously NTS) with those of outside investors (holders of 
TS). NTS holders are now able to sell their shares in the secondary market and thereby realize the 
benefits of stock price appreciation. This ability provides controlling shareholders with an incentive 
to care about share value, which in turn encourages them to take value-maximizing actions for the 
firm as a whole, including eliminating or reducing expropriating behaviours via large cash 
distributions. Moreover, because controlling shareholders’ ownership will be diluted through the 
conversion process (which typically entails share compensation), it becomes more costly for NTS 
holders to benefit from dividend payouts. Therefore, cash dividends distributed for an expropriation 
purpose are expected to decrease after the reform. 
However, in the post-reform period, when NTS become tradable, the wealth of controlling 
shareholders became closely related to stock prices. Accordingly, controlling shareholders tend to 
monitor managers more actively and provide more strategic advice. In addition, given the 
tradability of NTS after the reform, the competitive takeover market was unfrozen, allowing for the 
14 According to Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) and Bai, Liu, Lu, Song and Zhang (2005), firms with better 
corporate governance have higher firm value because investors are willing to pay a considerable premium for better 
governance, including stronger shareholder protection. Consequently, investors expect that the future (post-reform) 
price will be higher for firms with better pre-reform corporate governance than for weakly governed firms and that the 
adverse price impact from the supply of converted shares will be mitigated (Jin and Yuan (2008)). In addition, if TS 
holders are subject to expropriation before the reform as a result of low governance levels and weak shareholder 
protection, they are more likely to use the classified voting system (i.e., the compensation plan must be approved by at 
least two-thirds of voting TS holders before it is passed) to demand higher compensation to protect themselves. 
15 This strand of literature also provides support for our use of the compensation ratio as a proxy for firms’ corporate 
governance level. 
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replacement of inept managers. Poorly performing firms are more prone to be the targets of 
takeovers. The threat of being taken over provides managers with better incentives to increase 
efficiency and enhance firm performance. Hence, agency costs should decrease after the reform, 
and consequently, the need to pay cash dividends (as a means of curtailing agency problems) should 
also decline. 
Notably, because the split-share structure reform removed liquidity constraints on NTS, NTS 
holders are able to receive both dividends and capital gains in the post-reform period. This ability 
allows investors to create “home-made” dividends, which in turn reduces NTS holders’ demand for 
cash dividends. Therefore, we hypothesize as follows: 
H1: The average dividend payout decreases in the post-reform period. 
State-controlled firms in China are well known for their acute owner-manager agency problems. 
Vaguely defined state ownership rights discourage state shareholders from actively monitoring 
managerial behaviors, and the delegation of management and monitoring functions to bureaucrats 
whose interests are not well aligned with shareholder interests creates further problems. Moreover, 
under the dual-share structure, executives in state-controlled firms do not behave in the best 
interests of TS holders because such executives are typically nominated and employed by NTS 
holders (i.e., the central or local government), and their promotion depends largely on how well 
they execute the instructions of the government rather than on how much they contribute to creating 
firm value. This structure has fostered agency problems. 
By contrast, in privately controlled firms, controlling shareholders often install themselves or 
their representatives as the CEO or chairman of listed firms, and management is thus actively 
monitored by these private shareholders. Therefore, privately controlled firms are more efficient 
than state-controlled firms, and agency problems are more severe for state-controlled firms. As 
argued by Sheshinski and López-Calva (2003), transferring state ownership to private ownership 
should result in significant efficiency gains. 
The split-share structure reform dismantled the dual-share structure of the Chinese market. For 
state-controlled firms, the reform unfroze the transferring of ownership and effectively mitigated 
state shareholders’ moral hazard problems by aligning their control and cash flow rights. The 
agency costs of state-controlled firms are expected to decrease significantly after the reform. 
Therefore, compared with privately controlled firms, state-controlled firms have more severe pre-
reform agency conflicts and will experience greater reductions in their cash dividends after the 
reform. Hence, we propose the following hypothesis: 
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H2: The decline in cash dividends is more significant in firms that are controlled by state 
shareholders.  
We also investigate how the effect of the reform on cash dividends varies with firm-specific 
characteristics that capture corporate governance and stock liquidity. Before the reform, as stated 
above, controlling shareholders generally preferred cash dividends regardless of firms’ growth 
opportunities because cash dividend payments were generally the primary source of returns, given 
that their shares could not be traded in the open market. Hence, paying cash dividends met the 
demands of large shareholders but consumed cash and reduced the internal funds available for 
investment opportunities. The reform dismantled the dual-share structure, and the wealth of large 
shareholders became more closely tied to stock prices. Thus, the payment of dividends could be 
directly affected by a firm’s growth potential and investment needs. As a result, firms with higher 
growth experience the effects of the share reform mainly through the governance channel. Thus, we 
predict greater decreases in cash dividends in high-growth firms because these firms are more likely 
to have benefitted directly from governance improvements prompted by the reform. 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) suggest that the owners of illiquid shares incur additional 
trading costs (i.e., searching, negotiation and transaction). For instance, the difficulty in selling an 
illiquid stock induces a high transaction cost (i.e., a higher bid-ask spread), which results in a higher 
cost of capital and a lower stock price, if all other factors remain unchanged. The split-share 
structure reform relaxed the trading constraints on NTS shares and positively influenced the 
liquidity of shares, especially during the post-lockup period. Shareholders in firms with illiquid 
shares are prevented from achieving the expected capital gains, and hence, these shareholders still 
prefer cash dividends after the reform. By contrast, for firms whose stocks are more liquid, 
previously NTS can be sold in the market relatively easily with lower costs. Therefore, controlling 
shareholders in firms with higher liquidity are more likely to sell their shares after the lockup, 
reducing their demand for cash dividends. Hence, firms with higher liquidity are expected to have 
greater reductions in cash payouts after the reform. This expectation is a direct outcome of the 
liquidity channel, given that the reduction in cash dividends is triggered by the liquidity shock. 
Considering this reasoning, we hypothesize as follows:  
H3: Firms with higher growth rates and stock liquidity experience greater reductions in cash 
dividend payouts in the post-reform period. 
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3.5 Sample and Data Description 
The source of our data is the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. 
Our sample includes all Chinese A-shares listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges 
from 2003 to 2011. We restrict the sample period to the post-2000 period because have Chinese 
listed firms begun to apply a consistent and unified set of accounting standards since 2000, and the 
controlling shareholder data begin in 2003. 
In constructing our test sample, we exclude firms for which we cannot obtain data on the split-
share structure reform.16 We also remove firm years that are delisted, under ‘Special Treatment 
(ST)’ and ‘Particular Transfer (PT)’.17 
Because all dividends, including stock dividends, are taxed at 10% in China after 2005 and 
because listed firms need to withhold the dividend tax, many firms pay cash dividends simply to 
cover the tax payable induced by stock dividends. To eliminate this tax-induced effect, we exclude 
dividend observations with a non-zero before-tax cash dividend but with a zero after-tax dividend 
(following Lee and Xiao (2004); Huang, et al. (2011)).18 
To precisely capture the real effect of the reform, we include only firm-year observations within 
3 years before and 3 years after the reform. Given that reform compensation can take the form of a 
cash dividend, to avoid confounding factors, we discard the dividend observations that occur 
exactly in the reform year. Finally, a total of 6,156 firm-year observations are included in our test 
sample. These observations represent 1,275 listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges over the sample period. 
Figure 3.1 plots the number of sample firms by their reform completion years. The reform year 
ranges from 2005 to 2009, but we still find that most firms completed the reform in 2005 and 2006. 
In our sample period, more than 70% of firms completed the reform in 2006, and 18% of firms 
completed the reform in 2005. 
[Insert Figure 3.1 about here] 
We retrieve all variables from the CSMAR database. Table 3.1 provides definitions for all of 
the variables that are either investigated or used as controls in our tests. Our payout variable is the 
16 The 878 firms with missing reform data either had no NTS before the reform or were first listed after the reform (and 
therefore did not issue NTS). 
17 China has an investor warning system. If a firm has a negative net income for two consecutive years, then the CSRC 
gives ST to the shares of the company. The daily price change limit for ST firms is 5%. A firm that has consecutive 
losses for three years is further classified as an ST* firm. If the firm continues to lose money, it faces delisting and the 
trading of its shares is suspended. PT is a trading service offered for suspended stocks on every Friday. Cash dividend 
payments are restricted for firms with ST, ST* and PT status. 
18 We removed 795 firm-year observations. 
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dividend payout ratio, calculated as the total cash dividends divided by the EBIT (earnings before 
interest and tax). To cope with extreme values, we winsorize the dividend payout ratio, Payout, at 
the top one percent of its distribution. Some of the key variables that we use in the analysis also 
pose outlier problems. To address these problems, we winsorize ROA and LagPayout at the top and 
bottom one percentiles of their respective distributions and winsorize SGrowth and ROAVOL at the 
top one percentile of their respective distributions. 
[Insert Table 3.1 about here] 
Table 3.2 tabulates the summary statistics for the dividend payout variable and for other key 
variables used in subsequent analysis. Panel A reports the summary statistics for the entire sample. 
Cash dividend payouts account for 16.1% of the sample firms’ earnings on average, but the 
maximum payout ratio is as high as 93.4%. This result suggests that on average, Chinese listed 
firms distribute a lower proportion of earnings as dividends, compared with 27% in the US (Gill, 
Biger and Tibrewala (2010)) and 47% in the UK (Michaely and Roberts (2012)), with some firms 
paying extremely high dividends. Furthermore, we divide the full sample into two subsamples 
according to the nature of their ultimate controlling shareholders. The State subsample consists of 
firms whose ultimate controlling shareholder is an SOE or a government agency. The Private 
subsample consists of firms that are ultimately controlled by private entities. Panel B of Table 3.2 
reports summary statistics for the State subsample, and Panel C provides summary statistics for the 
Private subsample. We find that state-controlled firms pay higher average cash dividends than 
privately controlled firms. This finding is consistent with the evidence in previous studies (see Gao 
(2009); Hu and Huang (2005); Ma, et al. (2005); Song and Li (2007); Wu and Zhai (2013); Yu, et 
al. (2010)). State-controlled firms are also larger than privately controlled firms. 
[Insert Table 3.2 about here] 
3.6 Empirical Results 
3.6.1 Univariate analysis 
Figure 3.2 plots the cash dividend payout ratios for the sample firms by financial year. We observe 
that the reduction in cash payouts is concentrated in the years 2005, 2006 and 2007, when most 
firms completed their split-share structure reforms. These results provide an intuitive idea of the 
reform’s effect on firms’ cash dividend policy. 
[Insert Figure 3.2 about here] 
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To formally investigate the effect of the split-share structure reform on firms’ dividend payouts, 
we compare the sample firms’ three-year average cash dividend payout ratio before the reform with 
the three-year average after the reform. As expected, the average cash dividend payout ratio 
decreases from 20% before the reform to 13.5% after the reform, a change of 32.5%. The reform 
thus results in reduced levels of cash dividends, supporting our first hypothesis. We also compare 
the change in dividend payouts between the State and Private subsamples. We observe greater post-
reform reductions in cash payouts in firms owned by the state than in privately owned firms. This 
finding is also consistent with our expectation. 
[Insert Table 3.3 about here] 
3.6.2 Multivariate analysis 
3.6.2.1 The average effect of share reform on the dividend payout ratio and cross-sectional 
variation in the effects 
We now present the multivariate analysis. In designing our research method, we believe that the 
reform represents an exogenous shock to firms’ governance systems, given that the reform was 
mandatory and dominated by the CSRC. The reform affected only the exchangeability of previously 
NTS, with no effects on operating, financing, and investment opportunities that are unrelated to 
governance.  
The CSRC also restricted the number of firms starting the reform at any given time; thus, the 
reform stages for different firms were staggered. Because our sample firms completed the reform at 
different calendar times, we are able to apply a difference-in-differences approach to distinguish the 
effect of the reform from time-specific changes. In a particular financial year, the sample firms that 
completed the conversion constitute our treatment group, and the other sample firms serve as the 
control group. Because both groups experienced the same time-specific changes, the differences in 
their cash dividends provide an estimate of the effect of the split-share reform on dividend payouts.  
We estimate the following multivariate Tobit regression model to assess the effect of the reform 
on dividend policy along with other determinants.  
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
𝑠. 𝑡.𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 = 0                                                    (3.1) 
The dependent variable is the dividend payout ratio, Payout, calculated as the total cash 
dividends divided by the EBIT. To capture the actual effect of the reform, we construct an indicator 
variable Reform, which is equal to one if firm i has finished the reform by the end of year t and zero 
43 
 
otherwise. SGrowth is the annual sales growth rate averaged over the pre-reform years. Illiquidity is 
the Amihud illiquidity ratio, which is defined as the average ratio of the daily absolute return to the 
(dollar) trading volume on that day. This ratio is also averaged over the pre-reform years. State is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s ultimate controlling shareholder is a state-owned-
enterprise or a government agency and zero otherwise.  
Xi,t is the set of control variables that determine corporate dividend payouts. Based on the 
existing literature, Xi,t includes the following variables. ROAVOL is the standard deviation of ROA 
over the most recent four years, including the current financial year; it is used as a proxy for cash 
flow uncertainty.19 RE2TE is the proxy for the earned-to-contributed capital mix and is measured as 
the ratio of retained earnings to total equity.20 LagPayout is the cash dividend payout ratio in the 
prior year.21 Other control variables include firm size (measured by the logarithm of total assets), 
operating profitability (measured by return on assets), cash holding (measured by cash and 
marketable securities plus short-term investments scaled by total assets) and leverage (measured by 
the total liabilities scaled by total assets).22 
Table 3.4 tabulates the results from estimating Equation (3.1). Column 1 shows the result of the 
baseline model. The coefficient on Reform is -0.058, which is highly significant at the 1% level. 
This finding confirms that the reform leads to a reduction in firms’ cash dividend payout ratios and 
provides strong support for our first hypothesis. The coefficient on State is significantly positive. 
This finding is consistent with the univariate result that state-owned firms pay a higher level of cash 
dividends than privately owned firms do. Surprisingly, neither SGrowth nor Illiquidity has 
significant coefficients. This result implies that firms generally do not place much emphasis on 
growth opportunities and stock liquidity when determining their payout ratios. Regarding the 
control variables, all coefficients are associated with the expected signs, which are aligned with 
those documented in the existing literature. For example, both size and profitability have a positive 
effect on dividend payout ratios, confirming the result obtained by Fama and French (2001).  
In column 2, we add a variable capturing the interaction between Reform and State; the 
estimated coefficient on this interaction term captures the differential payout ratio response of a 
state-owned firm to the reform. The coefficient on Reform*State is negative and significant; thus, 
compared with privately owned firms, state-controlled firms appear to have experienced a greater 
19 Chay and Suh (2009) suggest that cash flow uncertainty has a negative effect on the amount of dividends and on the 
probability of paying dividends. 
20 DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz (2006) show that firms’ propensity to pay dividends is higher when the retained 
earnings constitute a larger portion of the total equity. 
21 Fama and French (2001) find inertia in dividend decisions. 
22 Fama and French (2001) provide evidence that larger firms and more profitable firms are more likely to pay 
dividends. 
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reduction in their cash dividend payout ratio after the reform. Thus, our second hypothesis is 
supported. 
To test whether the response of the payout ratio to the reform differs across firm characteristics, 
we interact the Reform dummy with the firm characteristics in column 3 (i.e., the sales growth rate 
(SGrowth) and the illiquidity ratio (Illiquidity)). Several patterns are observed. First, 
Reform*SGrowth is associated with a significantly negative coefficient; hence, firms with higher 
growth rates tend to experience greater reductions in cash payouts after the reform. Second, 
Reform*Illiquidity exhibits a significantly positive coefficient, implying that the reform results in a 
larger reduction in cash dividends for firms with higher stock liquidity. Taken together, these results 
lend strong support to our third hypothesis predicting greater post-reform reductions in cash 
dividends for firms with higher growth rates and liquidity. Third, although the interaction term of 
Reform and SGrowth has a significantly negative coefficient, SGrowth is positive and significant 
per se. This pattern reveals that before the reform, the growth rates of firms have a positive effect on 
cash dividends, but this effect becomes negative after the reform. As indicated by agency theory, 
cash dividends decrease with the growth opportunities of the firm, but we do not observe such a 
negative association in the pre-reform period. This finding is not unexpected, given the dual-share 
structure in Chinese listed firms before the reform. The differences in demand between TS and NTS 
holders and the unbalanced controlling rights lead to severe agency problems and weak corporate 
governance; thus, the relationship between dividends and growth opportunity is loose (even positive) 
in such firms. As the reform improved governance by reconciling demands and mitigating 
expropriation behavior, the previously distorted relationship between dividends and growth 
opportunity was corrected. Hence, we observe a negative coefficient of Reform*SGrowth and 
conclude that firms’ cash dividends are negatively affected by growth opportunities after the reform. 
We interpret this result as evidence of governance improvement associated with the reform. Finally, 
Illiquidity per se has a significantly negative coefficient; however, when it interacts with the Reform 
dummy, the coefficient becomes significantly positive. This result indicates that in the post-reform 
period, high-liquidity firms are associated with lower cash payout ratios, whereas the opposite 
association is observed before the reform. Following the reform, investors are allowed to freely sell 
their shares to achieve liquidity and thus tend to view stock liquidity and cash dividends as 
substitutes; hence, a negative correlation can be observed.23 We are less likely to observe such a 
negative relationship in the pre-reform period because the trading constraint on NTS restrained 
investors from liquidating their stock to create “homemade” dividends. In fact, high-liquidity firms 
23 Banerjee, et al. (2007) propose a liquidity hypothesis of dividends in which stock liquidity and cash dividends are 
viewed as substitutes and, thus, dividends are negatively related to liquidity. 
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pay higher cash dividends in the pre-reform period. A possible explanation is that trading ability is 
of more value to shareholders in more liquid firms, and hence, controlling shareholders demand 
higher cash dividends to compensate for forfeiting this trading ability. The reversal in the liquidity 
effect represents a liquidity improvement generated by the reform. In sum, the above results suggest 
that both the governance channel and the liquidity channel influenced the cash dividend policies of 
firms during the reform. 
Column 4 is the full model, which includes the interaction between Reform and State as well as 
the interactions between Reform and firm characteristics (i.e., SGrowth and Illiquidity). Our main 
conclusions remain unchanged. Notably, the coefficients on the lagged payout ratio, LagPayout, are 
consistently positive and significant throughout all four specifications. This result supports the view 
that firms tend to smooth their dividends (Fama and French (2001)).  
The split-share structure reform represents improvements in firms’ liquidity and governance. In 
this section, we observe a significant reduction in firms’ cash dividend payouts in the post-reform 
period, and greater reductions are observed for firms with higher growth rates and stock liquidity. 
This observation provides evidence that corporate governance and stock liquidity affect corporate 
dividend policy in a manner consistent with agency theory and the liquidity hypothesis of dividends. 
[Insert Table 3.4 about here] 
3.6.2.2 State ownership and the effect of share reform 
To verify whether the reform has a differential effect on state-controlled firms and privately 
controlled firms, we partition the full sample into two subsamples based on the nature of firms’ 
ultimate controlling shareholders. The State subsample consists of firms whose ultimate controlling 
shareholder is an SOE or a government agency. The Private subsample consists of firms that are 
controlled by private entities. For both subsamples, we estimate both the baseline and full models. 
The results are reported in Table 3.5. 
Column 1 tabulates the Tobit estimation results for the baseline model. The coefficients on 
Reform are significantly negative for both the State and Private subsamples. This finding suggests 
that listed firms experience a reduction in cash dividends after the reform, regardless of their 
ultimate controlling shareholders. This result is unsurprising because the reform was a countrywide 
program requiring participation from all firms. Furthermore, we observe that the coefficient on 
Reform is larger in magnitude for the State subsample than for the Private subsample (0.066 versus 
0.037). This finding confirms the result in Table 3.4, indicating that the reform has a greater effect 
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on the dividend payout ratio in state-controlled firms than in privately controlled firms. Thus, our 
second hypothesis is supported. 
Column 2 reports the estimation results of the full model, which includes the interaction 
between Reform and SGrowth / Illiquidity. Again, the coefficient on Reform is greater in magnitude 
(and more significant) for the State subsample than for the Private subsample (0.070 and 0.054, 
respectively). When examining the interaction terms, we find some interesting patterns. In the 
Private subsample, the interaction between Reform and SGrowth is significantly negative, whereas 
SGrowth is positive. Illiquidity is significantly negative, but the coefficient on Reform*Illiquidity is 
positive and highly significant. This pattern is the same as that observed for the full sample in Table 
3.4. This pattern, however, is not observed in the State subsample. In other words, both the 
governance and liquidity effects that we find in the full sample are driven primarily by the response 
of privately controlled firms. Privately controlled firms are more likely to correct the previously 
distorted relationship between cash dividends and growth / liquidity after the reform. This finding is 
not unexpected, given the different objectives of state-controlled and privately controlled firms. The 
nature of both corporate governance and corporate objective in state-controlled firms is shaped by 
the existence of the government objective function of controlling shareholders, including substantial 
non-price considerations such as a desire to meet certain political and social welfare objectives (e.g., 
Shleifer (1998)). By contrast, controlling shareholders of privately-owned firms are generally not 
expected to have political and social welfare objectives but are instead expected to focus on 
maximizing returns. Therefore, privately owned firms are expected to align their dividend policies 
more closely with growth opportunities after the reform, such that the coefficient on 
Reform*SGrowth is negative and highly significant for the Private subsample but insignificant for 
the State subsample. On the other hand, because of the controlling rights consideration, state-
controlled firms have limited ability to create “home-made” dividends to achieve liquidity by 
selling their shares, although the reform has unfrozen the trading constraint. Consequently, after the 
reform, the substitution between cash dividends and stock liquidity remains weak in state-controlled 
firms. Therefore, the post-reform association between liquidity and dividends in the State 
subsample is not as apparent as we observe in the Private subsample.  
[Insert Table 3.5 about here] 
3.6.2.3 Corporate governance and the effect of share reform  
In the previous analysis, we use the relationship between cash dividends and growth opportunities 
to proxy for corporate governance quality, but this relationship is likely to be an outcome of 
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governance rather than a direct measure.24 To explicitly investigate whether the effect of the split-
share structure reform on cash dividends is related to the pre-reform level of corporate governance, 
we include a direct indicator of corporate governance in our analysis in this section. Goodgvn is a 
proxy for good corporate governance, which is a dummy variable that equals one if firm i’s 
compensation ratio in the reform is below the sample median. The compensation ratio is defined as 
the number of additional shares received by TS holders from NTS holders for each tradable share 
held, multiplied by the closing price on the last trading date before the reform, plus the cash 
compensation ratio. Our use of the compensation ratio as a proxy for corporate governance is 
supported by many studies of the reform process, which generally indicate that the compensation 
ratio decreases with the pre-reform governance level (Jin and Yuan (2008); Zheng, et al. (2007); 
Xin and Xu (2007)).25 
Table 3.6 reports the Tobit regression results after including the direct proxy for good corporate 
governance. Column 1 shows the estimation of the baseline model. Reform has a significantly 
negative coefficient. Controlling for the governance level, we find that the reform still results in a 
significant reduction in firms’ dividend payout ratios. The coefficient on Goodgvn is negative and 
highly significant, suggesting that as a firm’s corporate governance improves, the dividend payout 
ratio decreases. This finding is consistent with the predictions of both agency theory and the 
expropriation hypotheses. Other variables are consistent with our previous results.  
In columns 2, 3 and 4, we interact Goodgvn with the Reform dummy and observe that the 
interaction terms have significantly positive coefficients throughout all three specifications. Given 
that Reform has a negative coefficient per se, we can infer that firms with weaker pre-reform 
governance have a more significant reform-induced reduction in cash dividends. This result is 
expected because as the quality of the pre-reform governance declines, the improvement following 
reform is greater, and the decrease in cash payouts is therefore larger. 
In column 3, we add a variable that captures the interaction between Reform and State. The 
coefficient on Reform*State is only marginally significant in this specification. This result is not 
unexpected, given that state-controlled firms are more likely to be weakly governed. Because the 
governance measure Goodgvn largely proxies for the state-control nature, our observation of an 
insignificant coefficient on Reform*State is reasonable.  
Column 4 reports the results for the full model. In addition to Reform*Goodgvn, the full model 
includes the interaction between Reform and State / SGrowth / Illiquidity. All the previous findings 
24 The reform dummy itself is an indicator of corporate governance. We thank Professor Tom Smith for pointing this 
out. 
25 See the detailed discussion in Section 3.3.4. 
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hold in the full model. Notably, Reform*SGrowth now becomes marginally significant. As 
discussed earlier, the association between growth opportunities and cash dividends is a potential 
outcome of good governance. Naturally, directly controlling for the level of corporate governance 
will reduce the salience of this association. Therefore, growth opportunities appear less important in 
determining the cash dividend ratio in this specification. The inclusion of the governance measure, 
however, does not interfere with the liquidity effect. 
[Insert Table 3.6 about here] 
3.6.2.4 Governance effect vs. liquidity effect 
By showing that the relationship between liquidity and dividends is stronger for firms with stronger 
shareholder power, Igan, et al. (2010) argue that good governance (e.g., shareholder protection) is a 
condition for stock liquidity to influence dividend policy. The liquidity needs of shareholders 
should be relevant to dividend decisions only if management accounts for their needs. Therefore, if 
governance is an extreme concern, then stock liquidity will not have a large effect on cash 
dividends. To address our conjecture, we partition our sample into two subsamples based on the 
pre-reform quality of corporate governance. We still use firms’ compensation ratio in the reform as 
a proxy for the pre-reform governance level. The Good Govnc subsample consists of firms whose 
compensation ratio is below the sample median (i.e., Goodgvn equals one). The Bad Govnc 
subsample includes firms with a compensation ratio above the sample median (i.e., Goodgvn is 
equal to zero). For both subsamples, we estimate both the baseline and full models. The results are 
reported in Table 3.7. 
Column 1 tabulates the Tobit estimation results for the baseline model. For both the Good and 
Bad governance subsamples, the coefficients for Reform are significantly negative. Even for firms 
with good corporate governance, the reform still affects their dividend policy. However, the 
influence is more significant in the Bad Govnc subsample (manifested by the larger coefficient in 
magnitude). This finding confirms the results in Table 3.6: the reform has a greater effect on the 
dividend payout ratio in firms with weaker pre-reform governance. 
In column 2, we interact the Reform dummy with the illiquidity ratio (Illiquidity). For both 
subsamples, we observe that although Illiquidity has a negative coefficient per se (i.e., a positive 
relationship between liquidity and cash dividends before the reform), Reform*Illiquidity is 
associated with a positive coefficient (i.e., a negative relationship after the reform). More precisely, 
the relationship between stock liquidity and cash dividends was reversed by the share reform, and 
the negative relationship observed after the reform is more consistent with the liquidity substitution 
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hypothesis of dividends (Banerjee, et al. (2007)). Comparing the two subsamples, we find that the 
reversal of the relationship is less pronounced in the Bad Govnc subsample than in the Good Govnc 
subsample (given the marginal significance of Illiquidity and Reform*Illiquidity in the Bad Govnc 
sample). This finding implies that the liquidity needs of shareholders are less respected in weakly 
governed firms. The result confirms our conjecture that if corporate governance is the dominant 
concern of management when making dividend payment decisions (for example, in weakly 
governed firms), then shareholders’ liquidity needs are less likely to be considered by management, 
and the reform-induced liquidity shock thus has a smaller impact on cash dividends in such firms. 
The estimation of the full model is reported in column 3. The inclusion of the other two 
interactions (i.e., Reform*State and Reform*SGrowth) does not alter our main conclusion. The 
reversal of the liquidity-dividend relationship is less significant in the Bad Govnc subsample than in 
the Good Govnc subsample, and this finding is consistent with our above conjecture. Notably, 
Reform*State has a significantly negative coefficient in the Good Govnc subsample, whereas the 
coefficient is insignificant in the Bad Govnc subsample. This finding suggests that the difference 
between state-owned and privately owned firms (in terms of the dividend-policy response to the 
reform) is driven primarily by well-governed state-owned firms. We also observe that the 
coefficient on Reform*SGrowth is significantly negative only in the Good Govnc subsample. Hence, 
in the post-reform period, growth opportunities have a strong effect on cash dividends only in well-
governed firms. For weakly governed firms, this effect is not observed. The findings on the effect of 
state ownership and growth opportunities indicate that in firms with weak governance, management 
regards governance as the major concern when making dividend decisions; neither the ownership 
nature nor growth opportunities have crucial effects on dividend policy. 
[Insert Table 3.7 about here] 
3.6.2.5 The effect of share reform on the propensity to pay cash dividends 
In the previous sections, we focus on how a governance and liquidity shock (the split-share reform) 
affects firms’ cash dividend payout ratios. In this section, we investigate whether firms’ propensity 
to pay a cash dividend also responds to the reform. We estimate a Logistic regression model as 
follows: 
𝐶𝐷𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡    (3.2) 
In constructing the dependent variable (i.e., CDPayer) for this Logit model, we assign a value 
of one to firms that pay a cash dividend and a value of zero to firms that do not pay a cash dividend 
during a given financial year. The set of control variables Xi,t is basically the same as in Equation 
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(3.1), except that we replace the lagged payout ratio (LagPayout) with the lagged dividend status 
(Lag1CDPayer) in Equation (3.2). Lag1CDPayer is an indicator variable that equals one if firm i 
paid cash dividends in the prior year and zero otherwise. 
The estimation results are tabulated in Table 3.8. Column 1 is the baseline model. The Reform 
dummy is negative and significant. Therefore, on average, firms are less likely to pay a cash 
dividend after completing the split-share structure reform. Cross-sectionally, state-controlled firms 
are more likely to pay cash dividends, whereas better governed firms have a lower propensity to pay 
cash dividends. In column 2, we compare the effect of the reform on the propensity to pay cash 
dividends between state-controlled and privately controlled firms. Although state-controlled firms 
are more likely to pay before the reform than privately controlled firms are (i.e., the coefficient on 
State is significantly positive), this difference seems to disappear after the reform because 
Reform*State has an insignificant coefficient. From another perspective, if we interpret the results 
for Reform*State together with Reform, we find that with respect to the propensity to pay cash 
dividends, the effect of the reform does not differ between state-controlled and privately controlled 
firms. 
To test whether the corporate governance level influences the effect of the share reform on the 
decision to pay, we interact Reform with Goodgvn in column 3. The coefficient on the interaction 
term is significantly positive. Given that Reform has a negative coefficient, the positive coefficient 
on the interaction term suggests that weakly governed firms experience a greater decline in the 
propensity to pay cash dividends after the reform. Moreover, we also add a variable capturing the 
interaction between Reform and Illiquidity. However, the coefficient on the Reform*Illiquidity is 
insignificant; thus, the effects of the reform are indistinguishable between high-liquidity and low-
liquidity firms.  
In column 4, we include the interaction between Reform and SGrowth. To avoid the potential 
correlation between SGrowth and Goodgvn, we omit Reform*Goodgvn from the model. 26  The 
coefficient on Reform*SGrowth is negative and highly significant, showing that the negative effect 
of the reform (Reform has a negative coefficient) on the propensity to pay cash dividends is stronger 
in high-growth firms than in low-growth firms. Finally, the estimation of the full model is reported 
in column 5. The inclusion of all interaction terms does not alter our conclusions.27 In addition, 
26 Recall that both SGrowth and Goodgvn are proxies for corporate governance and may thus be correlated. 
27 The effects of control variables on the probability of paying cash dividends are similar to their effects on dividend 
payout ratios. This result implies that firms consider the same or at least similar factors when making decisions on 
whether to pay and how much to pay. 
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throughout all specifications, the coefficients on the lagged dividend status, Lag1CDPayer, are 
consistently positive, which suggests that previous paying status is truly relevant. 
[Insert Table 3.8 about here] 
3.6.2.6 The effect of share reform on dividend-continuing, dividend-initiating and dividend-
omitting firms  
To determine whether the split-share reform has a differentiating effect on different dividend-
paying groups, we partition our sample into three subsamples according to their dividend status last 
year and this year. Dividend-continuing firms are classified as firms that pay a cash dividend in year 
t-1 and continue to pay dividend in year t. Dividend-initiating firms are firms that do not pay a cash 
dividend in year t-1 but pay a dividend in year t. For comparison, we choose one more group of 
firms, including those that continue not to pay dividends. Dividend-omitting firms are firms that pay 
a cash dividend in year t-1 but do not pay a dividend in year t. Dividend-continuing firms can be 
compared with dividend-omitting firms.  
Table 3.9 tabulates the results from the estimation of the Tobit and Logistic regressions. Panel 
A reports the Tobit regression results regarding the effect of the reform on the dividend payout ratio 
of continuing payers. The dependent variable is the cash dividend payout ratio, Payout. We find that 
the coefficients on Reform are negative and highly significant throughout all specifications. This 
finding suggests that during the post-reform period, payout levels decreases although these firms 
choose to maintain their cash dividends. However, we observe no significant cross-sectional 
difference in the effects of the reform. 
Panel B examines whether the split-share structure reform has an effect on firms’ decision to 
initiate a cash dividend by estimating a multivariate Logistic regression. The dependent variable is 
Initiate, which is an indicator variable that equals one if firm i does not pay a cash dividend in year 
t-1 but pays a dividend in year t and that equals zero if firm i does not pay dividends in years t and 
t-1. From the estimation results, we observe that the split-share structure reform leads to a reduction 
in firms’ likelihood of initiating cash dividends. Furthermore, the reduction is primarily 
concentrated in firms with high growth rates. For such firms, the probability of initiating dividends 
decreases dramatically after the reform. 
Panel C reports the Logistic regression results regarding the effect of the reform on the 
propensity to omit a cash dividend. The dependent variable is Omit, which is an indicator variable 
that equals one if firm i pays a cash dividend in year t-1 but does not pay a dividend in year t and 
that equals zero if firm i pays dividends in both years t and t-1. On average, firms are more likely to 
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omit a cash dividend after the split-share structure reform. However, we observe no explicit cross-
sectional variation in the effects of the reform in terms of the propensity to omit cash dividends. 
In sum, after the split-share structure reform, firms have generally become less likely to initiate 
cash dividends and more likely to omit cash dividends. Firms that choose to continue paying cash 
dividends tend to decrease the level of dividend payouts. These results are consistent with our main 
results in the previous sections. 
[Insert Table 3.9 about here] 
3.7 Robustness check 
3.7.1 The effect of share reform in different time horizons surrounding the reform 
Recall that we restrict our sample to firm-year observations within 3 years before and 3 years after 
the reform. To verify whether the effect of the reform on firms’ dividend policies is subject to the 
selected time horizon, we re-estimate the Tobit model in two different time horizons. One horizon 
includes firm-year observations within only one year before and one year after the reform, and the 
other horizon extends to two years before and after the reform. By investigating the effect of the 
reform in different time horizons, we can also gain insight into the question of when the governance 
and liquidity channels take into effect. 
In Table 3.10, Panel A shows the estimation of the Tobit model for the time horizon that ranges 
from one year before the reform to one year after the reform, and Panel B contains the estimation 
for the two-year horizon. Our main conclusion remains: the reform leads to a significant decrease in 
cash dividend payouts, regardless of the time horizon that we use. Therefore, the negative effect of 
the reform on cash dividends is robust to different time horizons. Some interesting patterns are also 
noted. In the one-year horizon surrounding the reform, neither the governance channel nor the 
liquidity channel is influential, given that the coefficients on both Reform*SGrowth and 
Reform*Illiquidity are not significant.28  
By contrast, in Panel B (i.e., the two-year horizon), the coefficients on Reform*Illiquidity 
become significant and have the expected positive sign. This finding implies that the liquidity 
channel comes into effect two years after the reform. This result is not unexpected because during 
the first year after the reform, the proportion of previously NTS that could be sold was strictly 
28 The coefficient on Reform*Goodgvn is significantly positive, implying that weakly governed firms decrease their 
cash dividends more after the reform. However, this finding may be observed because our governance measure is 
closely related to the compensation ratio. Weakly governed firms pay higher compensation to facilitate the reform 
process; as a consequence, they are more reluctant to pay high cash dividends in the post-reform period (Huang, Li and 
Ye (2012)). Hence, we should not place too much emphasis on this result. 
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restricted; only in the second year after the reform was completed did a certain proportion of 
previously NTS become tradable. However, the governance channel remains ineffective in the two-
year horizon (the coefficient on Reform*SGrowth remains insignificant). Our interpretation is that 
corporate governance improvements, especially improvement in the alignment between growth 
opportunities and cash dividends, may require a longer period to emerge.  
[Insert Table 3.10 about here] 
3.8 Conclusion 
The 2005 split-share structure reform in China mandates the conversion of non-tradable shares into 
tradable shares. The mandatory and exogenous nature of the reform makes it a quasi-natural 
experiment and provides an ideal setting for empirical analysis. The split-share structure reform 
represents an exogenous shock to firms’ governance that facilitated better alignment of the interests 
of controlling shareholders with those of outside investors. The reform also removed a substantial 
trading constraint and created a closer association between stock liquidity and controlling 
shareholders’ interests. In this chapter, we study the effect of reform-induced governance and 
liquidity improvements on the dividend policies of listed firms, with a focus on cash dividends. 
We predict and find that the average cash dividend payout decreases significantly after the 
reform. Cross-sectionally, the reduction in payouts is more significant for firms with higher growth 
rates and firms with higher liquidity. Our findings are consistent with the view that the reform is 
associated with improvements in firms’ liquidity and governance, and these improvements have 
been shown to significantly affect corporate dividend policy. In addition, because of the different 
characteristics and incentives of the ultimate controlling shareholders of state-controlled and 
privately controlled firms, a greater decline in cash dividends is observed for firms controlled by 
state shareholders. We further examine how firms’ decision to pay cash dividends is affected by the 
reform and find that firms are less likely to pay cash dividends in the post-reform period. The 
probability of initiating a cash dividend also decreases significantly after the reform. Instead, firms 
are more likely to omit a dividend, and when they do choose to maintain their dividends, they 
appear to pay out a lower proportion of earnings. Our results are robust to different time horizons 
surrounding the reform. Our findings provide strong evidence that corporate governance 
arrangements and stock liquidity shifts have considerably influenced corporate dividend policy. 
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Table 3.1    Variable Definitions 
The table provides definitions for all the variables that are either investigated or used as controls in our tests. 
Variable Definitions 
Payout Cash dividends divided by EBIT 
CDPayer Indicator variable that equals one if firm i pays a cash dividend in year t and zero otherwise 
Reform Indicator variable that equals one if firm i has completed the split-share structure reform by 
the end of year t and zero otherwise 
SGrowth Annual sales growth rate, averaged over the pre-reform years 
Illiquidity Average ratio of the daily absolute return to the (dollar) trading volume on that day, 
averaged over the pre-reform years 
LogTA Logarithm of total assets 
ROA Ratio of EBIT to total assets 
Cash Cash and marketable securities plus short-term investments scaled by total assets 
Leverage Ratio of total liabilities to total assets 
ROAVOL Standard deviation of ROA over the most recent four years including the current financial 
year 
RE2TE Ratio of retained earnings to total equity 
LagPayout Cash dividend payout ratio in the prior year 
Lag1CDPayer Indicator variable that equals to one if firm i paid cash dividends in the prior year and zero 
otherwise 
State Indicator variable that equals to one if firm i’s ultimate controlling shareholder is a state-
owned-enterprise or a government agency and zero otherwise 
Private Indicator variable that equals to one if firm i’s ultimate controlling shareholder is a private 
entity and zero otherwise 
Goodgvn Indicator variable that equals to one if firm i’s compensation ratio is below the sample 
median and zero otherwise. The compensation ratio is defined as the number of additional 
shares received by TS holders from NTS holders for each tradable share held, multiplied 
by the closing price on the last trading date before the reform, plus the cash compensation 
ratio. 
Initiate Indicator variable that equals one if firm i does not pay a cash dividend in year t-1, but 
pays a dividend in year t and equals zero if firm i does not pay dividends in years t and t-1. 
Omit Indicator variable that equals one if firm i pays a cash dividend in year t-1, but does not 
pay a dividend in year t and equals zero if firm i pays dividends in both year t and t-1. 
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Table 3.2    Summary Statistics  
The table presents summary statistics of dividend payout ratio and other key variables. All the variables are defined as 
in Table 1. Our full sample includes 6,156 firm-year observations during the period of 2003-2011, representing 1,275 
Chinese listed firms that had completed the split-share structure reform by December 31, 2011. We restrict the sample 
to firm-year observations within 3 years before and 3 years after the reform and the observations in the reform year are 
excluded. Panel A reports the summary statistics for the full sample. Panel B reports the summary statistics for the State 
subsample. The State subsample consists of those firms whose ultimate controlling shareholder is an SOE or a 
government agency. Panel C reports the summary statistics for the Private subsample. The Private subsample consists 
of the firms that are controlled by private entities. 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
Panel A: Full sample 
Payout 6,156 0.161 0.201 0.000 0.934 
Reform 6,156 0.527 0.499 0.000 1.000 
SGrowth 5,739 0.289 0.396 -1.000 4.406 
Illiquidity 5,936 0.006 0.010 0.000 0.274 
LogTA 6,155 21.529 1.072 16.694 27.488 
ROA 6,154 0.066 0.046 0.001 0.258 
Cash 6,155 0.167 0.119 0.000 0.999 
Leverage 6,155 0.487 0.179 0.007 1.000 
ROAVOL 6,156 0.031 0.041 0.000 0.298 
RE2TE 6,154 0.088 0.365 -2.735 0.721 
LagPayout 5,994 0.168 0.208 0.000 0.930 
Goodgvn 6,152 0.476 0.499 0.000 1.000 
CDPayer 6,156 0.577 0.494 0.000 1.000 
Lag1CDPayer 6,009 0.569 0.495 0.000 1.000 
Initiate 2,589 0.253 0.435 0.000 1.000 
Omit 3,420 0.193 0.394 0.000 1.000 
State 6,146 0.710 0.454 0.000 1.000 
Private 6,146 0.290 0.454 0.000 1.000 
Panel B: State sample 
Payout 4,363 0.171 0.201 0.000 0.934 
Reform 4,363 0.515 0.500 0.000 1.000 
SGrowth 4,214 0.282 0.368 -0.597 4.406 
Illiquidity 4,274 0.006 0.011 0.000 0.274 
LogTA 4,362 21.669 1.092 16.694 27.488 
ROA 4,361 0.064 0.045 0.001 0.258 
Cash 4,362 0.163 0.113 0.001 0.863 
Leverage 4,362 0.490 0.178 0.008 1.000 
ROAVOL 4,363 0.028 0.034 0.000 0.298 
RE2TE 4,361 0.105 0.302 -2.735 0.721 
LagPayout 4,273 0.181 0.210 0.000 0.930 
Goodgvn 4,363 0.435 0.496 0.000 1.000 
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CDPayer 4,363 0.608 0.488 0.000 1.000 
Lag1CDPayer 4,285 0.600 0.490 0.000 1.000 
Initiate 1,715 0.275 0.447 0.000 1.000 
Omit 2,570 0.180 0.384 0.000 1.000 
Panel C: Private sample 
Payout 1,783 0.134 0.197 0.000 0.934 
Reform 1,783 0.556 0.497 0.000 1.000 
SGrowth 1,520 0.307 0.464 -1.000 4.406 
Illiquidity 1,654 0.006 0.007 0.000 0.108 
LogTA 1,783 21.190 0.939 18.008 24.807 
ROA 1,783 0.069 0.048 0.001 0.258 
Cash 1,783 0.176 0.131 0.000 0.999 
Leverage 1,783 0.481 0.181 0.007 0.983 
ROAVOL 1,783 0.037 0.054 0.000 0.298 
RE2TE 1,783 0.049 0.480 -2.735 0.691 
LagPayout 1,713 0.137 0.200 0.000 0.930 
Goodgvn 1,779 0.578 0.494 0.000 1.000 
CDPayer 1,783 0.502 0.500 0.000 1.000 
Lag1CDPayer 1,715 0.492 0.500 0.000 1.000 
Initiate 871 0.210 0.408 0.000 1.000 
Omit 844 0.231 0.422 0.000 1.000 
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Table 3.3    Changes in Dividend Payout Ratio before and after the Reform  
The table compares firms’ three-year average cash dividend payout ratio before and after the split-share structure 
reform. Our full sample includes 6,156 firm-year observations during the period of 2003-2011, representing 1,275 
Chinese listed firms that had completed the split-share structure reform by December 31, 2011. We restrict the sample 
to firm-year observations within 3 years before and 3 years after the reform and the observations in the reform year are 
excluded. Payout is defined as the ratio of cash dividends to EBIT. Panel A reports the change in average payout ratio 
after the reform and its t-statistic for the full sample. Panel B reports the change for the State subsample. The State 
subsample consists of those firms whose ultimate controlling shareholder is an SOE or a government agency. Panel C 
reports the change for the Private subsample. The Private subsample consists of the firms that are controlled by private 
entities. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
Variable 3-year average before the reform 
3-year average after the 
reform Change (After - Before) 
Panel A: Full sample 
Payout 0.200*** (46.16) 
0.135*** 
(44.31) 
-0.065*** 
(-12.25) 
    
No of Observations 2768 3039 2768 
No of firms 1121 1121 1121 
Panel B: State sample 
Payout 0.214*** (41.78) 
0.140*** 
(39.83) 
-0.074*** 
(-11.86) 
    
No of Observations 2018 2165 2018 
No of firms 793 793 793 
Panel C: Private sample 
Payout 0.164*** (20.32) 
0.124*** 
(20.31) 
-0.040*** 
(-3.98) 
    
No of Observations 747 869 747 
No of firms 326 326 326 
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Table 3.4    Average Effect of Share Reform on Payout Ratio and Cross-sectional Variation in the Effects 
The table reports Tobit regression results on the average effect of the split-share structure reform on firms’ cash 
dividend payout ratio as well as the cross-sectional variation in the effects. Our full sample includes 6,156 firm-year 
observations during the period of 2003-2011, representing 1,275 Chinese listed firms that had completed the split-share 
structure reform by December 31, 2011. We restrict the sample to firm-year observations within 3 years before and 3 
years after the reform and the observations in the reform year are excluded. The dependent variable is Payout, defined 
as cash dividends divided by EBIT. Reform is a dummy variable that equals one if firm i has completed the split-share 
structure reform by the end of year t. State is an indicator variable that equals to one if the firm’s ultimate controlling 
shareholder is a state-owned-enterprise or a government agency. SGrowth is the annual sales growth rate, averaged over 
the pre-reform years and Illiquidity is the average ratio of the daily absolute return to the (dollar) trading volume on that 
day, averaged over the pre-reform years. LagPayout is the cash dividend payout ratio in the prior year. See Table 1 for 
definitions of all other variables. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
Independent Variable 
Dependent Variable: Cash Dividend Payout Ratio 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reform -0.058*** -0.028* -0.065*** -0.035** 
 
(-7.41) (-1.90) (-5.30) (-1.96) 
State 0.038*** 0.058*** 0.038*** 0.058*** 
 
(4.48) (4.83) (4.52) (4.80) 
Reform*State  -0.039**  -0.038** 
  
(-2.38)  (-2.31) 
SGrowth 0.008 0.008 0.033** 0.034** 
 
(0.77) (0.79) (2.00) (2.06) 
Reform*SGrowth   -0.042** -0.043** 
  
 (-1.98) (-2.05) 
Illiquidity -0.863 -0.873 -3.446*** -3.346*** 
 
(-1.16) (-1.17) (-2.77) (-2.69) 
Reform*Illiquidity   3.707*** 3.570*** 
  
 (2.72) (2.61) 
ROAVOL -1.041*** -1.045*** -1.043*** -1.048*** 
 
(-6.47) (-6.50) (-6.49) (-6.52) 
LogTA 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 
 
(8.46) (8.45) (8.23) (8.25) 
ROA 0.385*** 0.382*** 0.353*** 0.351*** 
 
(3.94) (3.91) (3.60) (3.58) 
RE2TE 0.372*** 0.371*** 0.376*** 0.376*** 
 
(11.67) (11.68) (11.79) (11.79) 
Cash 0.245*** 0.247*** 0.244*** 0.246*** 
 
(7.55) (7.62) (7.53) (7.59) 
Leverage -0.265*** -0.262*** -0.267*** -0.264*** 
 
(-10.61) (-10.49) (-10.67) (-10.57) 
LagPayout 0.577*** 0.577*** 0.576*** 0.576*** 
 
(32.08) (32.10) (32.07) (32.09) 
Intercept -0.773*** -0.789*** -0.740*** -0.758*** 
 (-8.61) (-8.76) (-8.19) (-8.36) 
     No of Observations 5,618 5,618 5,618 5,618 
Likelihood Ratio 2,576 2,582 2,589 2,594 
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Table 3.5    Effect of Share Reform across State and Private Subsamples 
The table reports Tobit regression results on the effect of the split-share structure reform on dividend payout ratio for 
two subsamples. Our full sample includes 6,156 firm-year observations during the period of 2003-2011, representing 
1,275 Chinese listed firms that had completed the split-share structure reform by December 31, 2011. We restrict the 
sample to firm-year observations within 3 years before and 3 years after the reform and the observations in the reform 
year are excluded. We partition the full sample into two subsamples by the nature of firms’ ultimate controlling 
shareholders. The State subsample consists of those firms whose ultimate controlling shareholder is an SOE or a 
government agency. The Private subsample consists of the firms that are controlled by private entities. For both 
subsamples, we estimate both the baseline and the full models. The dependent variable is Payout, defined as cash 
dividends divided by EBIT. Reform is a dummy variable that equals one if firm i has completed the split-share structure 
reform by the end of year t. SGrowth is the annual sales growth rate, averaged over the pre-reform years and Illiquidity 
is the average ratio of the daily absolute return to the (dollar) trading volume on that day, averaged over the pre-reform 
years. LagPayout is the cash dividend payout ratio in the prior year. See Table 1 for definitions of all other variables. T-
statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Independent Variable 
Dependent Variable: Cash Dividend Payout Ratio 
(1)  (2) 
State Private  State Private 
Reform -0.066*** -0.037**  -0.070*** -0.054* 
 
(-7.55) (-2.18)  (-5.08) (-1.89) 
SGrowth 0.008 0.018  0.028 0.061** 
 
(0.63) (0.90)  (1.39) (2.09) 
Reform*SGrowth    -0.033 -0.077** 
  
  (-1.30) (-1.98) 
Illiquidity -0.174 -3.907*  -2.148 -8.518*** 
 
(-0.25) (-1.89)  (-1.56) (-2.64) 
Reform*Illiquidity    2.598* 7.416** 
  
  (1.74) (2.00) 
ROAVOL -1.007*** -1.130***  -1.000*** -1.203*** 
 
(-5.52) (-3.29)  (-5.49) (-3.48) 
LogTA 0.033*** 0.057***  0.032*** 0.055*** 
 
(7.24) (4.95)  (6.96) (4.82) 
ROA 0.292*** 0.643***  0.259** 0.636*** 
 
(2.59) (3.25)  (2.28) (3.22) 
RE2TE 0.372*** 0.383***  0.375*** 0.387*** 
 
(10.31) (5.60)  (10.37) (5.68) 
Cash 0.236*** 0.259***  0.235*** 0.262*** 
 
(6.26) (4.01)  (6.23) (4.06) 
Leverage -0.269*** -0.269***  -0.272*** -0.270*** 
 
(-9.61) (-4.78)  (-9.66) (-4.78) 
LagPayout 0.548*** 0.656***  0.548*** 0.652*** 
 
(27.03) (16.94)  (27.02) (16.88) 
Intercept -0.645*** -1.241***  -0.615*** -1.199*** 
 (-6.72) (-5.21)  (-6.26) (-4.96) 
      
No of Observations 4,137 1,481  4,137 1,481 
Likelihood Ratio 1,787 748.5  1,792 756.5 
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Table 3.6    Corporate Governance and Effect of Share Reform 
The table reports Tobit regression results on the effect of the split-share structure reform on dividend payout ratio after 
including corporate governance measure. Our full sample includes 6,156 firm-year observations during the period of 
2003-2011, representing 1,275 Chinese listed firms that had completed the split-share structure reform by December 31, 
2011. We restrict the sample to firm-year observations within 3 years before and 3 years after the reform and the 
observations in the reform year are excluded. The dependent variable is Payout, defined as cash dividends divided by 
EBIT. Reform is a dummy variable that equals one if firm i has completed the split-share structure reform by the end of 
year t. Goodgvn is a proxy for good corporate governance, which is an indicator variable that equals to one if firm i’s 
compensation ratio is below the sample median. The compensation ratio is defined as the number of additional shares 
received by TS holders from NTS holders for each tradable share held, multiplied by the closing price on the last 
trading date before the reform, plus the cash compensation ratio. State is an indicator variable that equals to one if the 
firm’s ultimate controlling shareholder is a state-owned-enterprise or a government agency. SGrowth is the annual sales 
growth rate, averaged over the pre-reform years and Illiquidity is the average ratio of the daily absolute return to the 
(dollar) trading volume on that day, averaged over the pre-reform years. LagPayout is the cash dividend payout ratio in 
the prior year. See Table 1 for definitions of all other variables. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Independent Variable 
Dependent Variable: Cash Dividend Payout Ratio 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reform -0.058*** -0.075*** -0.069*** -0.056*** 
 
(-7.46) (-7.42) (-3.73) (-2.80) 
Goodgvn -0.036*** -0.055*** -0.053*** -0.052*** 
 
(-4.88) (-5.32) (-5.09) (-4.98) 
Reform*Goodgvn  0.038*** 0.033** 0.031** 
  
(2.64) (2.28) (2.17) 
State 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 
 
(3.64) (3.64) (3.91) (3.97) 
Reform*State   -0.032* -0.033** 
  
 (-1.91) (-1.97) 
SGrowth 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.028* 
 
(0.52) (0.49) (0.45) (1.69) 
Reform*SGrowth    -0.038* 
  
  (-1.80) 
Illiquidity -0.894 -0.895 -3.690*** -3.492*** 
 
(-1.20) (-1.20) (-2.93) (-2.78) 
Reform*Illiquidity   3.896*** 3.694*** 
  
 (2.83) (2.69) 
ROAVOL -1.012*** -1.007*** -1.001*** -1.012*** 
 
(-6.31) (-6.28) (-6.24) (-6.31) 
LogTA 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 
 
(8.58) (8.64) (8.31) (8.39) 
ROA 0.357*** 0.344*** 0.315*** 0.312*** 
 
(3.65) (3.52) (3.21) (3.18) 
RE2TE 0.358*** 0.362*** 0.364*** 0.365*** 
 
(11.28) (11.38) (11.45) (11.47) 
Cash 0.235*** 0.233*** 0.234*** 0.234*** 
 
(7.24) (7.18) (7.22) (7.22) 
Leverage -0.263*** -0.264*** -0.260*** -0.263*** 
 
(-10.57) (-10.59) (-10.43) (-10.54) 
LagPayout 0.570*** 0.569*** 0.570*** 0.569*** 
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(31.64) (31.63) (31.68) (31.65) 
Intercept -0.755*** -0.751*** -0.717*** -0.731*** 
 (-8.42) (-8.37) (-7.93) (-8.06) 
     
No of Observations 5,618 5,618 5,618 5,618 
Likelihood Ratio 2,600 2,607 2,619 2,623 
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Table 3.7    Effect of Stock Liquidity across Governance Subsamples 
The table reports Tobit regression results on the effect of stock liquidity on dividend payout ratio for two subsamples. 
Our full sample includes 6,156 firm-year observations during the period of 2003-2011, representing 1,275 Chinese 
listed firms that had completed the split-share structure reform by December 31, 2011. We restrict the sample to firm-
year observations within 3 years before and 3 years after the reform and the observations in the reform year are 
excluded. We partition the full sample into two subsamples by the quality of corporate governance. The Good Govnc 
subsample consists of those firms whose compensation ratio is below the sample median. The compensation ratio is 
defined as the number of additional shares received by TS holders from NTS holders for each tradable share held, 
multiplied by the closing price on the last trading date before the reform, plus the cash compensation ratio. The Bad 
Govnc subsample consists of the firms whose compensation ratio is above the sample median. The dependent variable 
is Payout, defined as cash dividends divided by EBIT. Reform is a dummy variable that equals one if firm i has 
completed the split-share structure reform by the end of year t. State is an indicator variable that equals to one if the 
firm’s ultimate controlling shareholder is a state-owned-enterprise or a government agency. SGrowth is the annual sales 
growth rate, averaged over the pre-reform years and Illiquidity is the average ratio of the daily absolute return to the 
(dollar) trading volume on that day, averaged over the pre-reform years. LagPayout is the cash dividend payout ratio in 
the prior year. See Table 1 for definitions of all other variables. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Independent Variable 
Dependent Variable: Cash Dividend Payout Ratio 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Good Govnc Bad Govnc  Good Govnc Bad Govnc  Good Govnc Bad Govnc 
Reform -0.050*** -0.064***  -0.080*** -0.080***  -0.017 -0.081*** 
 (-4.08) (-6.36)  (-4.59) (-5.96)  (-0.66) (-3.16) 
State 0.034*** 0.028**  0.034*** 0.029**  0.066*** 0.026 
 (2.74) (2.34)  (2.72) (2.37)  (3.76) (1.53) 
Reform*State       -0.063** 0.004 
       (-2.57) (0.17) 
SGrowth -0.003 0.014  -0.004 0.014  0.037 0.017 
 (-0.19) (0.93)  (-0.26) (0.91)  (1.46) (0.76) 
Reform*SGrowth       -0.064** -0.006 
       (-1.99) (-0.21) 
Illiquidity -1.622 -0.642  -5.124** -3.075*  -4.721** -3.053* 
 (-1.33) (-0.74)  (-2.49) (-1.84)  (-2.31) (-1.82) 
Reform*Illiquidity    5.673** 3.052*  5.146** 3.033* 
    (2.38) (1.73)  (2.17) (1.71) 
ROAVOL -0.991*** -0.973***  -0.992*** -0.954***  -1.020*** -0.954*** 
 (-3.91) (-4.66)  (-3.91) (-4.57)  (-4.04) (-4.57) 
LogTA 0.047*** 0.029***  0.046*** 0.027***  0.046*** 0.027*** 
 (6.98) (5.14)  (6.69) (4.84)  (6.74) (4.84) 
ROA 0.481*** 0.276**  0.446*** 0.255**  0.424** 0.254** 
 (2.82) (2.31)  (2.61) (2.13)  (2.48) (2.12) 
RE2TE 0.505*** 0.253***  0.512*** 0.252***  0.510*** 0.252*** 
 (9.44) (6.32)  (9.54) (6.28)  (9.55) (6.28) 
Cash 0.369*** 0.151***  0.366*** 0.151***  0.374*** 0.151*** 
 (6.45) (3.85)  (6.41) (3.86)  (6.55) (3.85) 
Leverage -0.263*** -0.270***  -0.260*** -0.267***  -0.261*** -0.268*** 
 (-6.60) (-8.40)  (-6.53) (-8.34)  (-6.54) (-8.33) 
LagPayout 0.632*** 0.511***  0.634*** 0.511***  0.630*** 0.511*** 
 (21.28) (22.69)  (21.34) (22.68)  (21.22) (22.68) 
Intercept -1.080*** -0.515***  -1.031*** -0.468***  -1.068*** -0.468*** 
 (-7.59) (-4.50)  (-7.10) (-4.02)  (-7.35) (-3.97) 
No of Observations 2,735 2,883  2,735 2,883  2,735 2,883 
Likelihood Ratio 1,348 1,091  1,354 1,094  1,364 1,094 
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Table 3.8    Effect of Share Reform on the Propensity to Pay Cash Dividends 
The table reports Logistic regression results on the average effect of the split-share structure reform on firms’ 
propensity to pay a cash dividend. Our full sample includes 6,156 firm-year observations during the period of 2003-
2011, representing 1,275 Chinese listed firms that had completed the split-share structure reform by December 31, 2011. 
We restrict the sample to firm-year observations within 3 years before and 3 years after the reform and the observations 
in the reform year are excluded. The dependent variable is CDPayer, which is an indicator variable that equals one if 
firm i pays a cash dividend in year t. Reform is a dummy variable that equals one if firm i has completed the split-share 
structure reform by the end of year t. Goodgvn is proxy for good corporate governance, which is an indicator variable 
that equals to one if firm i’s compensation ratio is below the sample median. The compensation ratio is defined as the 
number of additional shares received by TS holders from NTS holders for each tradable share held, multiplied by the 
closing price on the last trading date before the reform, plus the cash compensation ratio. State is an indicator variable 
that equals to one if the firm’s ultimate controlling shareholder is a state-owned-enterprise or a government agency. 
SGrowth is the annual sales growth rate, averaged over the pre-reform years and Illiquidity is the average ratio of the 
daily absolute return to the (dollar) trading volume on that day, averaged over the pre-reform years. Lag1CDPayer is an 
indicator variable that equals to one if firm i paid cash dividends in the prior year. See Table 1 for definitions of all 
other variables. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
Independent Variable 
Dependent Variable: The propensity to pay a dividend 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Reform -0.346*** -0.254* -0.551*** -0.229* -0.287 
 
(-4.56) (-1.83) (-4.32) (-1.93) (-1.50) 
State 0.333*** 0.398*** 0.331*** 0.338*** 0.390*** 
 
(4.08) (3.47) (4.04) (4.14) (3.36) 
Reform*State  -0.127   -0.108 
  
(-0.80)   (-0.67) 
Goodgvn -0.378*** -0.378*** -0.523*** -0.368*** -0.498*** 
 
(-5.28) (-5.27) (-5.14) (-5.12) (-4.85) 
Reform*Goodgvn   0.284**  0.257* 
  
 (2.00)  (1.79) 
SGrowth 0.120 0.120 0.111 0.490*** 0.481*** 
 
(1.20) (1.20) (1.11) (3.02) (2.95) 
Reform*SGrowth    -0.593*** -0.586*** 
  
  (-2.91) (-2.87) 
Illiquidity -2.904 -2.912 -10.882 -8.210 -8.730 
 
(-0.55) (-0.55) (-0.98) (-0.75) (-0.79) 
Reform*Illiquidity   10.494 7.684 8.461 
  
 (0.85) (0.64) (0.69) 
ROAVOL -12.492*** -12.523*** -12.465*** -12.679*** -12.675*** 
 
(-7.64) (-7.65) (-7.62) (-7.75) (-7.74) 
LogTA 0.497*** 0.497*** 0.493*** 0.497*** 0.499*** 
 
(10.55) (10.55) (10.27) (10.34) (10.38) 
ROA 15.426*** 15.439*** 15.171*** 15.258*** 15.117*** 
 
(13.48) (13.48) (13.17) (13.27) (13.12) 
RE2TE 2.656*** 2.653*** 2.687*** 2.673*** 2.699*** 
 
(8.34) (8.33) (8.42) (8.38) (8.45) 
Cash 1.649*** 1.660*** 1.626*** 1.657*** 1.649*** 
 
(4.79) (4.82) (4.73) (4.81) (4.79) 
Leverage -1.413*** -1.401*** -1.402*** -1.458*** -1.447*** 
 
(-5.78) (-5.73) (-5.73) (-5.93) (-5.88) 
Lag1CDPayer 1.731*** 1.731*** 1.732*** 1.735*** 1.736*** 
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(23.91) (23.91) (23.90) (23.93) (23.92) 
Intercept -11.742*** -11.793*** -11.520*** -11.790*** -11.799*** 
 (-12.11) (-12.14) (-11.50) (-11.73) (-11.71) 
      
No of Observations 5,632 5,632 5,632 5,632 5,632 
Pseudo R2 35.1% 35.1% 35.1% 35.2% 35.2% 
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Table 3.9    Effect of Share Reform on Dividend-Continuing, Dividend-Initiating and Dividend-Omitting Firms 
The table reports Tobit and Logistic regression results on the effect of the split-share structure reform on dividend-
continuing, dividend-initiating and omitting firms. Our full sample includes 6,156 firm-year observations during the 
period of 2003-2011, representing 1,275 Chinese listed firms that had completed the split-share structure reform by 
December 31, 2011. We restrict the sample to firm-year observations within 3 years before and 3 years after the reform 
and the observations in the reform year are excluded. We partition the full sample into three subsamples according to 
their dividend status last year and this year. Dividend-continuing firms are classified as those firms that pay a cash 
dividend in year t-1 and continue to pay dividend in year t. Dividend-initiating firms are those firms that do not pay a 
cash dividend in year t-1, but pay a dividend in year t. For comparison, we choose one more group of firms, which are 
those firms that continue to not pay dividends. Dividend-omitting firms are those firms that pay a cash dividend in year 
t-1, but do not pay a dividend in year t. Dividend-continuing firms can be the comparison of dividend-omitting firms. 
Panel A reports Tobit regression results on the effect of the reform on dividend payout ratio of continuing payers. The 
dependent variable is Payout, defined as cash dividends divided by EBIT. Panel B reports Logistic regression results on 
the effect of the reform on the propensity to initiate a cash dividend. The dependent variable is Initiate, which is an 
indicator variable that equals one if firm i does not pay a cash dividend in year t-1, but pays a dividend in year t and 
equals zero if firm i does not pay dividends in years t and t-1. Panel C reports Logistic regression results on the effect of 
the reform on the propensity to omit a cash dividend. The dependent variable is Omit, which is an indicator variable that 
equals one if firm i pays a cash dividend in year t-1, but does not pay a dividend in year t and equals zero if firm i pays 
dividends in both years t and t-1. Reform is a dummy variable that equals one if firm i has completed the split-share 
structure reform by the end of year t. Goodgvn is proxy for good corporate governance, which is an indicator variable 
that equals to one if firm i’s compensation ratio is below the sample median. The compensation ratio is defined as the 
number of additional shares received by TS holders from NTS holders for each tradable share held, multiplied by the 
closing price on the last trading date before the reform, plus the cash compensation ratio. State is an indicator variable 
that equals to one if the firm’s ultimate controlling shareholder is a state-owned-enterprise or a government agency. 
SGrowth is the annual sales growth rate, averaged over the pre-reform years and Illiquidity is the average ratio of the 
daily absolute return to the (dollar) trading volume on that day, averaged over the pre-reform years. LagPayout is the 
cash dividend payout ratio in the prior year. Lag1CDPayer is an indicator variable that equals to one if firm i paid cash 
dividends in the prior year. See Table 1 for definitions of all other variables. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, 
** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: The effect of the reform on dividend payout ratio of dividend-continuing firms 
Independent Variable 
Dependent Variable: Cash Dividend Payout Ratio 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Reform -0.037*** -0.031*** -0.051*** -0.042*** -0.043*** 
 
(-6.14) (-2.64) (-4.86) (-4.42) (-2.67) 
State -0.001 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 0.003 
 
(-0.17) (0.33) (-0.17) (-0.16) (0.32) 
Reform*State  -0.008   -0.008 
  
(-0.63)   (-0.62) 
Goodgvn -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(-0.48) (-0.50) (-0.50) (-0.11) (-0.10) 
Reform*Goodgvn    -0.004 -0.004 
  
  (-0.35) (-0.38) 
SGrowth -0.008 -0.008 -0.023 -0.008 -0.023 
 
(-0.89) (-0.88) (-1.54) (-0.92) (-1.52) 
Reform*SGrowth   0.023  0.022 
  
 (1.24)  (1.21) 
Illiquidity -0.923 -0.935 -2.012* -1.816 -1.996* 
 
(-1.25) (-1.27) (-1.76) (-1.60) (-1.74) 
Reform*Illiquidity   1.613 1.370 1.573 
  
 (1.21) (1.04) (1.18) 
ROAVOL 0.683*** 0.682*** 0.688*** 0.687*** 0.686*** 
 
(4.82) (4.82) (4.86) (4.85) (4.84) 
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LogTA 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 
(0.66) (0.65) (0.50) (0.55) (0.50) 
ROA -0.752*** -0.753*** -0.757*** -0.758*** -0.757*** 
 
(-10.10) (-10.11) (-10.13) (-10.14) (-10.14) 
RE2TE 0.022 0.022 0.025 0.023 0.024 
 
(0.73) (0.73) (0.81) (0.75) (0.79) 
Cash 0.102*** 0.102*** 0.101*** 0.102*** 0.102*** 
 
(4.32) (4.33) (4.32) (4.34) (4.34) 
Leverage -0.257*** -0.257*** -0.255*** -0.257*** -0.254*** 
 
(-13.04) (-13.02) (-12.88) (-13.03) (-12.85) 
LagPayout 0.495*** 0.495*** 0.497*** 0.496*** 0.497*** 
 
(32.00) (32.01) (32.02) (31.98) (32.00) 
Intercept 0.254*** 0.251*** 0.272*** 0.265*** 0.268*** 
 (3.77) (3.72) (3.98) (3.88) (3.91) 
      
No of Observations 2,635 2,635 2,635 2,635 2,635 
Likelihood Ratio 1,662 1,663 1,665 1,664 1,665 
Panel B: The effect of the reform on the probability of initiating dividends 
Independent Variable 
Dependent Variable: The propensity to initiate a dividend 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Reform -0.337*** -0.163 -0.211 -0.634*** -0.149 
 
(-2.97) (-0.77) (-1.18) (-3.19) (-0.52) 
State 0.467*** 0.594*** 0.484*** 0.461*** 0.618*** 
 
(3.77) (3.31) (3.89) (3.71) (3.37) 
Reform*State  -0.239   -0.262 
  
(-0.98)   (-1.07) 
Goodgvn -0.426*** -0.423*** -0.401*** -0.577*** -0.529*** 
 
(-3.91) (-3.88) (-3.66) (-3.64) (-3.29) 
Reform*Goodgvn    0.282 0.247 
  
  (1.30) (1.13) 
SGrowth 0.091 0.090 0.662*** 0.077 0.668*** 
 
(0.69) (0.68) (3.14) (0.59) (3.12) 
Reform*SGrowth   -0.932***  -0.945*** 
  
 (-3.41)  (-3.43) 
Illiquidity -18.632* -18.897* -32.916* -36.628** -33.624* 
 
(-1.75) (-1.76) (-1.85) (-2.04) (-1.87) 
Reform*Illiquidity   21.837 25.134 22.727 
  
 (1.14) (1.29) (1.17) 
ROAVOL -12.379*** -12.429*** -13.089*** -12.320*** -13.091*** 
 
(-5.26) (-5.28) (-5.52) (-5.24) (-5.52) 
LogTA 0.319*** 0.316*** 0.317*** 0.306*** 0.315*** 
 
(4.17) (4.13) (4.16) (4.02) (4.13) 
ROA 15.660*** 15.684*** 15.532*** 15.262*** 15.334*** 
 
(9.19) (9.19) (9.09) (8.90) (8.91) 
RE2TE 4.208*** 4.197*** 4.262*** 4.238*** 4.281*** 
 
(9.30) (9.29) (9.39) (9.37) (9.42) 
Cash 1.647*** 1.667*** 1.682*** 1.627*** 1.695*** 
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(3.27) (3.31) (3.34) (3.25) (3.37) 
Leverage -0.877** -0.841** -0.946*** -0.836** -0.899** 
 
(-2.43) (-2.32) (-2.60) (-2.31) (-2.46) 
Intercept -8.387*** -8.443*** -8.402*** -7.908*** -8.401*** 
 (-5.29) (-5.31) (-5.26) (-4.98) (-5.25) 
      
No of Observations 2,373 2,373 2,373 2,373 2,373 
Pseudo R2 21.7% 21.8% 22.2% 21.8% 22.3% 
Panel C: The effect of the reform on the probability of omitting dividends 
Independent Variable 
Dependent Variable: The propensity to omit a dividend 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Reform 0.295*** 0.282 0.360* 0.555*** 0.532* 
 
(2.75) (1.48) (1.77) (2.76) (1.82) 
State -0.236** -0.246 -0.238** -0.239** -0.224 
 
(-2.13) (-1.60) (-2.14) (-2.15) (-1.44) 
Reform*State  0.019   -0.029 
  
(0.09)   (-0.13) 
Goodgvn 0.333*** 0.333*** 0.333*** 0.470*** 0.469*** 
 
(3.44) (3.44) (3.44) (3.48) (3.44) 
Reform*Goodgvn    -0.275 -0.275 
  
  (-1.44) (-1.42) 
SGrowth -0.266 -0.265 -0.366 -0.263 -0.347 
 
(-1.59) (-1.59) (-1.39) (-1.57) (-1.32) 
Reform*SGrowth   0.168  0.141 
  
 (0.50)  (0.42) 
Illiquidity -37.968*** -37.957*** -28.069 -26.301 -27.104 
 
(-2.63) (-2.63) (-1.46) (-1.37) (-1.40) 
Reform*Illiquidity   -19.926 -22.710 -21.550 
  
 (-0.80) (-0.91) (-0.86) 
ROAVOL 10.481*** 10.487*** 10.398*** 10.401*** 10.370*** 
 
(4.22) (4.22) (4.19) (4.19) (4.17) 
LogTA -0.676*** -0.676*** -0.676*** -0.678*** -0.679*** 
 
(-9.73) (-9.73) (-9.70) (-9.72) (-9.73) 
ROA -17.350*** -17.350*** -17.247*** -17.178*** -17.153*** 
 
(-10.21) (-10.21) (-10.13) (-10.10) (-10.08) 
RE2TE -0.057 -0.058 -0.071 -0.106 -0.102 
 
(-0.10) (-0.10) (-0.13) (-0.19) (-0.18) 
Cash -1.563*** -1.565*** -1.565*** -1.539*** -1.536*** 
 
(-3.27) (-3.27) (-3.27) (-3.21) (-3.20) 
Leverage 1.766*** 1.765*** 1.783*** 1.783*** 1.793*** 
 
(5.00) (5.00) (5.04) (5.05) (5.06) 
Intercept 13.667*** 13.675*** 13.633*** 13.564*** 13.599*** 
 (9.35) (9.34) (9.26) (9.23) (9.20) 
      
No of Observations 3,259 3,259 3,259 3,259 3,259 
Pseudo R2 11.8% 11.8% 11.8% 11.9% 11.9% 
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Table 3.10    Effect of Share Reform in Different Time Horizons surrounding the Reform 
The table reports Tobit regression results on the effect of the split-share structure reform on firms’ dividend payout ratio 
within different time horizons surrounding the reform. Our full sample includes 6,156 firm-year observations during the 
period of 2003-2011, representing 1,275 Chinese listed firms that had completed the split-share structure reform by 
December 31, 2011. In Panel A, we restrict the sample to firm-year observations within 1 year before and 1 year after 
the reform and the observations in the reform year are excluded. In Panel B, we restrict the sample to firm-year 
observations within 2 years before and 2 years after the reform and the observations in the reform year are excluded. 
The dependent variable is Payout, defined as cash dividends divided by EBIT. Reform is a dummy variable that equals 
one if firm i has completed the split-share structure reform by the end of year t. Goodgvn is proxy for good corporate 
governance, which is an indicator variable that equals to one if firm i’s compensation ratio is below the sample median. 
The compensation ratio is defined as the number of additional shares received by TS holders from NTS holders for each 
tradable share held, multiplied by the closing price on the last trading date before the reform, plus the cash 
compensation ratio. State is an indicator variable that equals to one if the firm’s ultimate controlling shareholder is a 
state-owned-enterprise or a government agency. SGrowth is the annual sales growth rate, averaged over the pre-reform 
years and Illiquidity is the average ratio of the daily absolute return to the (dollar) trading volume on that day, averaged 
over the pre-reform years. LagPayout is the cash dividend payout ratio in the prior year. See Table 1 for definitions of 
all other variables. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
Panel A: One-year horizon surrounding the reform 
Independent Variable 
Dependent Variable: Cash Dividend Payout Ratio 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Reform -0.077*** -0.098*** -0.081*** -0.122*** -0.147*** 
 
(-6.46) (-4.16) (-4.07) (-6.37) (-4.62) 
State 0.042*** 0.029 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.022 
 
(3.05) (1.50) (3.05) (3.03) (1.12) 
Reform*State  0.028   0.041 
  
(1.03)   (1.52) 
Goodgvn -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.071*** -0.073*** 
 
(-2.80) (-2.79) (-2.80) (-4.24) (-4.34) 
Reform*Goodgvn    0.074*** 0.079*** 
  
  (3.21) (3.36) 
SGrowth 0.028 0.028 0.045* 0.028 0.042* 
 
(1.58) (1.58) (1.80) (1.58) (1.67) 
Reform*SGrowth   -0.033  -0.027 
  
 (-0.98)  (-0.78) 
Illiquidity 0.839 0.860 -0.804 -0.752 -0.726 
 
(0.68) (0.70) (-0.39) (-0.37) (-0.36) 
Reform*Illiquidity   2.576 2.525 2.542 
  
 (1.14) (1.12) (1.13) 
ROAVOL -1.757*** -1.762*** -1.759*** -1.731*** -1.737*** 
 
(-5.94) (-5.95) (-5.95) (-5.86) (-5.89) 
LogTA 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 
 
(6.36) (6.38) (6.26) (6.33) (6.37) 
ROA 0.646*** 0.652*** 0.631*** 0.602*** 0.604*** 
 
(3.88) (3.91) (3.78) (3.61) (3.62) 
RE2TE 0.312*** 0.311*** 0.313*** 0.320*** 0.320*** 
 
(5.65) (5.63) (5.67) (5.78) (5.77) 
Cash 0.266*** 0.265*** 0.265*** 0.265*** 0.263*** 
 
(5.00) (4.98) (4.99) (5.00) (4.96) 
Leverage -0.207*** -0.207*** -0.208*** -0.208*** -0.211*** 
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(-4.98) (-5.00) (-5.01) (-5.01) (-5.08) 
LagPayout 0.597*** 0.597*** 0.596*** 0.598*** 0.598*** 
 
(20.86) (20.87) (20.86) (20.95) (20.97) 
Intercept -0.978*** -0.969*** -0.960*** -0.949*** -0.941*** 
 (-6.66) (-6.59) (-6.45) (-6.40) (-6.32) 
No of Observations 2,001 2,001 2,001 2,001 2,001 
Likelihood Ratio 1,075 1,076 1,077 1,087 1,090 
Panel B: Two-year horizon surrounding the reform 
Independent Variable 
Dependent Variable: Cash Dividend Payout Ratio 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Reform -0.067*** -0.052*** -0.075*** -0.105*** -0.086*** 
 
(-7.50) (-3.02) (-5.12) (-7.38) (-3.65) 
State 0.033*** 0.043*** 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.039*** 
 
(3.32) (3.10) (3.35) (3.32) (2.78) 
Reform*State  -0.020   -0.011 
  
(-1.03)   (-0.57) 
Goodgvn -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.053*** -0.052*** 
 
(-3.42) (-3.43) (-3.43) (-4.41) (-4.26) 
Reform*Goodgvn    0.047*** 0.044*** 
  
  (2.77) (2.59) 
SGrowth 0.013 0.013 0.032* 0.012 0.030 
 
(1.06) (1.07) (1.73) (1.00) (1.64) 
Reform*SGrowth   -0.034  -0.031 
  
 (-1.40)  (-1.29) 
Illiquidity -0.969 -0.978 -3.077** -3.176** -2.991** 
 
(-0.97) (-0.98) (-2.08) (-2.14) (-2.01) 
Reform*Illiquidity   3.383** 3.454** 3.243* 
  
 (2.03) (2.06) (1.93) 
ROAVOL -1.046*** -1.049*** -1.045*** -1.031*** -1.043*** 
 
(-5.36) (-5.37) (-5.35) (-5.28) (-5.34) 
LogTA 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 
 
(6.98) (6.97) (6.92) (6.93) (6.98) 
ROA 0.381*** 0.380*** 0.361*** 0.347*** 0.345*** 
 
(3.23) (3.22) (3.06) (2.94) (2.92) 
RE2TE 0.378*** 0.378*** 0.381*** 0.385*** 0.385*** 
 
(9.69) (9.70) (9.75) (9.84) (9.84) 
Cash 0.283*** 0.284*** 0.282*** 0.281*** 0.281*** 
 
(7.32) (7.33) (7.30) (7.25) (7.26) 
Leverage -0.257*** -0.256*** -0.258*** -0.256*** -0.258*** 
 
(-8.63) (-8.58) (-8.67) (-8.62) (-8.67) 
LagPayout 0.570*** 0.570*** 0.569*** 0.570*** 0.569*** 
 
(26.86) (26.87) (26.87) (26.91) (26.89) 
Intercept -0.751*** -0.758*** -0.729*** -0.715*** -0.731*** 
 (-6.91) (-6.96) (-6.73) (-6.61) (-6.72) 
No of Observations 3,870 3,870 3,870 3,870 3,870 
Likelihood Ratio 1,889 1,890 1,895 1,901 1,903 
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Figure 3.1    Number of Firms by Reform Year 
The figure plots the number of sample firms by their reform completion years. Our full sample includes 6,156 firm-year 
observations during the period of 2003-2011, representing 1,275 Chinese listed firms that had completed the split-share 
structure reform by December 31, 2011. We restrict the sample to firm-year observations within 3 years before and 3 
years after the reform and the observations in the reform year are excluded. 
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Figure 3.2    Cash Dividend Payout Ratio by Financial Year 
The figure plots sample firms’ cash dividend payout ratios by financial year. Our full sample includes 6,156 firm-year 
observations during the period of 2003-2011, representing 1,275 Chinese listed firms that had completed the split-share 
structure reform by December 31, 2011. We restrict the sample to firm-year observations within 3 years before and 3 
years after the reform and the observations in the reform year are excluded. 
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 Financial Constraints, Financing Capacity and Dividend Policy Chapter 4
4.1 Introduction 
Prior research suggests a value-enhancing effect of corporate dividend initiations and increases by 
reporting that positive abnormal stock returns are associated with dividend initiation and increase 
announcements (see, for example, Michaely, et al. (1995); Grullon, et al. (2002)). However, 
dividend-increasing firms could suffer from a decline in corporate liquidity following dividend 
increases in the form of reduced cash balances and additional financing leverage because these 
firms typically spend cash or increase borrowing to finance the increased dividend payments 
(Jensen (1986); Stephens and Weisbach (1998)). If dividend-increasing firms are financially 
constrained prior to the increase, deteriorated corporate liquidity can be extremely damaging. They 
are more exposed to financial distress risk due to diminished cash balances 29  and could also 
experience underinvestment in the product market and become less competitive as financing future 
investment becomes more difficult.30 For these reasons, decisions to increase dividends appear to be 
less desirable for financially constrained firms.  
Contrary to this common belief, financially constrained firms sometimes choose to increase 
dividends (Masters, et al. (2013)) or repurchase shares (Chen and Wang (2012)). However, most 
studies show that dividend increases by financially constrained firms do not enhance firm value, as 
both stock returns and operating performance suffer in both the short and long term, relative to their 
unconstrained counterparts (Chen and Wang (2012); Masters, et al. (2013)). 
Why would a constrained firm increase dividends if such an increase does not improve firm 
value? Previous studies provide some possible answers. For example, Chen and Wang (2012) 
suggest that managerial overconfidence may explain why constrained firms buy back shares by 
showing that constrained firms tend to buy back more shares when their managers are more 
overconfident.31 
In our paper, we propose that enhancing financing capacity could be a potential motivation for 
financially constrained firms to approach dividend-increasing decisions.32 Due to the existence of 
29 See Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999), Kaplan and Zingales (2000), Lamont, Polk and Saa-Requejo 
(2001), Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004), Whited and Wu (2006), and Denis and Sibilkov (2010) for a detailed 
discussion. 
30 See, for example, Chevalier and Scharfstein (1994), Campello (2003), and Almeida, et al. (2004). 
31 Share repurchase and dividend increase are substitutes in most classic dividend theories, such as the dividend 
irrelevancy theory of Miller and Modigliani (1961), the agency theories of Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986), and 
the signaling models of Bhattacharya (1979) and Miller and Rock (1985). Thus, we borrow related findings here. 
32 Hereinafter, by the term “financing capacity”, we refer to the capacity to obtain public financing in the secondary 
market. 
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information asymmetry, seasoned equity offering (SEO) announcements are usually associated with 
negative market reactions (Korajczyk, Lucas and McDonald (1991); Bayless and Chaplinsky 
(1996)), while dividend announcements could reduce potential information asymmetry (Howe and 
Lin (1992); Khang and King (2006); Li and Zhao (2008)). Therefore, firms have incentives to 
utilize dividend payments to mitigate future financing costs (via the reduction of information 
asymmetry). The incentive is even stronger for constrained firms, as they typically face a higher 
level of information asymmetry and thus higher costs of external funds. 
Prior studies establish a link between financing capacity and dividend-increasing decisions to 
some extent. However, most of them (see, e.g., Li, Wang and Qi (2006); Masters, et al. (2013)) 
suffer from the problem of endogeneity arising from the interdependence of financing and dividend 
decisions. Specifically, on the one hand, a firm’s dividend policy is closely related to its financing 
capacity because dividend payments rely on the sufficiency of retained earnings, the proportion of 
which in total internal funds is subject to the availability of external finance. On the other hand, the 
financing capacity is dependent on dividend policy. For example, firms would choose to 
strategically pay higher dividends to develop good reputations and reduce future financing costs (La 
Porta, et al. (2000)), especially for financially constrained firms. Without properly addressing this 
endogeneity issue, the association between financing capacity and dividend decisions observed in 
the existing empirical work cannot be identified as evidence of causality as financing and dividend 
decisions can be endogenously determined. Thus, the question of whether financing capacity has an 
effect on dividend policy remains an unsolved empirical issue.  
In this chapter, we attempt to mitigate the potential problem of endogeneity by examining a 
mandatory regulation on financing qualification that was enacted by the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC, the equivalent of the Securities and Exchange Commission in the 
U.S.) in 2008.33 In the “Decisions on Amending Provisions on Cash Dividends by Listed Firms” 
published in October 2008, the CSRC specified that for listed firms intending to publicly issue new 
securities, the accumulated cash dividends distributed over the past three years must be no less than 
30% of the average realized annual distributable profits. This regulation imposes a stricter 
restriction on firms’ financing qualification, and it was also the first time that the CSRC formally 
stressed the importance of cash dividends over other distribution types.34 
33 Hereinafter, by the term “financing qualification”, we refer to the eligibility to publicly issue securities with respect to 
the dividend requirement. 
34 The 2008 regulation increased the dividends requirement to 30% of average profits, from the 20% stipulated in a 
regulation released in 2006. Details on these regulations are introduced in Section 4.2. 
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This regulation provides an ideal experimental setting for our research. Given its coerciveness, 
the regulation can be regarded as an exogenous shock to firms’ external financing capacity but 
without having a universal impact on dividend policy because it is applicable only if the firm is 
seeking external financing in the public secondary market. In this regard, utilizing the regulation to 
design a quasi-natural experiment could effectively identify the causal effect of financing capacity 
on dividend policy and attenuate the potential endogeneity problem. Moreover, the approach of a 
quasi-natural experiment could also alleviate the confounding effect of other correlated omitted 
variables.  
We examine how this shock to financing capacity affects firms’ dividend decisions, with a 
focus on financially constrained firms. As the 2008 regulation mandatorily associates dividend 
payment with firms’ financing qualification, it essentially dampens firms’ external financing 
capacity, and the impact is particularly pronounced for financially constrained firms, as they are 
usually the firms with a greater demand for external finance and thus place greater value on 
financing eligibility. 35  Therefore, we expect that in the post-regulation period, financially 
constrained firms are more likely to pay cash dividends and pay more dividends than do 
unconstrained firms to satisfy the regulatory requirement and thereby obtain financing eligibility. 
We use a sample of 8,758 firm-year observations from 941 non-financial firms listed on the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2003 through 2012. Following Whited and Wu 
(2006), we construct a synthetic Whited-Wu index (WW index, hereinafter) to measure the degree 
of a firm’s financial constraints, and the value of the index represents the wedge between the 
internal and external costs of funds. Our results verify that this index is informative of the extent to 
which a firm is financially constrained.  
We begin by examining how listed firms respond to a shock to financing capacity. Our results 
show that the deterioration in financing capacity (triggered by the 2008 regulation) affects firms’ 
dividend policy. Firms, on average, are more likely to pay cash dividends after the regulation, but 
they pay less than before.  
Applying the WW index to categorize our sample firms into constrained and unconstrained 
firms, we observe that the regulation alters the relationship between financial constraints and 
dividend policy. Before the regulation, constrained firms are less willing to pay cash dividends than 
unconstrained firms; when they do pay, they tend to pay lower dividends. This pattern, however, is 
reversed after the regulation comes into effect. Financially constrained firms become more willing 
to pay cash dividends than unconstrained firms and also pay higher dividends in relative terms. 
35 See a detailed discussion in Section 4.3. 
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Furthermore, we find that the behavior of financially constrained firms differs from that of 
unconstrained firms when affected by the shock to financing capacity. Specifically, although both 
constrained and unconstrained firms display a post-regulation increase in the propensity to pay cash 
dividends, the magnitude of the increase is much smaller for unconstrained firms. Constrained and 
unconstrained firms both reduce their dividend payments after the regulation, but the reduction in 
dividends is less significant for financially constrained firms. As a robustness check, we use three 
alternative measures of financial constraints that are suggested by prior studies (i.e., firm size, state 
ownership and sales growth) and re-perform our tests. Our conclusions remain unchanged, and 
hence our results are not driven by the use of a particular measure of financial constraints. 
We further examine whether financially constrained firms increase dividends (relative to 
unconstrained firms) for the exact purpose of enhancing external financing capacity. We build our 
analysis upon the investigation of firms’ propensity to finance in the equity market before and after 
the 2008 regulation and perform a cross-sectional comparison between financially constrained and 
unconstrained groups. The basic intuition is that if constrained firms increase dividends precisely 
for the purpose of improving their financing capacity, they will seize the opportunity to acquire 
external finance once they satisfy the financing qualification via increasing dividends. As a result, 
we should observe an increase in the probability of financing for constrained firms after the 
regulation. Constrained firms should also be more likely to finance than their unconstrained 
counterparts because the relatively high cost of external financing makes them more appreciative of 
the financing opportunity. Therefore, financing activities in the post-regulation period should be 
concentrated in constrained firms that are also qualified for public financing.36 
Our results confirm that among all qualified firms, firms that are financially constrained in 
particular increase their propensity to finance publicly in the secondary market during the post-
regulation period. Combined with our previous findings that financially constrained firms increase 
both their propensity to and the amount they pay after the regulation (relative to their unconstrained 
counterparts), our results provide a possible answer to the question of why financially constrained 
firms increase dividends. Our evidence suggests that the desire to enhance external financing 
capacity is a potential incentive for constrained firms to increase cash dividend payments. 
Our study advances the literature on the relationship between financial constraints and 
corporate dividend policy by empirically examining how financial constraints affect dividend policy 
in the presence of financing concerns. Such an examination greatly enriches the existing knowledge 
36 Hereinafter, by the term “qualified firms”, we refer to firms that satisfy the dividend requirement for public financing. 
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of the real effects of financial constraints. We gain a deeper insight into the relationship between 
financial constraints and corporate behaviors. 
Our paper also contributes by highlighting the effect of external financing capacity on dividend 
policy. As Chinese listed firms, especially non-state-owned firms, rely heavily on external financing, 
identifying financing capacity as an influential factor enriches the understanding of the determinants 
of dividend policy in Chinese listed firms. From a methodological perspective, our study 
contributes by identifying a setting in which firms experience an exogenous shock to their financing 
capacity, thereby enabling us to identify the causal effect of financing capacity on cash dividends. 
Our setting avoids the inference problems arising from the concern that both cash dividends and 
financing capacity can be endogenously determined. 
Finally, our study extends the research on the dividend regulations in the Chinese capital 
market. The issue of low dividends (in particular, low cash dividends) by listed firms has aroused 
considerable concern among regulators. The CSRC released a number of regulations in recent years 
in an attempt to promote cash dividend payments and establish long-term dividend policy. 
Therefore, investigating the implications of such regulations for firms’ dividend policy is of 
particular importance, as it could provide real evidence on whether these regulations achieve the 
goals of regulators. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the regulations on dividend policy 
and public financing in the Chinese capital market. Section 4.3 reviews the related literature and 
develops our hypotheses. Our data and methodology are described in Section 4.4. Sections 4.5 to 
4.7 present our empirical analyses, and our robustness check is reported in Section 4.8. The final 
section concludes the chapter and offers some discussion.  
4.2 Regulations on dividend policy and public financing in China 
In China, dividend payments are usually associated with considerable financing programs (Lee and 
Xiao (2004)). This could be a consequence of the mandatory regulations imposed in recent years 
that stipulate dividend payment as a necessary condition for external financing. While firms in 
developed economies generally tend to have stable dividend polices, most Chinese listed firms are 
experiencing rapid growth with a focus on capital accumulation and expansion. Therefore, they 
have fewer dividend initiations and lower dividend payments (Shao and Lin (2004)). Recognizing 
the fact that the interests of minority shareholders are not properly protected, in recent years the 
CSRC has pursued mandatory regulations on dividend policy, which are intended to encourage 
listed firms to establish long-term dividend policies and to promote cash dividend payments.  
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On November 6 2000, Fuchun Fan, vice chairman of the CSRC, declared that the authorities 
were considering cash dividend payment as a necessary condition for listed firms to offer a rights 
issue or seasoned equity issue. Following that, in March 2001, the CSRC released the 
“Administration Measures for New Shares’ Issuance by Listed Firms” and formally stipulated that 
the underwriters of common equity must pay close attention to the public financing applications 
(i.e., rights issues, seasoned offerings and convertible bond issues) by firms that had failed to pay a 
dividend in the past three years without their Boards of Directors having provided any justifiable 
explanation. Two months later, in the “Guidance on the Approval of New Shares’ Issuance”, the 
CSRC further required the regulating authority to investigate the payout status, especially the 
payout ratio of cash dividends, in the past three years when approving listed firms’ financing 
applications. This was the first attempt by Chinese regulators to officially associate dividend 
payment with firms’ financing qualification. However, the CSRC did not specify the minimum 
amount to be distributed as dividends. Additionally, the payment of dividends was not compulsory 
provided that the firms’ Boards of Directors provided satisfactory explanations for not paying 
dividends. 
In an attempt to further protect shareholders’ rights (especially the rights of individual 
shareholders), the CSRC asserted in December 2004 that firms failing to pay cash dividends in the 
past three years will not be allowed to issue new shares, offer rights issues or issue convertible 
bonds. In May 2006, the “Administration Measures for New Shares” was revised to the 
“Administration Measures for Security Issuance”. In this new edition, the CSRC further stipulated 
that, for listed firms intending to publicly issue new securities, the total cash or stock dividends 
distributed over the past three years must be no less than 20% of the average realized annual 
distributable profits. 
More recently, in the “Decisions on Amending Provisions on Cash Dividends by Listed Firms” 
published in October 2008, the CSRC further specified the type of dividends (i.e., cash dividends) 
to be paid by listed firms when seeking public financing. The main purpose was to ensure a stable 
distribution of cash dividends. More important, this new regulation reinforced the protection of 
individual shareholders’ rights by imposing a stricter restriction on firms’ public financing 
qualification. To meet the financing requirements, the firm’s accumulated cash dividends 
distributed over the past three years must be more than 30% of the average realized annual 
distributable profits, whereas the 2006 regulation stipulated 20%. This was the first time that the 
CSRC formally stressed the importance of cash dividends over other distribution types. Therefore, 
this announcement is widely considered the most powerful regulation on dividend policy and public 
financing and is expected to exert considerable influence on listed firms’ cash dividend policy. 
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Given its significance, we employ the 2008 regulation as the setting for our study on the interaction 
between financing and dividend decisions. The appeal of this research design is that the regulation 
can be considered exogenous to firms’ dividend decision process because it affects only the 
financing capacity but has no (or little) effect on dividend policy itself or other factors related to 
dividends, as the regulation is applicable only if the firm wishes to publicly finance in the secondary 
market. Therefore, our setting avoids the problems of endogeneity and correlated omitted variables 
and helps us to clearly identify the causal effect of financing capacity on dividend policy. 
4.3 Literature review and hypothesis development 
4.3.1 Financial constraints 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) argue that in a frictionless external capital market, firms can raise 
sufficient funds for all positive NPV (net present value) investment projects at a cost equal to that of 
internal capital. Therefore, external funding can fully cover the insufficiency of internal funds. That 
is, investment and growth do not depend on the availability of internal capital. Once capital market 
imperfections are introduced, however, internal and external forms of capital are not perfect 
substitutes. For example, the information asymmetry between investors and management increases 
the cost of external capital relative to internal funds (Myers and Majluf (1984)). The wedge between 
the internal and external costs of funds describes the extent to which a firm is financially 
constrained.  
The literature examining the effect of financial constraints on firm behavior has traditionally 
focused on corporate investment decisions. When external financing is more costly than internal 
funding, firms are not necessarily able to pursue all value-increasing investment opportunities. 
Corporate investment is subject to the sufficiency of internal funds and the availability of external 
funding. Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) argue that the change in cash flows is an important 
determinant of marginal capital spending for constrained firms and that the sensitivity of investment 
to cash flows increases in the degree of financial constraints.37 Much subsequent research has also 
supported the influential role of financial constraints in firms’ investment decision process (see, for 
example, Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991); Whited (1992); Calomiris and Hubbard (1994); 
Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995); Lamont (1997)). 
37 Although Fazzari, et al. (1988) report evidence consistent with their hypothesis, the interpretation of their findings 
has been challenged on both theoretical and empirical grounds. For example, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) question the 
validity of investment-cash flow sensitivities as a measure of financial constraints. Erickson and Whited (2000) and Alti 
(2003) also note that there is significant measurement error problem with Tobin’s Q. 
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The first study in the literature incorporating financial constraints in asset pricing models as a 
risk factor is Lamont, et al. (2001). Based on the regression coefficient estimates in Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997), Lamont, et al. (2001) construct a “synthetic KZ index” as a measure of financial 
constraints. They find that financially constrained firms appear to share common variation in their 
stock returns, suggesting the existence of a financial constraints factor, but that the constraints 
factor does not earn a significant risk premium. Building upon a standard intertemporal investment 
model that incorporates financial constraints, Whited and Wu (2006) estimate the nonlinear 
structural Euler equation to derive a financial constraints index (“WW index”) for each firm and 
then construct return factors on the estimated constraints index. Although their evidence shows that 
the (positive) risk premium earned by financially constrained firms is not statistically significant, 
their work provides an important link between the level of financial constraints and firm-specific 
characteristics. Relatedly, Gomes, Yaron and Zhang (2006) adopt a production-based asset pricing 
framework to explicitly model the effect of financing frictions and suggest that financial constraints 
constitute a common risk factor that can improve the pricing of the cross-section of expected returns. 
More recently, Campello and Chen (2010) document evidence that financially constrained firms 
have greater systematic risk and that the risk associated with being financially constrained is priced 
in financial markets.  
4.3.2 Financial constraints and dividend policy 
In the literature on financial constraints, the dividend payout ratio is commonly used as an a priori 
criterion to identify costly external finance (see, for example, Fazzari, et al. (1988); Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997); Almeida, et al. (2004); Denis and Sibilkov (2010); Almeida and Campello (2010)); 
this is motivated by the expectation that low-dividend firms have little internal cash to finance 
investments and thus must rely on external sources. Specifically, Whited and Wu (2006) treat firms’ 
dividend payment status as an important determinant of the WW financial constraints index. The 
general conclusion is that financially constrained firms tend to pay lower cash dividends and also 
have a weaker desire to pay. Because financially constrained firms are subject to relatively high 
costs of external funds, they tend to retain most of the low-cost internal funds that they can generate 
to smooth investment and thus distribute little or no income.  
In the context of the Chinese capital market, it is also clear that cash dividends are adversely 
affected by the extent of financial constraints (see, e.g., Wei and Liu (2004); Li, et al. (2006); 
Zhang and Lv (2007)). A limitation in many Chinese studies is the use of a single firm characteristic 
as the proxy for financial constraints, for instance, firm size (Yan and Wang (2011); Xie and Fang 
(2011); Han and Zhou (2011); Zhong and Lu (2013)), firm age (Xie and Fang (2011)) and state 
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ownership (Lian and Cheng (2007); Guo and Ma (2009); Guo and Wei (2011)). Bushman, Smith 
and Zhang (2011) note that the commonly used proxy of firm characteristics is highly correlated 
with firm growth; therefore, sorting using these variables may not reflect the difference in the 
degree of financial constraints but rather the difference in firm growth. Our study avoids such 
measurement error by applying a synthetic WW index constructed based on a structural investment 
model (following Whited and Wu (2006)) and efficiently identifies the firms that face external 
financial constraints. Equipped with a direct measure of firms’ financially constrained status, we 
propose that: 
H1a: Before the 2008 regulation, financially constrained firms have a lower propensity to pay 
cash dividends than unconstrained firms. 
H1b: Before the 2008 regulation, financially constrained firms pay lower cash dividends than 
unconstrained firms. 
4.3.3 Financing capacity and dividend policy in financially constrained firms 
As Jensen (1986) and Stephens and Weisbach (1998) note, increasing dividends can increase 
leverage and reduce cash, and thus corporate liquidity. If dividend-increasing firms are financially 
constrained prior to the increase, diminished corporate liquidity can be harmful. With less cash, 
these firms are more likely to be exposed to financial distress risk (Opler, et al. (1999); Kaplan and 
Zingales (2000); Lamont, et al. (2001); Almeida, et al. (2004); Whited and Wu (2006); Denis and 
Sibilkov (2010)). Due to the increased difficulty in seeking external financing, financially 
constrained firms could also experience underinvestment in the product market and become less 
competitive (Chevalier and Scharfstein (1994); Campello (2003); Almeida, et al. (2004)). As 
dividends are commonly regarded as “sticky” (Lintner (1956)), financially constrained firms, 
therefore, are expected to be less likely to increase dividends.  
In contrast to this widely accepted view, financially constrained firms sometimes choose to 
increase dividends (Masters, et al. (2013)) or repurchase shares (Chen and Wang (2012)). However, 
most studies show that dividend increases by financially constrained firms do not enhance firm 
value. For example, Chen and Wang (2012) find that relative to unconstrained firms, financially 
constrained firms experience significantly weaker market reactions (in both the short and long term) 
after they announce share repurchase programs. Constrained repurchasers also underperform in 
terms of operating profitability. Furthermore, they are more vulnerable to increased financial risk 
because of diminished corporate liquidity in the post-buyback period. Similarly, Masters, et al. 
(2013) document lower abnormal stock returns and operating performance for financially 
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constrained firms after dividend-increase announcements, relative to their unconstrained 
counterparts.  
As share repurchases and dividend increases do not enhance shareholder wealth, the potential 
incentive for financially constrained firms to make such decisions is worth investigating. Chen and 
Wang (2012) show that constrained firms tend to buy back more shares when their managers are 
more overconfident (e.g., when they overestimate the future returns of their firms and postpone the 
exercise of their stock options) and that these firms are associated with even poorer post-buyback 
stock performance. Their results suggest that managerial overconfidence may explain why 
constrained firms repurchase.  
Another possible explanation is related to financing capacity. Prior studies find that that SEO 
announcements are usually associated with negative market reactions due to the existence of 
information asymmetry (Korajczyk, et al. (1991); Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996)). The dividend 
literature provides compelling evidence that relative to non-payers, information asymmetry is less 
acute for dividend payers (Howe and Lin (1992); Khang and King (2006); Li and Zhao (2008)). 
Therefore, the market reacts less negatively to dividend payers’ SEO announcements than to 
nonpayers’ announcements (Booth and Chang (2011)). Moreover, Deshmukh (2005) shows that 
issue costs are adversely associated with dividend yield. Hence, for firms seeking external financing, 
dividend-paying behavior may be driven by the incentive to mitigate financing costs (via the 
reduction of information asymmetry). The incentive is more pronounced for constrained firms than 
for their unconstrained counterparts, as the former typically face a higher level of information 
asymmetry and, consequently, higher costs of external funds. Masters, et al. (2013) provide 
evidence that constrained firms use dividends to enhance their external financing potential. 
However, a limitation of their study is that they focus on the market reactions to the dividend-
increasing announcements followed by SEOs. With respect to how financing capacity affects the 
dividend-increasing decisions of financially constrained firms, they only provide univariate 
evidence with limited explanatory power. 
According to La Porta, et al. (2000), in countries with weak legal protections for minority 
shareholders, firms pay higher dividends to develop reputations that they treat shareholders well to 
be able to raise external funds on attractive terms. As there are relatively weak protections for 
minority shareholders in China (Chen and Xu (2001)), the incentives for firms to use dividend 
increases to develop good reputations and thereby reduce future financing costs are even stronger, 
especially when firms are financially constrained. Wei and Jiang (2001) conduct a survey on 
Chinese listed firms’ dividend policy and find that firms consider current and future financing needs 
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when making dividend decisions. Li, et al. (2006) also report that financing capacity is the most 
important determinant of dividend policy, especially for non-state-owned listed firms, which are 
normally considered more financially constrained than state-owned firms. 
Although previous studies establish a link between financing capacity and dividend increases to 
some degree, most of them (see, e.g., Li, et al. (2006)) suffer from the problem of endogeneity 
arising from the fact that financing and dividend decisions are interdependent. On the one hand, 
firms’ dividend policy is closely related to financing capacity because dividend payments rely on 
the sufficiency of retained earnings, the proportion of which in total internal funds is subject to the 
availability of external finance. On the other hand, a firm’s financing capacity is dependent on 
dividend policy. For example, firms would choose to pay higher dividends to develop good 
reputations and reduce future financing costs (La Porta, et al. (2000)), especially for financially 
constrained firms. 
4.3.4 A shock to financing capacity: dividend implications 
In this chapter, we attempt to mitigate the endogeneity issue by examining a mandatory Chinese 
regulation on financing qualification that was announced by the CSRC in 2008.38 This regulation 
provides an ideal experiment for our research. Specifically, given its coerciveness, the regulation 
can be regarded as an exogenous shock to firms’ public financing capability but without having a 
universal impact on dividend policy per se because it is applicable only if the firm is seeking 
financing in the public secondary market. In this regard, utilizing the regulation to design a quasi-
natural experiment could effectively identify the causal effect of financing capacity on dividend 
policy and attenuate the potential endogeneity problem. Moreover, this approach using a quasi-
natural experiment could also alleviate the confounding effect of other correlated omitted variables.  
As the 2008 regulation mandatorily associates dividend payment with firms’ financing 
qualification, it essentially dampens firms’ financing capacity. There are two channels through 
which the regulation affects corporate dividend policy.  
4.3.4.1 The “residual dividend” effect 
On the one hand, according to the residual dividend policy theory (Preinreich (1932); Sage (1937); 
Miller and Modigliani (1961)), firms pay out excess cash as dividends only after all profitable 
investments are financed. When the 2008 regulation damages their ability to obtain external 
financing, firms are forced to depend more on internally generated funds and reduce their demand 
for external financing. As a result, the greater inclination to save internal funds (for future 
38 The details on the 2008 regulation can be found in Section 4.2. 
83 
 
                                                 
investment needs) would lead to a decrease in the probability of paying cash dividends and a 
decline in the payout ratio. We refer to this effect as the “residual dividend” effect. For financially 
constrained firms, however, this effect may be contaminated by the complementarity between 
internal funds and the demand for external financing. 
Contrary to the standard pecking order theory, when a firm is financially constrained, its 
investment choice becomes endogenous to external financing decisions (Almeida and Campello 
(2010)). The interdependence of financing and investment decisions could fundamentally affect the 
relationship between internal funds and external financing. Because of the higher opportunity cost 
of investment faced by constrained firms, they are more inclined to retain internal funds for 
additional capital expenditures and reluctant to use internal funds to substitute for external financing. 
Moreover, tight financing constraints create a direct incentive for these firms to keep internal funds 
to meet future investment needs in addition to current investment needs. As a result, financially 
constrained firms do not seem to show an inclination toward internal funds and they may not reduce 
the demand for external financing even when profitability increases (i.e., a complementarity 
between internal funds and external financing) (Almeida and Campello (2010)). 
Following this line of argument, financially constrained firms have considerable demand for 
external financing even when regulation further restrains their financing ability. Therefore, once 
such regulation is implemented, they are expected to have a strong motivation to pay dividends to 
maintain their financing capacity. In this regard, the magnitude of the reductions in both the 
propensity to pay and the payout ratio would be smaller for constrained firms, relative to 
unconstrained firms. 
4.3.4.2 The “qualified dividend” effect 
On the other hand, as the public financing requirement is stricter after the regulation is imposed, 
firms that are no longer qualified may seek to recover their financing eligibility, as Chinese listed 
firms have a strong preference for public financing (see, Huang and Zhang (2001)). Therefore, it is 
highly plausible that firms would pay or increase their cash dividends after the regulation, thereby 
allowing them to satisfy the dividend requirement and recover their external financing capacity. We 
term this possibility the “qualified dividend” effect. 
In particular, this “qualified dividend” effect is more pronounced for financially constrained 
firms. As these firms typically have less financing ability (resulting from the high costs of external 
funds), and thus assign greater value to obtaining financing eligibility, financially constrained firms 
are more eager to recover their financing capacity in the post-regulation period. Hence, in terms of 
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dividend policy, constrained firms are expected to be more likely to pay cash dividends than 
unconstrained firms and pay higher dividends.  
In summary, the “residual dividend” effect and the “qualified dividend” effect yield different 
predictions of how firms’ dividend policies change after the regulation is imposed. If the “residual 
dividend” effect dominates, we could observe decreases in both the propensity to pay and the 
payout ratio. Instead, if the “qualified dividend” effect overwhelms the former, increases should be 
observed. Which effect prevails is then an empirical question. 
However, both the “residual dividend” effect and the “qualified dividend” effect consistently 
predict that when experiencing a shock to financing capacity, financially constrained firms behave 
differently from unconstrained firms. Relatively speaking, financially constrained firms appear to 
be more reluctant to cut dividends or depress their desire to pay; rather, they are more willing to pay 
or increase dividends after the regulation. 
These predictions lead to our second set of hypotheses: 
H2a: Compared to unconstrained firms, the post-regulation increase (decrease) in the 
propensity to pay cash dividends is more (less) significant for financially constrained firms. 
H2b: Compared to unconstrained firms, the post-regulation increase (decrease) in cash 
dividends is more (less) significant for financially constrained firms. 
4.3.5 Dividend increases and future financing  
Our second set of hypotheses predicts that relative to unconstrained firms, financially constrained 
firms are more willing to pay or increase dividends after the regulation. If our conjecture is correct, 
then the questions become why financially constrained firms choose to increase their dividends and 
whether they increase dividend payments for the purpose of public financing.  
The 2008 regulation further stipulates that the accumulated cash dividends distributed over the 
past three years must be no less than 30% of the average realized annual distributable profits if 
listed firms intend to publicly issue new securities. A direct consequence is that qualified firms (in 
terms of the dividend requirement) will have an advantage in acquiring approval for their financing 
applications. Given this advantage, these firms are more likely to engage in public financing 
activities. Therefore, we should observe a post-regulation increase in the probability of financing 
for qualified firms. Furthermore, among these qualified firms, financially constrained firms are 
expected to have a greater desire to finance than their unconstrained counterparts. On the one hand, 
constrained firms are confronted with higher external financing costs; hence, they will benefit more 
if they take advantage of this financing qualification. On the other hand, financially constrained 
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firms may engage in precautionary savings to reduce their future need for funds (Hennessy and 
Whited (2007)). Thus, once they satisfy the financing qualification, they will seize the opportunity 
to finance. Therefore, we conjecture that: 
H3: In the post-regulation period, financing activities are concentrated in financially 
constrained firms that are also qualified for public financing. 
4.4 Data and methodology 
4.4.1 Sample design 
Our data are from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. The 
original sample covers all Chinese non-financial firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges during the period from 2003 to 2012.39 We restrict the sample to the post-2000 period 
because Chinese listed firms began to apply a consistent and unified set of accounting standards in 
2000 and the controlling shareholder data begin in 2003. We construct our sample by first deleting 
any firm-year observations with missing data or for which total assets, the capital stock, or sales are 
either zero or negative. Following Whited and Wu (2006), we also exclude any firm for which the 
reported short-term debt is greater than the reported total debt or for which the reported changes in 
capital stock cannot be covered by the reported sales of capital goods and by the reported 
depreciation to avoid coding errors. Furthermore, we remove firms that are delisted, under ‘Special 
Treatment (ST)’ and ‘Particular Transfer (PT)’.40 This screening criterion is important because we 
wish to identify firms with financial constraints rather than firms that are in financial distress. 
Since 2005, all dividends, including stock dividends, are taxed at 10% in China. As listed firms 
need to withhold the dividend tax, many firms pay cash dividends simply to cover the tax payable 
induced by stock dividends. Following the approach in Lee and Xiao (2004) and Huang, et al. 
(2011), we drop dividend observations with a non-zero before-tax cash dividend but with a zero 
after-tax dividend to achieve a clear classification of cash dividend payers. This leaves us with a 
final sample of 8,758 firm-year observations, representing 941 non-financial listed firms on the 
Chinese stock market. 
39 The sample period for our tests on dividend policy is 2003-2012. The estimation of the Euler equation requires using 
instruments dated at t-2; hence we extend the sample period to 2001-2012 when we estimate the nonlinear generalized 
method of moments (GMM). 
40 China has an investor warning system. If a firm has a negative net income for two consecutive years, then the CSRC 
gives ST to the shares of the company. The daily price change limit for ST firms is 5%. A firm that has consecutive 
losses for three years is further classified as an ST* firm. If the firm continues to lose money, it faces delisting and the 
trading of its shares is suspended. PT is a trading service offered for suspended stocks on every Friday. Cash dividend 
payments are restricted for firms with ST, ST* and PT status. 
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Table 4.1 provides definitions for all of the variables that are either investigated or used as 
controls in our tests. Our dividend variables are CDPayer, an indicator that equals one if the firm 
pays a cash dividend in the current financial year and zero otherwise, and Payout, the dividend 
payout ratio calculated as the total cash dividends divided by the EBIT (earnings before interest and 
tax). To capture the effect of the regulation, we define a dummy variable, Regulate, which takes a 
value of one if the current financial year is after the release of the 2008 dividend regulation and zero 
otherwise. Concerning certain extreme values, Payout is winsorized at the top and bottom one 
percent and SG (sales growth) at the top one percent of their respective distributions. 
[Insert Table 4.1 about here] 
4.4.2 Methodology 
4.4.2.1 Measuring financial constraints 
There are two common approaches to estimate the extent to which a firm is financially constrained: 
the Q-theory model and the Euler equation, both of which build upon the dynamic optimization 
model of investment. The Q-model, however, is criticized for its significant measurement error and 
identification problems (see Kaplan and Zingales (1997); Alti (2003); Erickson and Whited (2000)) 
and is more data-demanding. Zhang, Yang, Ma and Huang (2012) also note that the market 
valuation of capital, a proxy for the marginal Q, is difficult to estimate in many developing 
countries due to the imperfections of financial markets. Therefore, in this chapter, we use the 
Whited-Wu (WW) index to measure financial constraints. This index owes its origins to Whited and 
Wu (2006) and is constructed via generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation of an 
investment Euler equation. The construction of the financial constraints index begins with a 
standard partial-equilibrium investment model, in which financial constraints are interpreted as the 
shadow cost associated with raising new equity and imply that external (equity) financing is costly 
relative to internal finance.41 Following the approach developed by Whited and Wu (2006), we 
parameterize the shadow cost of new equity financing as a function of observable firm 
characteristics using Chinese data. A slight difference from Whited and Wu (2006) is that we do not 
include the dividend-paying indicator in the function, as our study explicitly concerns dividend 
policy. Instead, we include an indicator to control for the effect of state ownership on the shadow 
cost, considering that state-owned-enterprises in China have an inherent advantage in receiving 
external financing, not only from government support (Qian (1994)) but also from state-owned 
banks (Kornai (1998); Tian (2005)). The specification is as follows: 
41 Regarding the details of this investment model, please refer to Whited and Wu (2006). 
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𝜆𝑖𝑡 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏2𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏3𝑆𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏4𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏5𝐼𝑆𝐺𝑖𝑡 +𝑏6𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏7𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏8𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏9𝐼𝐷𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡                                            (4.1) 
Where 𝑏𝑖 is the parameter to be estimated; LTD is the ratio of the long-term debt to total assets; 
SOE is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s ultimate controlling shareholder is a state-
owned-enterprise and zero otherwise; SG is the firm’s annual sales growth; LogTA is the natural log 
of total assets; ISG is the firm’s industry sales growth; Cash is the ratio of cash, marketable 
securities and short-term investments to total assets; CF is the ratio of cash flows to total assets; NA 
is the number of analysts following the firm; and IDAR is the firm’s industry debt-to-assets ratio. 
The fitted value of 𝜆𝑖𝑡  is the WW financial constraints index. A higher value of 𝜆𝑖𝑡  suggests a 
higher degree of financial constraints. 
Following Whited and Wu (2006), we apply GMM and estimate the nonlinear Euler equation in 
first differences to eliminate potential firm fixed effects.42 Our instruments comprise all of the Euler 
equation variables and also include inventories, depreciation, current assets, current liabilities, and 
tax payments. All of the instruments are normalized by total assets. Unlike Whited and Wu (2006), 
we do not include either the ratio of dividends to total assets (because dividends are our research 
object) or the average ratio of cash flows to assets over the past three periods (given its high 
correlation with other variables) as predictors of profitability. Instead, we include a dummy that 
equals one if the ratio of cash flows to assets was positive in the previous year to proxy for 
profitability. Because the Euler equation is estimated in first differences, all of the instrumental 
variables are lagged two periods in the GMM estimation.  
Table 4.2 reports the estimation results of the GMM estimation of the Euler equation. Column 
(1) contains estimates from the most general specification of the model, with all nine of the 
financial-health variable in equation (4.1) included. The subsequent column is the estimation result 
of the model from which we drop the constant (because it has the smallest t-statistic). The 
coefficients of all the explanatory variables have the expected signs in Column (2), consistent with 
the predictions in the literature, except for LTD and NA.43 For example, SOE is associated with a 
positive coefficient, suggesting that state-owned listed firms are less likely to be financially 
constrained. This is consistent with the evidence in China that state-owned listed firms possess 
greater access to external financing (Qian (1994); Tian (2005)). The negative sign on the LogTA 
indicates that small firms are subject to greater financial constraints. This essentially captures the 
well-documented size effect (see, for instance, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2005)). The 
42 The Euler equation is given by equation (10) of Whited and Wu (2006). 
43 This is not unexpected, as Chinese listed firms have a strong preference for equity financing (see Huang and Zhang 
(2001)) and that the industry of security analysts remains at an early stage of development (Zhang and Lv (2007)). 
88 
 
                                                 
combination of SG (with a negative coefficient) and ISG (with a positive coefficient) can effectively 
identify firms’ financially constrained status because only firms in high-growth industries but with 
low individual sales growth wish to invest more so as to be constrained (Whited and Wu (2006)). 
Both Cash and CF enter with negative signs, which is consistent with theoretical predictions. Firms 
with high cash holdings and sufficient cash flows are interpreted as being financially healthier, and 
such firms are less likely to be financially constrained. Finally, the extent of financial constraints is 
greater for firms in low-debt capacity industries, resulting in a negative coefficient on IDAR.  
[Insert Table 4.2 about here] 
Therefore, the WW financial constraints index is constructed using the estimates from Model (2) 
of Table 4.2: 
?̂?𝑖𝑡 = −0.1477𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 − 0.0654𝑆𝐺𝑖𝑡 − 0.0508𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 0.018𝐼𝑆𝐺𝑖𝑡 
−0.1287𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑡 − 0.0076𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 − 0.3651𝐼𝐷𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡                              (4.2) 
For every firm-year observation, we sort all of the firms in our sample into deciles based on the 
values of their WW indices. Firms with the lowest WW index values are placed in decile one, and 
firms with the highest values are placed in decile ten. Following the approach in Chen, Goldstein 
and Jiang (2007) and Chen and Wang (2012), we assign firms to groups based on the WW decile 
for the financial year before the announcement of the regulation (i.e., 2008), thereby allowing us to 
precisely capture firms’ financially constrained status before the regulation. We consider the firms 
in the top 3 WW index deciles to be financially constrained, while firms in the remaining deciles are 
considered financially unconstrained.44 
Table 4.3 presents descriptive statistics for the full sample and the subsamples partitioned by 
the financial constraints index. The table shows that more than half of our sample firms pay a cash 
dividend during the sample period and the average payout ratio is approximately 17 percent. Note 
that Regulate has a mean value of 0.531, which suggests that our sample is balanced with respect to 
the number of observations before and after the regulation.  
When we divide the sample into financially constrained and unconstrained firms based on the 
WW index, we observe significant differences in firm characteristics between the two subsamples. 
First, financially constrained firms have a low probability of paying cash dividends and pay less 
than unconstrained firms (0.535 vs. 0.703, 0.154 vs. 0.175, respectively). This is consistent with the 
predictions in the literature that dividend-paying firms and firms with higher payout ratios are less 
44 Our sorting scheme is analogous to that in Lamont, et al. (2001), except that we use the WW index instead of the KZ 
index. Our conclusions remain unchanged if we define financially constrained firms as those in the top 20% (as in Chen 
and Wang (2012)) or 40% (as in Whited and Wu (2006)) of the WW index. 
89 
 
                                                 
likely to face financial constraints. Second, state-owned firms are less likely to be financially 
constrained. This is not surprising considering that state-owned-enterprises in China have better 
access to external financing. Third, financially constrained firms typically operate in high sales-
growth industries but have low individual sales growth. They also belong to industries with low 
debt capacity. Finally, compared with unconstrained firms, financially constrained firms are usually 
smaller and have less cash flow and less analyst coverage. In sum, the firms categorized as 
constrained by our WW index appear to have the characteristics that the literature associates with 
high costs of external financing, and these patterns lend more credence to our index. 
[Insert Table 4.3 about here] 
4.5 The effect of financial constraints and a financing shock: Univariate 
analyses 
Having constructed the financial constraints index and demonstrated that this index is informative 
of the extent to which a firm is financially constrained, we now examine whether and how financial 
constraints influence firms’ dividend policy in the context of the 2008 regulation on financing and 
dividends. We begin with a univariate analysis. 
Table 4.4 reports the changes in firms’ dividend policy after the 2008 regulation and compares 
the changes between financially constrained and unconstrained firms. Panel A reports the results on 
the propensity to pay cash dividends and panel B reports those on the payout ratio. We find that 
firms are more willing to pay cash dividends after the 2008 regulation, irrespective of whether they 
are financially constrained. It is understandable that firms attempt to enhance their financing 
capacity by paying dividends when the regulation mandates dividend payment as a financing 
qualification. This behavior is more pronounced in financially constrained firms, as the increase in 
the propensity for such firms is significantly greater than that for unconstrained firms (0.120 and 
0.034, respectively) and the difference between the two groups is significant at the 1% level. This 
finding provides support for our hypothesis H2a by demonstrating that firms with high costs of 
external financing are more eager to obtain financing eligibility. However, firms appear to reduce 
their dividend payout ratio after the regulation, but financially constrained firms do so to a lesser 
extent (the difference between the changes is highly significant). This remains consistent with our 
prediction that financially constrained firms attribute greater importance to financing eligibility and 
hence are more reluctant to cut dividends. 
[Insert Table 4.4 about here] 
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4.6 The Effect of financial constraints and a financing shock: Cross-sectional 
regression analyses 
The 2008 regulation represents an exogenous shock to firms’ financing capacity, as it mandatorily 
associates dividend payment with firms’ financing qualification. The deterioration in financing 
capacity could oblige firms to adjust their dividend policy, but firms facing higher costs of external 
financing may respond differently. To capture how financial constraints affect firms’ dividend 
policy response to this financing shock in a multivariate framework, we apply a difference-in-
differences approach and estimate a Logit model on firms’ propensity to pay cash dividends and a 
Tobit model on the dividend payout ratio. 
4.6.1 The effect of financial constraints and a financing shock on the propensity to pay cash 
dividends 
Table 4.5 presents the Logit estimation results on how firms adjust their dividend-paying behavior 
to the 2008 regulation and how the extent of financial constraints affects this adjustment. The 
dependent variable is CDPayer, which equals one if the firm pays a cash dividend in the current 
financial year. We define a variable, Constraint, that takes a value of one if the firm’s WW index is 
in the top 3 deciles and zero otherwise. Note that we measure Constraint based on the WW decile 
for the financial year before the 2008 regulation to ensure that we can precisely capture firms’ 
financially constrained status before the regulation. 
In Model 1, the explanatory variables are Regulate and Constraint. The coefficient on Regulate 
is significantly positive, which confirms the univariate result that the enactment of the 2008 
regulation raises firms’ willingness to pay. Constraint is associated with a negative and significant 
coefficient. Thus, firms facing financial constraints are less likely to pay a cash dividend, relative to 
firms with no constraints. This negative relationship is consistent with the evidence documented in 
the literature on financial constraints.  
We further examine whether the existence of financial constraints is important by including an 
interaction term between Regulate and Constraint (i.e., Regulate*Constraint) in Model 2. First, 
Constraint has a negative coefficient per se; hence, before the regulation, constrained firms are less 
likely to pay a cash dividend than are unconstrained firms. This provides support for our hypothesis 
H1a. However, this pattern is reversed after the regulation: constrained firms now become more 
likely to pay than unconstrained firms, as the interaction term Regulate*Constraint exhibits a 
significantly positive coefficient. The positive coefficient on Regulate*Constraint further implies 
that financially constrained firms display a higher post-regulation increase in the propensity to pay 
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than unconstrained firms. These findings are consistent with the “qualified dividend” effect and 
suggest that when the regulation impaired firms’ financing capacity, financially constrained firms 
engage in more dividend-paying behaviors because they face high costs of external finance and 
highly value their eligibility for public financing.45 Our hypothesis H2a is thus also supported. 
In Model 3, in addition to Regulate, Constraint and Regulate*Constraint, we regress CDPayer 
against a number of control variables suggested in the literature as factors affecting dividend 
decisions, for example, leverage (Myers (1984)), volatility (Chay and Suh (2009)) and lagged 
dividend status (Fama and French (2001)).46 47 Our results are quantitatively similar.48 The post-
regulation increase in the propensity to pay cash dividends remains larger for financially 
constrained firms, relative to unconstrained firms, after controlling for those potential influences. In 
addition, the coefficients on all of the controls are associated with the expected signs. For example, 
leverage is negatively related to the propensity to pay; lagged dividend status enters with a positive 
coefficient, confirming the view that dividends are “sticky” (Lintner (1956); Myers (1984)). 
Models 4, 5 and 6 are essentially the same specifications as Models 1, 2 and 3, respectively, 
except that we control for the potential effects of firm-specific differences by including the firm 
fixed effects in the regressions. Because Constraint is measured as a firm-specific indicator based 
on the WW decile for the financial year before the 2008 regulation for each sample firm, we do not 
include Constraint as a standalone variable in the presence of firm fixed effects. The estimation 
results are aligned with those from the previous three models, suggesting that our results are not 
driven by unobservable firm-specific factors. 
[Insert Table 4.5 about here] 
4.6.2 The effect of financial constraints and a financing shock on the dividend payout ratio 
Another important aspect of dividend policy is the cash dividend payout ratio. To verify whether the 
shock to financing capacity (i.e., the 2008 regulation) affects firms’ payout ratio, we apply a 
multivariate Tobit model and report the estimation results in Table 4.6. 
In Model 1, we find that firms’ dividend payout ratio exhibits a decrease after the 2008 
regulation, as Regulate is significantly negative. According to the theory of residual dividend policy, 
firms distribute cash only if all financing needs of its investments are met. The regulation dampens 
45 Recall that the “qualified dividend” effect predicts a post-regulation increase in firms’ propensity to pay cash 
dividends but a greater increase for financially constrained firms. See Section 4.3.4.2 for details. 
46 For the definitions of the control variables, please refer to Table 4.1. 
47 We do not include firm size, profitability or cash holding as controls because we have already included them in the 
parameterization of the WW index. 
48 There are fewer observations in Model 3 because of some missing values. 
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the financing capacity of all firms, which forces firms to rely on internal sources of funds. Therefore, 
cash dividends that can be distributed decrease in the post-regulation period. Moreover, recall that 
the regulation requires the accumulated cash dividends be no less than 30% of annual distributable 
profits.49 If the firm has already satisfied the requirement, it does not need to pay higher dividends 
after the regulation. Additionally, the coefficient on Constraint is negative and significant at the 1% 
level, indicating that financially constrained firms pay lower dividends than unconstrained firms, on 
average.  
In Model 2, we add an interaction term, Regulate*Constraint, to capture the differential effect 
of the regulation on financially constrained and unconstrained firms. The coefficient on the 
interaction term is positive and statistically significant, while the coefficient on Constraint itself is 
negative. This finding implies that the regulation changes the relationship between financial 
constraints and dividend payouts. Before the regulation, financial constraints have a significantly 
negative impact on payout ratios (supporting hypothesis H1b), but this negative impact weakens in 
the post-regulation period. Furthermore, constrained firms respond differently from unconstrained 
firms when affected by the shock to financing capacity. We observe that while Regulate has a 
negative coefficient, Regulate*Constraint enters with a positive sign. Therefore, relative to 
unconstrained firms, the post-regulation reduction in cash dividends is less significant for 
financially constrained firms. This is consistent with the expectation of the “residual dividend” 
effect and supports our hypothesis H2b.50 
To control for the effect of other potential explanatory variables, in Model 3, we regress Payout 
against several control variables in addition to those considered previously. 51  The results are 
qualitatively similar to those from Models 1 and 2 (e.g., Regulate*Constraint is positive and 
significant at the 5% level), suggesting that the effect of financial constraints persists and is not 
driven by other factors. Model 3 also shows that Leverage and Volatility have negative impacts on 
firms’ dividend payout ratios, while lagged dividend status (Lag1CDPayer) has a positive effect, as 
previous studies suggest.52 
[Insert Table 4.6 about here] 
49 The 2008 regulation stipulates that the accumulated cash dividends distributed over the past three years must be no 
less than 30% of the average realized annual distributable profits if listed firms intend to publicly issue new securities. 
50 Recall that the “residual dividend” effect expects a post-regulation decline in firms’ cash dividend payout ratios but a 
smaller decrease for financially constrained firms. See Section 4.3.4.1 for details. 
51 We do not include firm fixed effects in the models, as there is not a sufficient statistic that would allow the fixed 
effects to be conditioned out of the likelihood and the unconditional fixed-effects estimates are biased (Honoré (1992)). 
52 The lagged dividend payout ratio is not included as a control because using lagged payout ratios as an explanatory 
variable is akin to regressing the dependent variable on itself (Fama and French (2001)). 
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To summarize, the results in Sections 4.6.1 and 4.6.2 confirm that compared with unconstrained 
firms, constrained firms increase their propensities to pay dividends to a greater extent and reduce 
their dividend payout ratios to a lesser extent after the regulation. This finding is consistent with the 
predictions of both the “qualified dividend” and the “residual dividend” effect that we discuss in 
Section 4.3.4. Furthermore, we find evidence that the two effects play different roles in firms’ 
decisions regarding whether to pay a dividend and how much to pay. It appears that the “qualified 
dividend” effect dominates in firms’ decisions regarding whether to pay a cash dividend because the 
observed post-regulation increase in firms’ propensity to pay is consistent with the “qualified 
dividend” effect. In contrast, when firms determine how much to pay out as dividends, the “residual 
dividend” effect appears to dominate, as we observe a decline in the payout ratio after the regulation, 
exactly as the “residual dividend” effect predicts. 
4.6.3 The effect of financial constraints and a financing shock: subsample analysis 
To explicitly examine how financial constraints affect firms’ responses to the financing shock, we 
compare two subsamples categorized based on their WW deciles in the financial year before the 
2008 regulation. The most constrained subsample comprises those firms in the top 3 WW index 
deciles, while the most unconstrained subsample includes firms in the lowest 3 deciles. The 
comparison between the top and bottom subsamples could provide a clearer picture of the impact of 
financial constraints. 
4.6.3.1 The propensity to pay cash dividends 
Table 4.7 tabulates the Logit estimation results on the propensity to pay dividends for the two 
subsamples. We observe significant differences in the dividend response to the 2008 regulation 
between the two groups of firms. Throughout all three specifications, the coefficients on Regulate 
are positive and highly significant for firms with the tightest financial constraints, while none of 
them is significant for firms having no financial constraints. This result suggests that financially 
constrained firms become more likely to pay cash dividends after the regulation but the most 
unconstrained firms do not. For firms facing very high costs of external finance, the implementation 
of the regulation places them in a more disadvantaged position by restricting their future financing 
capacity. As a result, these firms are inclined to utilize dividend payments to increase their 
financing capacity. By contrast, for those firms with the least financial constraints, there is no 
incentive for them to pay dividends more frequently after the regulation, as they already possess 
relatively better access to external finance before the regulation. This finding corresponds to the 
evidence in Table 4.5 and provides further support for our hypothesis H2a. 
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[Insert Table 4.7 about here] 
4.6.3.2 The dividend payout ratio 
Table 4.8 compares how the dividend payout ratio responds to the regulation between the top and 
bottom subsamples classified by the extent of financial constraints. For the most financially 
constrained firms, the coefficients on Regulate are positive but insignificant in either Model 1 or 2, 
whereas the coefficients are negative and highly significant at the 1% level for the most 
unconstrained group. These findings reveal some interesting patterns. When the regulation dampens 
firms’ financing capacity, financially unconstrained firms reduce their dividend payouts 
significantly (likely for the sake of saving more cash to meet investment needs). In stark contrast, 
financially constrained firms do not exhibit the same behavior; they increase their dividend payouts 
(albeit not significantly). The decrease in financing capacity does not depress constrained firms’ 
demand for external funds because the opportunity costs of investments are relatively higher for 
constrained firms (Almeida and Campello (2010)). To maintain their financing capacity, 
constrained firms tend to increase (or reduce to a lesser extent) their dividend payout ratios. This 
confirms our results in Table 4.6 and provides direct evidence for our hypothesis H2b. 
[Insert Table 4.8 about here] 
4.7 Why do financially firms increase dividends? 
In the previous sections, we demonstrate that financially constrained firms (relatively) increase 
dividend payments after experiencing a shock to financing capacity. As Jensen (1986) and Stephens 
and Weisbach (1998) note, increasing dividends can increase leverage and reduce cash, and thus 
corporate liquidity. If dividend-increasing firms are financially constrained prior to the increase, 
diminished corporate liquidity can be harmful. Then, it is natural to ask why constrained firms 
increase their dividends. Do they increase dividends for financing purposes? In this section, we 
provide possible answers to these questions by examining firms’ propensity to finance in the post-
regulation period between the groups of financially constrained and unconstrained firms. 
We define a dummy variable, Finance, that equals one if the firm has conducted a public SEO 
or a rights issue in the current financial year and zero otherwise. Recall that the 2008 regulation 
establishes a minimum dividend level that firms must reach to secure eligibility for public financing. 
Only firms that have met this requirement can apply for public financing. To accommodate this 
financing qualification, for every firm year, we create a variable, Qualified, that takes a value of one 
if the firm’s accumulated cash dividends distributed over the past three years is more than 30% of 
the average realized annual distributable profits and zero otherwise. Hence, if the value of Qualified 
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is one for a specific firm year, then the firm is eligible for public financing (in terms of the dividend 
requirement) in this particular year. If constrained firms increase dividends precisely to enhance 
their financing capacity, they will seize the opportunity of obtaining financing once they use 
dividend increases to satisfy the financing qualification. Therefore, we should observe an increase 
in constrained firms’ likelihood of financing after the regulation. Constrained firms should also 
display a higher likelihood of financing than their unconstrained counterparts because the relatively 
high cost of external funds makes them more appreciative of the financing opportunity. In light of 
these arguments, we predict that financing activities in the post-regulation period will be 
concentrated in constrained firms that qualify for public financing (i.e., our hypothesis H3). To test 
this prediction, we estimate Logit regressions of Finance on Regulate, Qualified, Constraint and 
their interactions. The results are presented in Table 4.9.  
In Model 1, Regulate has a negative but insignificant coefficient, suggesting that the regulation 
per se has little or no effect on firms’ financing decisions. This is not unexpected, as the regulation 
does not restrict financing activities directly; rather, it imposes a restriction through the dividend 
requirement. The coefficient on Constraint is negative and highly significant at the 1% level. In 
keeping with evidence suggested in the previous literature, financially constrained firms are less 
likely to engage in public financing activities, partly because they face higher costs of external 
finance. Qualified is associated with a positive coefficient (significant at the 1% level), indicating 
that the probability of financing is higher among firms that qualify for public financing because 
they have a relative advantage in having their financing applications approved. 
In Model 2, we interact Regulate and Qualified with Constraint (i.e., 
Regulate*Qualified*Constraint) to capture the differential effect of the regulation on financing 
behavior between the financially constrained and unconstrained groups. The coefficient on the 
interaction term is positive and highly significant. This finding can be interpreted from two 
perspectives. First, financially constrained firms that also qualify for financing tend to be more 
likely to finance publicly in the secondary market after the regulation. Second, in the post-
regulation period, among all qualified firms, financially constrained firms are more inclined to 
finance than their unconstrained counterparts.  
To explicitly examine this cross-sectional difference, we add another interaction term, 
Regulate*Qualified, in Model 3 as a comparison to Model 2. As expected, Regulate*Qualified does 
not show a significant coefficient, while the triple interaction (Regulate*Qualified*Constraint) 
remains positive and significant. In other words, among those qualified firms, financially 
constrained firms are particularly likely to increase their propensity to finance in the post-regulation 
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period. This pattern confirms our hypothesis H3 that during the post-regulation period, financing 
activities are concentrated in constrained firms that are qualified. Our results also provide 
convincing evidence in favor of the view that the need to improve financing capacity could drive 
financially constrained firms to increase cash dividend payments. 
Model 4 is a more general model in the sense that we include a variable, Leverage, as an 
additional regressor. Our conclusions remain unchanged after controlling for the effect of debt-
financing capacity.53 According to the pecking order theory, debt financing is preferred to equity 
financing (Myers (1984)). Therefore, a higher debt-financing capacity will depress the demand for 
equity financing, leading to a lower propensity to finance in the equity market. Our results are 
consistent with this theoretical prediction, as the coefficient on Leverage is negative (albeit not 
significant). 
[Insert Table 4.9 about here] 
4.8 Robustness check 
To confirm that our results are not driven by the use of the synthetic WW financial constraints 
index, we re-estimate the main regressions of our empirical analyses using three firm characteristic 
variables suggested in prior studies as alternative measures of financial constraints. LogTA is the 
natural log of total assets; State is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s ultimate 
controlling shareholder is a state-owned-enterprise or a government agency and zero otherwise; and 
SG is the firm’s annual sales growth. The relationships between these three variables and financial 
constraints are well documented in the literature. For example, small firms are subject to greater 
financial constraints (see, Beck, et al. (2005)). State-owned listed firms are less likely to be 
financially constrained (see, Guo and Wei (2011)). Firms with lower individual sales growth tend to 
invest more, thereby making them more constrained (Whited and Wu (2006)). 
Table 4.10 presents the Logit estimation results on the effect of the three variables on firms’ 
propensity to pay cash dividends. Note that LogTA, State and SG are measured as firm-specific 
averages over the pre-regulation period for each sample firm, and hence that they are not included 
on their own in the presence of the firm fixed effects. As expected, our conclusions remain 
unaffected by the use of alternative measures of financial constraints. For instance, after the 2008 
regulation, firms with smaller size, non-state ownership and lower sales growth appear to be more 
willing to pay cash dividends. This corresponds to the finding in Table 4.5 that financially 
constrained firms display a higher propensity to pay than unconstrained firms in the post-regulation 
53 Recall that the financing activity we discuss in this section is restricted to equity financing. 
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period. These results hold even after we control for other potential explanatory variables (e.g., 
leverage, volatility and lagged dividend status).54 
[Insert Table 4.10 about here] 
Table 4.11 reports the Tobit estimation results on the effect of firm size, state ownership, and 
sales growth on firms’ cash dividend payout ratios. Again, our results are robust to different 
measures of financial constraints. During the post-regulation period, firms that are small, growing 
slowly, and non-state-owned tend to pay higher cash dividends than firms that are large, growing 
rapidly, and state-owned.55 This is aligned with the evidence presented in Table 4.6 that financially 
constrained firms, relative to their unconstrained counterparts, raise their dividend payout ratios 
after the regulation to recover their financing capacity. 
[Insert Table 4.11 about here] 
4.9 Conclusion 
The regulation released in 2008 mandatorily associates dividend payment with firms’ financing 
qualification, which essentially dampens firms’ public financing capacity. The exogenous nature of 
the regulation makes it a desirable setting for a quasi-natural experiment, whereby we are able to 
attenuate the potential endogeneity problem and cleanly identify the causal effect of financing 
capacity on dividend policy. In this context, we examine how this shock to financing capacity 
affects firms’ dividend decisions, with a focus on financially constrained firms.  
Our results show that the reduction in financing capacity (caused by the 2008 regulation) affects 
firms’ dividend policy. Firms are more likely to pay cash dividends after the regulation, but they 
pay less than they did before.  
Measuring financial constraints using a synthetic WW index, we observe that the relationship 
between financial constraints and dividend policy changes in response to the shock to financing 
capacity. Before the regulation, constrained firms are less willing to pay cash dividends and pay less 
than unconstrained firms. However, when the regulation reduces firms’ financing capacity, 
financially constrained firms become more likely to pay cash dividends than unconstrained firms 
and pay more.  
54 Note that when we include all three measures in a single model (i.e., Models 4 and 5), the coefficient on State remains 
negative but is no longer significant. This is reasonable, as LogTA and State are highly correlated (e.g., large firms are 
normally state owned). 
55 Similar to that in Table 4.10, when we include all three variables in Model 4, the coefficient on LogTA loses its 
significance (but the sign remains negative). Again, this could arise from the high correlation between LogTA and State. 
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We also find that financially constrained firms display a greater post-regulation increase in the 
propensity to pay cash dividends than unconstrained firms. Similarly, the post-regulation reduction 
in dividend payout ratios is less significant for constrained firms, relative to their unconstrained 
counterparts. These findings suggest that financially constrained firms behave differently from 
unconstrained firms when affected by this shock to their financing capacity. Our results are robust 
to alternative measures of financial constraints. 
We further examine why financially constrained firms behave differently and argue that the 
dividend-increasing behavior of constrained firms is driven by the need to obtain external financing. 
The evidence that financing activities in the post-regulation period are concentrated in qualified 
firms that are financially constrained confirms our conjecture.  
Our findings offer some policy implications for the dividend regulation system in China. Based 
on our results (e.g., firms increase dividends after the regulation), the 2008 dividend regulation, to 
some extent, achieves certain goals of the regulator, which include, for example, the promotion of 
cash dividend payments and the protection of minority shareholders’ interests. However, we should 
prudently evaluate the role of the dividend regulation in improving capital market efficiency. First, 
as we document, firms categorized as financially constrained are typically small firms in high-
growth industries but with low individual sales growth. These firms have greater demand for funds 
but face relatively greater difficulties in obtaining external financing. The regulation, however, 
applies the same dividend criterion to constrained firms regardless of their inherent financing 
disadvantage. This may harm the sustainable development of these firms, as their financing capacity 
is further damaged by the regulation. Second, the mandatory association of dividend payments with 
public financing qualification is widely criticized by practitioners. They argue that the compulsory 
association could lead to a potential “adverse selection” problem. Some of the firms that face a 
considerable need for funds may be unable to finance in the secondary market because their cash 
flow shortage results in a failure to satisfy the dividend requirement for seeking public financing. 
Instead, other firms with sufficient cash flows may exploit the financing qualification to achieve the 
goal of misappropriation. Their common practice is to meet the requirement first (through paying a 
limited but qualified amount of dividends) and then conduct huge financing programs, such as 
SEOs or rights issues. In this way, large amounts of funds flow to these firms with relatively little or 
no need for external funds, which represents an inefficient allocation of resources in the capital 
market. Finally, as shown by our results, the increase in dividends is concentrated in financially 
constrained firms. This suggests that while the regulation is influential for firms experiencing 
difficulty in accessing external financing, there is little effect on firms with either better access to 
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external financing or a relatively limited demand for funds. Therefore, the regulation has limited 
ability to facilitate the establishment of a stable dividend policy in Chinese listed firms. 
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Table 4.1    Variable Definitions 
The table provides definitions for all the variables that are either investigated or used as controls in our tests. 
Variable Definition 
CDPayer Indicator variable that equals one if the firm pays a cash dividend in the current financial 
year and zero otherwise 
Payout Cash dividends divided by EBIT 
Regulate Indicator variable that equals one if the current financial year is after the 2008 dividend 
regulation has been released and zero otherwise 
Constraint Indicator variable that takes a value of one if the firm’s WW index is in the top 3 deciles 
and zero otherwise 
Finance Indicator variable that equals one if the firm has conducted a public seasoned equity 
offering (SEO) or a rights issue in the current financial year and zero otherwise 
Qualified Indicator variable that takes a value of one if the firm’s accumulative cash dividends 
distributed over the past three years is more than 30% of the average realized annual 
distributable profits and zero otherwise 
State Indicator variable that equals to one if the firm’s ultimate controlling shareholder is a state-
owned-enterprise or a government agency and zero otherwise 
SOE Indicator variable that equals to one if the firm’s ultimate controlling shareholder is a state-
owned-enterprise and zero otherwise 
LTD Ratio of long-term debt to total assets 
SG Annual sales growth rate 
LogTA Natural logarithm of total assets 
ISG Industry sales growth rate 
Cash Ratio of cash, marketable securities and short-term investments to total assets 
CF Ratio of cash flow to total assets 
NA Number of analysts following the firm 
IDAR Industry debt to assets ratio 
Leverage Ratio of total liabilities to total assets 
Volatility Standard deviation of the return on assets (ROA) over the most recent four years including 
the current financial year 
Lag1CDPayer Indicator variable that equals to one if the firm paid cash dividends in the prior year and 
zero otherwise 
MKT Return on the market 
SMB Return on an arbitrage portfolio that is long small firms and short large firms 
HML Return on an arbitrage portfolio that is long firms with high book to market ratios and short 
firms with low book to market ratios 
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Table 4.2    Euler Equation Estimates 
The table reports the estimation results of Euler equation. Calculations are based on a sample of all non-financial listed 
firms in the Chinese stock market during the period of 2003-2009. The Euler equation is given by equation (10) of 
Whited and Wu (2006). The nonlinear GMM estimation is carried out with the model in first differences with twice 
lagged instruments. αi is the investment adjustment cost parameter, and μ is a mark-up. LTD is the ratio of the long-term 
debt to total assets; SOE is an indicator variable that equals to one if the firm’s ultimate controlling shareholder is a 
state-owned-enterprise and zero otherwise; SG is the firm’s annual sales growth; LogTA is the natural log of total assets; 
ISG is the firm’s industry sales growth; Cash is the ratio of cash, marketable securities and short-term investments to 
total assets; CF is the ratio of cash flows to total assets; NA is the number of analysts following the firm; and IDAR is 
the firm’s industry debt-to-assets ratio. MKT, SMB and HML are the Fama-French factors on market, size and book-to-
market. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The value of the J statistic and the P-value of the J-test on the model 
specification are reported in the last two rows. 
Parameter Expected sign (1) (2) 
LTD + -0.0401 -0.0352 
  (-0.0002) (-0.1777) 
SOE - -0.1679 -0.1477 
  (-0.0002) (-0.5905) 
SG - -0.0744 -0.0654 
  (-0.0002) (-1.1159) 
LogTA - -0.0578 -0.0508*** 
  (-0.0002) (-13.8686) 
ISG + 0.0204 0.0180 
  (0.0002) (0.6016) 
Cash - -0.1464 -0.1287 
  (-0.0002) (-0.5530) 
CF - -0.0087 -0.0076 
  (-0.0002) (-0.1236) 
NA - 0.0022 0.0020 
  (0.0002) (0.2458) 
IDAR - -0.4151 -0.3651 
  (-0.0002) (-0.7807) 
Constant  0.1372  
  (0.0000)  
µ  1.2301*** 1.2301*** 
  (20.8437) (22.2357) 
α0  -0.3940 -0.3940 
  (-0.3708) (-0.4447) 
α2  0.4983* 0.4983* 
  (1.7302) (1.8608) 
α3  0.0117 0.0117 
  (1.4603) (1.5188) 
l0  0.8675*** 0.8675*** 
  (6.9429) (8.1986) 
MKT  -0.0610 -0.0610 
  (-0.4322) (-0.5335) 
SMB  0.0406 0.0406 
  (0.1705) (0.1707) 
HML  1.7559 1.7559 
  (1.1048) (1.1580) 
    
Observations  5,272 5,272 
J statistic  1.3179 1.3179 
P-value  0.9707 0.9706 
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Table 4.3    Summary Statistics 
The table reports summary statistics of key variables. All the variables are defined as in Table 1. The full sample consists of 8,758 firm-year observations during the period of 2003-
2012, representing 941 non-financial listed firms in the Chinese stock market. For every year of data, we sort all the firms in the sample into deciles based on the values of their WW 
indices, where decile 1 represents the lowest values and decile 10 the highest. We then assign firms to groups based on the WW decile for the financial year before the announcement 
of the regulation (i.e., 2008). Firms in the top 3 WW index deciles are classified as financially constrained; firms in other deciles as financially unconstrained. 
Variable 
Full sample Financially constrained Financially unconstrained 
N Mean SD Min Max N Mean SD Min Max N Mean SD Min Max 
CDPayer 8,752 0.654 0.476 0.000 1.000 2,549 0.535 0.499 0.000 1.000 6,203 0.703 0.457 0.000 1.000 
Payout 8,740 0.169 0.196 0.000 1.053 2,548 0.154 0.211 0.000 1.053 6,192 0.175 0.189 0.000 1.053 
Regulate 8,758 0.531 0.499 0.000 1.000 2,549 0.545 0.498 0.000 1.000 6,209 0.526 0.499 0.000 1.000 
State 8,758 0.703 0.457 0.000 1.000 2,549 0.595 0.491 0.000 1.000 6,209 0.748 0.434 0.000 1.000 
SOE 8,758 0.105 0.306 0.000 1.000 2,549 0.055 0.229 0.000 1.000 6,209 0.125 0.331 0.000 1.000 
LTD 8,758 0.081 0.107 0.000 0.717 2,549 0.053 0.080 0.000 0.513 6,209 0.093 0.114 0.000 0.717 
SG 8,758 0.190 0.307 -0.978 2.112 2,549 0.153 0.293 -0.736 2.100 6,209 0.205 0.311 -0.978 2.112 
LogTA 8,758 21.837 1.148 19.178 27.852 2,549 20.963 0.670 19.178 24.336 6,209 22.196 1.110 19.477 27.852 
ISG 8,758 0.311 0.271 0.011 2.913 2,549 0.315 0.299 0.011 2.913 6,209 0.310 0.259 0.011 2.913 
Cash 8,758 0.168 0.114 0.000 0.931 2,549 0.168 0.114 0.000 0.931 6,209 0.168 0.114 0.002 0.795 
CF 8,758 0.057 0.080 -0.565 0.563 2,549 0.050 0.077 -0.500 0.563 6,209 0.060 0.081 -0.565 0.430 
NA 8,758 7.106 10.454 0.000 89.000 2,549 4.083 7.120 0.000 43.000 6,209 8.347 11.316 0.000 89.000 
IDAR 8,758 0.129 0.031 0.033 0.180 2,549 0.124 0.035 0.033 0.180 6,209 0.132 0.028 0.033 0.180 
Leverage 8,758 0.486 0.177 0.007 0.936 2,549 0.442 0.170 0.007 0.936 6,209 0.504 0.177 0.008 0.919 
Volatility 8,758 0.026 0.027 0.000 0.262 2,549 0.029 0.031 0.000 0.262 6,209 0.025 0.024 0.000 0.234 
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Table 4.4    Changes in Dividend Policy after the 2008 Regulation 
This table reports the changes in firms’ dividend policy after the 2008 regulation and compares the changes between 
financially constrained and unconstrained firms. Panel A shows the results on the propensity to pay cash dividends and 
panel B on the payout ratio. We assign sample firms to groups based on the WW decile for the financial year before the 
2008 regulation. Financially constrained firms are firms in the top 3 deciles of the WW index. Financially unconstrained 
firms are firms in other deciles. CDPayer is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm pays a cash dividend in the 
current financial year. Payout is defined as cash dividends divided by EBIT. The changes in CDPayer and Payout are 
calculated on a basis of “after” minus “before” and the difference in changes is calculated on a basis of “constrained” 
minus “unconstrained”. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
Variable Financially constrained  Financially unconstrained  
Constrained -
Unconstrained 
Before After  Before After  Difference in Change 
Panel A: The propensity to pay cash dividends 
CDPayer 0.469*** 0.589***  0.685*** 0.719***   
 (32.00) (44.63)  (80.01) (91.42)   
Change  0.120***   0.034***  0.086*** 
(After-Before)  (6.08)   (2.85)  (3.89) 
        
Observations 1,159 1,390  2,940 3,263   
        
Panel B: The cash dividend payout ratio 
Payout 0.168*** 0.143***  0.200*** 0.152***   
 (24.12) (28.58)  (51.89) (51.74)   
Change  -0.025***   -0.045***  0.020** 
(After-Before)  (-3.00)   (-9.11)  (2.17) 
        
Observations 1,159 1,389  2,940 3,252   
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Table 4.5    Effect of Financial Constraints and a Financing Shock: Propensity to Pay Cash Dividends  
The table reports Logit estimation results on the effect of financial constraints on firms’ propensity to pay a cash 
dividend. The sample consists of 8,758 firm-year observations during the period of 2003-2012, representing 941 non-
financial listed firms in the Chinese stock market. The dependent variable is CDPayer, which is an indicator variable 
that equals one if the firm pays a cash dividend in the current financial year. Regulate is a dummy variable that takes a 
value of one if the current financial year is after the 2008 dividend regulation and zero otherwise; Constraint is an 
indicator variable that takes a value of one if the firm’s WW index is in the top 3 deciles and zero otherwise (Constraint 
is not included on its own in the presence of the firm fixed effects, as it is firm-specifically measured based on the WW 
decile for the financial year before the 2008 regulation); Regulate*Constraint is the interaction between Regulate and 
Constraint. See Table 1 for definitions of all other variables. Z-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Independent variable Dependent variable: The propensity to pay cash dividends (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Regulate 0.267*** 0.162*** 0.260*** 0.298*** 0.194*** 0.335*** 
 (5.84) (2.92) (3.73) (5.12) (2.75) (4.12) 
Constraint -0.732*** -0.901*** -0.781***    
 (-15.05) (-12.69) (-8.01)    
Regulate*Constraint  0.321*** 0.331***  0.330*** 0.347** 
  (3.29) (2.65)  (2.62) (2.40) 
Leverage   -1.803***   -4.173*** 
   (-10.57)   (-10.25) 
Volatility   -9.954***   -8.851*** 
   (-8.94)   (-5.07) 
Lag1CDPayer   2.170***   0.257*** 
   (38.17)   (3.64) 
Constant 0.726*** 0.779*** 0.579***    
 (20.17) (19.60) (5.06)    
       
Firm fixed effect NO NO NO YES YES YES 
       
Observations 8,752 8,752 7,762 6,075 6,075 5,041 
Likelihood Ratio (chi2) 255.9 266.8 2,267 26.30 33.21 185 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 4.6    Effect of Financial Constraints and a Financing Shock: Dividend Payout Ratio 
The table reports Tobit estimation results on the effect of financial constraints on firms’ cash dividend payout ratios. 
The sample consists of 8,758 firm-year observations during the period of 2003-2012, representing 941 non-financial 
listed firms in the Chinese stock market. The dependent variable is Payout, defined as cash dividends divided by EBIT. 
Regulate is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the current financial year is after the 2008 dividend regulation 
and zero otherwise; Constraint is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the firm’s WW index is in the top 3 
deciles and zero otherwise (Constraint is firm-specifically measured based on the WW decile for the financial year 
before the 2008 regulation); Regulate*Constraint is the interaction between Regulate and Constraint. See Table 1 for 
definitions of all other variables. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
Independent variable Dependent variable: Cash dividend payout ratio (1) (2) (3) 
    
Regulate -0.032*** -0.043*** -0.020*** 
 (-5.17) (-5.94) (-2.94) 
Constraint -0.058*** -0.080*** -0.057*** 
 (-8.33) (-7.77) (-5.46) 
Regulate*Constraint  0.041*** 0.026** 
  (2.94) (1.99) 
Leverage   -0.415*** 
   (-24.66) 
Volatility   -1.153*** 
   (-9.59) 
Lag1CDPayer   0.215*** 
   (32.72) 
Constant 0.138*** 0.144*** 0.215*** 
 (27.88) (27.00) (17.91) 
    
Observations 8,740 8,740 7,750 
Likelihood Ratio (chi2) 98.54 107.2 2,070 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 4.7    Effect of Financial Constraints and a Financing Shock: Subsample Analysis on the Propensity to Pay 
Cash Dividends 
The table reports Logit estimation results on the effect of financial constraints on firms’ propensity to pay a cash 
dividend for two subsamples. We assign sample firms to groups based on the WW decile for the financial year before 
the 2008 regulation. Firms are classified as the most financially constrained if they are in the top 3 WW index deciles. 
The most unconstrained firms are firms in the lowest 3 deciles. The dependent variable is CDPayer, which is an 
indicator variable that equals one if the firm pays a cash dividend in the current financial year. Regulate is a dummy 
variable that takes a value of one if the current financial year is after the 2008 dividend regulation and zero otherwise. 
See Table 1 for definitions of all other variables. Z-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Independent variable 
Dependent variable: The propensity to pay cash dividends 
Most financially constrained  Most financially unconstrained 
(1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
        
Regulate 0.483*** 0.589*** 0.719***  0.043 0.087 0.145 
 (6.02) (5.74) (5.77)  (0.46) (0.74) (1.08) 
Leverage  -1.658*** -5.301***   -1.927*** -4.667*** 
  (-5.49) (-7.28)   (-5.78) (-5.84) 
Volatility  -12.335*** -10.064***   -8.109*** -4.261 
  (-6.34) (-3.56)   (-3.54) (-1.25) 
Lag1CDPayer  2.009*** 0.040   2.247*** 0.436*** 
  (20.11) (0.31)   (19.40) (3.16) 
Constant -0.123** -0.124   1.218*** 0.929***  
 (-2.08) (-0.70)   (18.06) (4.14)  
        
Firm fixed effect NO NO YES  NO NO YES 
        
Observations 2,549 2,247 1,580  2,642 2,345 1,338 
Likelihood Ratio (chi2) 36.54 666 97.45  0.208 477.4 52.08 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.648 0.000 0.000 
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Table 4.8    Effect of Financial Constraints and a Financing Shock: Subsample Analysis on the Dividend Payout 
Ratio  
The table reports Tobit estimation results on the effect of financial constraints on firms’ cash dividend payout ratios for 
two subsamples. We assign sample firms to groups based on the WW decile for the financial year before the 2008 
regulation. Firms are classified as the most financially constrained if they are in the top 3 WW index deciles. The most 
unconstrained firms are firms in the lowest 3 deciles. The dependent variable is Payout, defined as cash dividends 
divided by EBIT. Regulate is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the current financial year is after the 2008 
dividend regulation and zero otherwise. See Table 1 for definitions of all other variables. T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Independent variable 
Dependent variable: Cash dividend payout ratio 
Most financially constrained  Most financially unconstrained 
(1) (2)  (1) (2) 
      
Regulate 0.007 0.017  -0.061*** -0.041*** 
 (0.47) (1.17)  (-6.84) (-4.82) 
Leverage  -0.460***   -0.392*** 
  (-10.92)   (-16.67) 
Volatility  -1.879***   -0.768*** 
  (-6.74)   (-4.10) 
Lag1CDPayer  0.257***   0.174*** 
  (17.06)   (16.15) 
Constant 0.027** 0.138***  0.187*** 0.261*** 
 (2.25) (5.31)  (28.96) (14.92) 
      
Observations 2,548 2,246  2,637 2,340 
Likelihood Ratio (chi2) 0.220 567.2  46.22 604.8 
Prob > chi2 0.639 0.000  0.000 0.000 
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Table 4.9    Effect of Financial Constraints on the Propensity to Finance 
The table reports Logit estimation results on the effect of financial constraints on firms’ propensity to finance publicly. 
The sample consists of 8,758 firm-year observations during the period of 2003-2012, representing 941 non-financial 
listed firms in the Chinese stock market. The dependent variable is Finance, which is an indicator variable that equals 
one if the firm has conducted a public seasoned equity offering (SEO) or a rights issue in the current financial year and 
zero otherwise. Regulate is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the current financial year is after the 2008 
dividend regulation and zero otherwise; Constraint is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the firm’s WW 
index is in the top 3 deciles and zero otherwise (Constraint is firm-specifically measured based on the WW decile for 
the financial year before the 2008 regulation); Qualified is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the firm’s 
accumulated cash dividends distributed over the past three years is more than 30% of the average realized annual 
distributable profits and zero otherwise; Regulate*Qualified is the interaction between Regulate and Qualified; 
Regulate*Qualified*Constraint is the interaction among Regulate, Qualified and Constraint. See Table 1 for definitions 
of all other variables. Z-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
Independent variable Dependent variable: The propensity to finance publicly (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Regulate -0.135 -0.269* -0.329 -0.332 
 (-0.92) (-1.68) (-0.47) (-0.48) 
Constraint -0.827*** -1.298*** -1.297*** -1.320*** 
 (-4.02) (-4.06) (-4.06) (-4.12) 
Qualified 1.456*** 1.327*** 1.283** 1.254** 
 (4.42) (3.98) (2.18) (2.13) 
Regulate*Qualified   0.063 0.078 
   (0.09) (0.11) 
Regulate*Qualified*Constraint  0.954** 0.951** 0.945** 
  (2.27) (2.25) (2.24) 
Leverage    -0.399 
    (-0.96) 
Constant -4.832*** -4.650*** -4.608*** -4.389*** 
 (-14.29) (-13.55) (-7.91) (-7.03) 
     
Observations 8,758 8,758 8,758 8,758 
Likelihood Ratio (chi2) 57.89 63.17 63.18 64.10 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 4.10    Robustness Check: Propensity to Pay Cash Dividends  
The table reports the Logit estimation results on the effect of firm size, ownership nature, and sales growth, which are 
alternative measures of financial constraints, on firms’ propensity to pay cash dividends. The sample consists of 8,758 
firm-year observations during the period of 2003-2012, representing 941 non-financial listed firms in the Chinese stock 
market. The dependent variable is CDPayer, which is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm pays a cash 
dividend in the current financial year. Regulate is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the current financial 
year is after the 2008 dividend regulation and zero otherwise; LogTA is the natural log of total assets; State is an 
indicator variable that equals to one if the firm’s ultimate controlling shareholder is a state-owned-enterprise or a 
government agency and zero otherwise; SG is the firm’s annual sales growth; LogTA, State and SG are measured as 
firm-specific averages over the pre-regulation years for each sample firm (for this reason, they are not included on their 
own in the presence of the firm fixed effects); Regulate*LogTA is the interaction between Regulate and LogTA; 
Regulate*State is the interaction between Regulate and State; Regulate*SG is the interaction between Regulate and SG. 
See Table 1 for definitions of all other variables. Z-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Independent variable Dependent variable: The propensity to pay cash dividends (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Regulate 6.228*** 0.521*** 0.693*** 5.441*** 6.465*** 
 (4.31) (5.01) (6.90) (3.67) (3.84) 
LogTA 0.570***   0.525***  
 (10.20)   (9.07)  
Regulate*LogTA -0.273***   -0.214*** -0.256*** 
 (-4.05)   (-3.05) (-3.19) 
State  0.238**  0.114  
  (2.50)  (1.13)  
Regulate*State  -0.262**  -0.212 -0.236 
  (-2.11)  (-1.63) (-1.56) 
SG   2.878*** 2.722***  
   (9.61) (8.91)  
Regulate*SG   -1.605*** -1.489*** -1.699*** 
   (-4.33) (-3.95) (-3.75) 
Leverage -2.241*** -1.501*** -1.884*** -2.575*** -4.101*** 
 (-12.42) (-9.04) (-11.06) (-13.88) (-10.02) 
Volatility -10.399*** -9.909*** -10.328*** -10.990*** -8.988*** 
 (-9.26) (-9.08) (-9.19) (-9.49) (-5.11) 
Lag1CDPayer 2.122*** 2.240*** 2.159*** 2.046*** 0.247*** 
 (37.11) (39.80) (37.82) (35.32) (3.47) 
Constant -11.624*** -0.002 -0.235** -11.135***  
 (-9.87) (-0.02) (-1.98) (-9.22)  
      
Firm fixed effect NO NO NO NO YES 
      
Observations 7,762 7,762 7,762 7,762 5,041 
Likelihood Ratio (chi2) 2,329 2,180 2,304 2,446 213.9 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 4.11    Robustness Check: Dividend Payout Ratio  
The table reports the Tobit estimation results on the effect of firm size, ownership nature, and sales growth, which are 
alternative measures of financial constraints, on firms’ cash dividend payout ratios. The sample consists of 8,758 firm-
year observations during the period of 2003-2012, representing 941 non-financial listed firms in the Chinese stock 
market. The dependent variable is Payout, defined as cash dividends divided by EBIT. Regulate is a dummy variable 
that takes a value of one if the current financial year is after the 2008 dividend regulation and zero otherwise; LogTA is 
the natural log of total assets; State is an indicator variable that equals to one if the firm’s ultimate controlling 
shareholder is a state-owned-enterprise or a government agency and zero otherwise; SG is the firm’s annual sales 
growth; LogTA, State and SG are measured as firm-specific averages over the pre-regulation years for each sample firm; 
Regulate*LogTA is the interaction between Regulate and LogTA; Regulate*State is the interaction between Regulate 
and State; Regulate*SG is the interaction between Regulate and SG. See Table 1 for definitions of all other variables. T-
statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Independent variable Dependent variable: Cash dividend payout ratio (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Regulate 0.389*** 0.026** 0.007 0.267** 
 (3.03) (2.41) (0.71) (2.04) 
LogTA 0.039***   0.033*** 
 (7.98)   (6.53) 
Regulate*LogTA -0.019***   -0.010 
 (-3.13)   (-1.64) 
State  0.045***  0.033*** 
  (4.44)  (3.19) 
Regulate*State  -0.057***  -0.054*** 
  (-4.47)  (-4.10) 
SG   0.145*** 0.130*** 
   (5.12) (4.57) 
Regulate*SG   -0.092*** -0.088** 
   (-2.71) (-2.55) 
Leverage -0.445*** -0.394*** -0.416*** -0.457*** 
 (-25.41) (-23.76) (-24.57) (-25.65) 
Volatility -1.191*** -1.158*** -1.180*** -1.245*** 
 (-9.92) (-9.68) (-9.80) (-10.28) 
Lag1CDPayer 0.209*** 0.221*** 0.217*** 0.204*** 
 (31.73) (34.12) (32.91) (30.70) 
Constant -0.611*** 0.154*** 0.166*** -0.526*** 
 (-5.96) (11.56) (13.42) (-5.07) 
     
Observations 7,750 7,750 7,750 7,750 
Likelihood Ratio (chi2) 2,112 2,050 2,059 2,153 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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 Conclusion Chapter 5
The effects of dividend policies are puzzling. The famous Modigliani-Miller theorem states that in 
an efficient market, corporate policy (such as a dividend decision) has no effect on firm value 
unless it changes the firm’s total cash flows or expected returns. Therefore, pure accounting 
changes, such as stock dividends, should have no significant effect on stock prices because 
shareholders do not actually receive any real cash returns. However, empirical research shows that 
stock prices react significantly when firms make stock dividend announcements (Grinblatt, et al. 
(1984)). 
Chapter two examines the announcement effects of dividends in the Chinese capital market 
during the period 1993-2006, with an emphasis on stock dividends. We separately investigate the 
cumulative abnormal returns around the announcements of cash, stock and combined dividends. 
Because earnings are announced concurrently with dividend decisions in China, and therefore 
estimates of abnormal returns could be confounded by the earnings effect, we then attempt to 
examine the dividend announcement effect under different earnings signals. We find a strong 
announcement effect of stock dividends even after controlling for concurrent earnings surprises. In 
contrast, pure cash dividend stocks experience no significant price run-up around the 
announcements. These patterns suggest a preference for stock dividends but a dislike for cash 
dividends among Chinese investors. 
The findings in Chapter two are in contrast to what has been previously documented in more 
mature markets. A possible explanation for the dislike of cash dividends is that cash distributions 
may be interpreted as negative signals for firms, for example, a signal of weak governance. To 
confirm our conjecture, we further investigate the factors that could affect the cash dividend policy 
of Chinese listed firms in the next two chapters. 
In Chapter three, we examine the effect of corporate governance and stock liquidity on 
corporate payout policy in the context of the split-share structure reform implemented in China in 
2005. The split-share reform mandates the conversion of non-tradable shares into tradable shares. 
The mandatory and exogenous nature of the reform makes it a quasi-natural experiment and 
provides an ideal setting for our research design. The split-share structure reform facilitated an 
improved alignment of the interests of controlling shareholders with those of outside investors, 
leading to an improvement in corporate governance. Meanwhile, the reform removed a substantial 
trading constraint and generated a close relationship between stock liquidity and controlling 
shareholders’ interests.  
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We investigate the implications of the share-reform-induced governance and liquidity 
improvements for corporate dividend policy in Chapter three. We find that, on average, cash 
dividends decrease significantly after the reform. The reduction in payouts is more pronounced for 
firms with higher growth rates and liquidity. Given the fundamental difference in controlling 
shareholders between state-controlled and privately controlled firms, the reduction in cash payouts 
appears to be larger in state-controlled firms. Our results are robust to different time horizons 
surrounding the reform. 
We also investigate whether the reform affects firms’ decisions to pay cash dividends in 
Chapter three. The result indicates that the propensity to pay cash dividends significantly decreases 
after the reform and the probability of initiating a cash dividend also decreases. Instead, firms are 
more likely to omit a cash dividend in the post-reform period. When firms choose to maintain their 
dividend payments after the reform, their payments tend to be lower.  
Our findings from Chapter three provide evidence that the removal of the split-share structure 
leads to improvements in both corporate governance and stock liquidity. Moreover, we show that 
changes in corporate governance arrangements and stock liquidity have considerable effects on 
firms’ dividend policy. 
Another strand of research establishes a link between financing capacity and dividend policy. 
The underlying argument is that dividend payments could reduce potential information asymmetry 
and thus mitigate financing costs, especially in countries with weak legal protections for minority 
shareholders. 
Chapter four investigates how a shock to financing capacity affects listed firms’ dividend 
decisions in China. In 2008, the CSRC released a regulation on financing qualification, in which 
financing eligibility is associated with a certain amount of dividend payments. The regulation 
essentially dampens firms’ financing capacity but without having a universal impact on dividend 
policy per se because it is applicable only if the firm is seeking public financing. In this regard, the 
regulation represents an exogenous shock to firms’ financing capacity, and by exploiting this shock 
we are able to clearly identify the causal effect of financing capacity on dividend policy.  
In particular, our sample firms are categorized into financially constrained and unconstrained 
groups using a synthetic Whited-Wu financial constraints index. We emphasize financially 
constrained firms because the relatively high costs of external financing force these firms to 
attribute greater importance to financing eligibility. Consequently, the impact of the regulation is 
expected to be more pronounced among financially constrained firms. 
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Consistent with our expectation, we observe that when affected by a shock to financing 
capacity (i.e., the 2008 regulation), financially constrained firms behave differently from they did 
before the regulation. Before the regulation, constrained firms, on average, appear to have a lower 
desire to pay cash dividends than unconstrained firms; when they do pay, they tend to pay lower 
dividends. The shock to financing capacity, however, changes this pattern. Financially constrained 
firms now become more willing to pay cash dividends than unconstrained firms and pay higher 
dividends in relative terms. Furthermore, although after the regulation, both financially constrained 
and unconstrained firms exhibit a greater propensity to pay cash dividends than before, the increase 
in this likelihood is much more significant in constrained firms than that in unconstrained firms. 
Constrained firms also display a smaller post-regulation reduction in cash dividend payout ratios, 
relative to unconstrained firms. 
More important, we provide a possible answer to the question of why financially constrained 
firms increase dividends in Chapter four. We demonstrate that the need to improve financing 
capacity is a potential motivation for such behavior by showing that financially constrained firms 
significantly increase their propensity to publicly finance in the post-regulation period when they 
utilize dividends to obtain financing eligibility. 
Our findings in Chapter four shed some light on the dividend regulation system in China. Our 
evidence suggests that the 2008 dividend regulation, to some extent, achieves the regulator’s goals, 
which include, for example, the promotion of cash dividend payments and the protection of 
shareholders’ interests. However, the compulsory association of dividend payments with public 
financing qualification may also entail problems. For example, it may harm the sustainable 
development of financially constrained firms, as their financing capacity is further damaged. This 
association could also lead to a potential “adverse selection” problem because external capital may 
flow to firms that possess sufficient cash flows but have little or no need for funds. The dividend 
requirement of the financing regulation thus provides such firms with a legal pathway to 
misappropriation. The phenomenon of huge financing programs following limited dividend 
payments observed in the Chinese capital market may be a manifestation of such misappropriation. 
Moreover, our results suggest that the increase in dividends is concentrated in financially 
constrained firms, rather than unconstrained firms. Therefore, the regulation has limited ability to 
facilitate the establishment of a stable dividend policy in Chinese listed firms.  
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